Evidence of meeting #36 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was threat.
A recording is available from Parliament.
12:25 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
Thank you.
In your opinion, sir, how can the federal government work better with northern and indigenous communities to advance Arctic security specifically?
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
Thank you.
There are a series of existing mechanisms. For example, the differentiated Inuit Nunangat space and the opportunities associated with the Inuit-Crown partnership committee over the last number of years are a really opportune space for working on collaboration and alignment of priorities and co-development of implementation efforts between Inuit leadership and the federal government. Otherwise, I think there are mechanisms for information sharing and knowledge sharing through constellations like the Arctic security working group, as well as established territorial mechanisms and indigenous governments.
I think the key here is recognizing that this requires doing things differently and not just bringing in northern partners to inform them about what's already been decided upon. We have to truly ensure that these northern partners are empowered with information proactively so that they can sit down and we can actually figure out where those alignments are of interest.
12:25 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
What are the areas of security policy where indigenous knowledge would be particularly useful?
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
One of the reasons I articulated the “through, to and in” concept is that everything relating to threats in the Arctic, in my mind, should be led, wherever possible, by northern rights holders and northern stakeholders. When we're talking about threats to the Arctic at those tables, there must be northern representation in the spirit of “nothing about us without us”. When we're looking at some of those threats in the Arctic, those are tables where northern rights holders should have seats if they wish to avail themselves of them. Otherwise, these might be conversations in areas of expertise where they're willing to look to the Government of Canada to cover that space on behalf of northerners and all Canadians.
In essence, I think it's really important to have this clarity on what we're talking about to help ensure that northerners can choose which spaces, which tables, they choose to be at.
12:30 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
That's not a ton of time. I will just say thank you to both of our witnesses here.
Mr. Lackenbauer, do you have any other final thoughts on the issue of the Arctic Council?
12:30 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
As much as there's pressure to act on this right now, we're still dealing with such a state of uncertainty that I think we're wise to have adopted the posture that we have of re-engaging and reinvigorating certain projects under the auspices of the Arctic Council that do not involve Russia and in essence preserving the integrity of this high-level forum until such a time as there may be opportunity to re-engage and build it forward into what the Arctic Council should be.
12:30 p.m.
Bloc
12:30 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Christine Normandin
Now it's my turn to take the floor for six minutes.
I'd like to go back to Mr. Kelly's questions and also look at the kind of co‑operation that there may be between Russia and China with respect to the Arctic and, from their perspective, the constraints that come with that collaboration.
I'd like to hear what both of you have to say about the pros and cons of China and Russia's view of co‑operation in the Arctic, and the fact that China might stop accepting the status quo on the Arctic situation and challenge it.
I'll ask you to start, Mr. Byers.
12:30 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
I'll respond in English because it's my better language.
China and Russia are not friends. They are allies of convenience. At the moment, China is purchasing vast amounts of Russian resources at bargain basement prices and then selling them onward for enormous profits. It's selling oil and gas to the European Union at very significant profit for China, so it's taking advantage of the situation.
They are not friends in the way that Canada and the United States are friends, and one could foresee in future a Chinese invasion of the Russian far east to seize territory and gain resources. I don't see that relationship becoming much closer in terms of trust or in terms of integrating their militaries. However, obviously, Russia is the weaker power, and China is rapidly becoming more powerful, so we do need to watch this.
We also need to watch India, which is providing far too much support to Russia, and let me just say this: Turkey has surprised me by sticking to its NATO alliance commitments, so good for Turkey. However, it's very mobile.
In terms of China in the Arctic, China's principal interests in the Arctic in the last decade have been access to shipping and access to resources. In terms of resources, until recently it was very welcome in the Arctic states in terms of foreign investment and in terms of trade.
I come from Vancouver. If you look at Vancouver harbour, you see that it's full of ships carrying Canadian resources to China. This is not something that's changed radically in the last few years. In terms of shipping routes—and most people don't know this—China does not oppose Canada's legal position in the Northwest Passage. It's been very clear to Chinese shippers that it expects Chinese shipping companies to follow Canadian rules.
Is it a global threat in terms of its increasing power and the centralization of authority in President Xi Jinping? Absolutely. That's a major concern. Is it a threat to the Canadian Arctic? It's not an imminent one. However, I mentioned harassment earlier—not an invasion, but harassment. Russia and potentially China could begin to cause problems. The Russians have been messing around with subsea cables in the Norwegian Arctic, for instance, and flying drones near oil platforms. We could see low-level harassment in the Canadian Arctic, so we do need to step up our surveillance capabilities. We do need to support the Canadian Rangers on the missions that they do outside of communities. We need to keep our eyes on what's happening, but we don't need a massive military buildup in anticipation of an invasion. That would be a diversion of resources away from the real theatre, which is the European theatre right now.
12:30 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Christine Normandin
Thank you, Mr. Byers.
Dr. Lackenbauer, I'd also like to hear your thoughts on the same question.
12:35 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
Yes, Madam Chair, I definitely concur with most of the points.
I think we want to parse Chinese interest in the Russian shipping and resource sectors as yielding somewhat different outcomes. We have seen Chinese investment in the liquefied natural gas sector, particularly in the Yamal Peninsula with the Yamal-2 project, which is the one example of Chinese investment in the Arctic on a grand scale.
What's also telling is that despite all of the win-win rhetoric and enthusiasm from Beijing towards Moscow's development aspirations for the northern sea route, the actual money invested in building up infrastructure along that route or building up the transportation arteries to connect the northern sea route to Eurasian markets is actually very modest. I think this speaks to the fact that this is largely a transactional relationship to date.
As Canadians, we also need to remember that as much as we have the Arctic as part of our identity, as Professor Roussel said a few moments ago, so does Russia. They're very proud, so the notion that somehow China would be treated as an equal within the Russian Arctic I think is something very unpalatable to the Russian psyche.
In some respects, I'm also concerned that we need to be careful. China does represent risks in our Arctic and elsewhere in particular sectors—influence through economic activities and concerns about science and research security—but we have to be careful not to elevate them to the status of a peer competitor in the Arctic itself. They are not an Arctic state. They have none of the sovereignty or rights associated with being an Arctic state. It's really important that we don't elevate them up to a stature within this discussion that quite frankly they don't deserve and they don't warrant, based upon what their rights and footprint are within the region.
12:35 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Christine Normandin
Thank you so much.
I'll now give the floor to Lindsay Mathyssen of the NDP for six minutes.
12:35 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to both witnesses today.
Before I move on to my other point, Mr. Lackenbauer, you have written an article about why China is not in fact that peer competitor in the Arctic. Do you think you could submit that to the committee so that it can be considered within our report?
12:35 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
It would be my pleasure.
12:35 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you very much.
We've heard very different points of view on that threat and what Canada's reaction needs to be to that threat, in terms of building up offensive weaponry versus sticking to the status quo and domain awareness. Of course, in the long run, the key concern is, where does that path lead?
I'd like to hear from both witnesses, maybe from Professor Byers first and then from Professor Lackenbauer.
12:35 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
The committee probably knows this: The White House released a U.S. Arctic strategy in the last couple of weeks. I highly commend it. It's not in its entirety appropriate for Canada, but I would say that much of its substance can guide us and that a partnership is necessary with the United States on many of these issues.
In that context, I would say that we do have an ongoing dispute with the United States concerning the legal status of the Northwest Passage. We demonstrated just a couple of months ago our ability to resolve Arctic disputes with allies; I'm talking about the maritime boundaries settlement and the Hans Island settlement with Denmark. Given the increased Russian threat and the long-term challenge of China, this might be an opportune moment for us to sit down with the Americans and talk about the Northwest Passage in an open-minded way to see if we can tie up that ongoing point of difference between Canada and the United States.
In terms of the larger situation in the Canadian Arctic, again, we need to maintain and build our search and rescue capacity, our ability to get places quickly to save lives and to, if necessary, board a non-compliant civilian vessel in the Northwest Passage. The Cormorant search and rescue helicopters are fabulous for that.
As well, we need to renew some of our existing capability before it ages out—the RADARSAT Constellation, the Aurora long-range patrol vessels—and I would suggest that we need to make sure that our fighter jets, including our next-generation fighter jets, are able to operate across the Arctic. That will involve some improvements in runways and ground infrastructure and all of that for when they come online.
There are a lot of small things that can be done, but my big response to your question is that it's the U.S.-Canada relationship: Let's work with them as much as we can to see if we can resolve the difference.
12:40 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I will focus directly on what you asked about offensive capability. The way I would phrase it is like this: How do we avoid the security dilemma that occurs when we make investments in defence that are interpreted by an adversary or competitor as something that in turn threatens them and encourages them to make an increased investment and triggers what might be an arms race or a security spiral?
In this particular case, I think it is important for us to go in soberly and to recognize that Russia does have legitimate sovereignty and sovereign rights in a large part of the Arctic. It does have defence concerns. Given where it has chosen to position a lot of its deterrence capabilities and defence capabilities, largely relating to global power issues, and having chosen to invest in the Arctic, particularly in the Kola Peninsula, means that NATO is perceived as a threat to the Russian Arctic in a way that I don't think Russia is perceived as a threat to the Canadian Arctic.
Being appreciative of that to me makes it absolutely essential that we get strategic messaging right and that we're very careful in explaining that investments in NATO are investments in a defensive alliance, not an offensive one. When Moscow chooses to go and construct narratives suggesting that NATO is a threat to Russia, this has no founding in what NATO really is.
I think it's also very important to think about ensuring that we manage this security situation in the Arctic for fear that it will invite outsiders. I was struck by the Chinese ambassador to Iceland, who made a final intervention in response to a NATO official at the Arctic Circle assembly in Reykjavik a few weeks ago. He said that China has obligations to look to theoretical military roles in the Arctic because, as a Security Council member, it might have an obligation to intervene if things get out of hand.
That's something I'm going to have to chew on for a long time. That's not a future I would welcome under any scenario, but to me it amplifies the importance of the Arctic states' managing this issue to the best of our abilities and not inviting the rest of the world to come.
12:40 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Christine Normandin
Thank you very much. This concludes the first round of questions.
Once again, there are more questions than time, so I'm going to cut the time for each of the speakers by 20%. The time will be divided as follows: four minutes for the Conservatives, four minutes for the Liberals, two minutes for the Bloc, two minutes for the NDP, four minutes for the Conservatives and, lastly, four minutes for the Liberals.
We'll start with the Conservative Party of Canada and Mr. Zimmer, for four minutes.
12:40 p.m.
Conservative
Bob Zimmer Conservative Prince George—Peace River—Northern Rockies, BC
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'll be asking my questions of Professor Lackenbauer.
You spoke a lot about the non-military threat that Russia potentially doesn't pose to the Arctic, but let's speak about some of the things you spoke about just recently.
You criticized Chinese claims to the Arctic in what you just mentioned. I'll also bring up that the Russians have also claimed 705,000 square kilometres of what we recognize in Canada as Canadian territory. That's Arctic seabed that has a lot of resources. Russia has said that it's theirs. It made this claim at the UN many years ago. These are two very strong countries that have made a very real threat.
I'm just going to quote from the document that was referred to by my colleague Mr. Kelly previously. This is China's own document on Arctic policy:
China is an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs. Geographically, China is a "Near-Arctic State", one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle. The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China's climate system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry and other sectors.
The reason I bring that up is to bring you back to the question of why we're here today talking about Arctic security. Seeing that there are these two very real claims, two very real assertions in the Arctic, do you think it's necessary to have a sufficient military presence in the Arctic? I'm not even talking about a buildup for a potential invasion; I'm just talking of a presence and a basis on which to assert ourselves and our sovereignty.
12:45 p.m.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I'd say, first of all, when we're talking about extending continental shelves, this is not territory. We're talking about sovereign rights to resources on the seabed or below the seabed. I think it's problematic to talk about this as territory, because it sets out the wrong concept of what we're dealing with.
12:45 p.m.
Conservative