National Defence Committee on Nov. 15th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order. I see quorum, and our witnesses are ready to go.

Before I introduce our witnesses and call on Mr. Hamilton for his five minutes, I want members to take note that Thursday's meeting is cancelled due to a joint agreement among the whips. That has left us in a bit of a scramble, but members should know now rather than later that we won't be meeting on Thursday.

May the chair express an unhappiness with the decision of all the whips, because this is happening way too frequently. It's very difficult to run committees and have coherent studies if in fact in we are subject to the whims of whips. I get irritated with the solid and important work of committees constantly being deferred to other issues. It's something that only members can remedy. I encourage individual party members to talk to their whips about these issues.

Having had my rant for the morning, I will ask Mr. Hamilton to begin his five minutes for his opening statement and introduce Ms. Kutz and Mr. Randall.

With that, Mr. Hamilton, welcome back to the committee.

[Kevin Hamilton, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Chair. It's a pleasure to be here again.

I welcome the opportunity to join you all today to discuss the evolving security environment in the Arctic, Canada's Arctic sovereignty and our Arctic foreign policy.

First of all, Canada's Arctic sovereignty is of long standing and is well established. Every day, through a wide range of activities, governments, indigenous peoples and local communities all exercise Canada's enduring sovereignty over our Arctic lands and waters.

With respect to security, since the end of the Cold War, the circumpolar Arctic has been characterized as a region of international co-operation and peace. While the Arctic region remains peaceful, it is not tension-free. We must remain alert to the impact of ongoing geopolitical conflict and the activities of our adversaries.

Russia's continued military buildup and weapons testing in the Arctic remains troubling in and of itself, but its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine demonstrates Russia's complete lack of respect for international principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, fundamental principles that underpin co-operation in the Arctic.

That's why like-minded Arctic states have responded in a strong and concerted manner, including by discontinuing their cooperation with Russia in regional forums such as the Arctic Council.

Canada continues to work closely with like-minded Indigenous and state partners to promote collaboration and continue the important work of the Arctic Council on projects that do not involve Russia.

Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and the national defence policy entitled “Strong, Secure, Engaged” describe the security challenges and risks that Canada faces in the Arctic.

The international chapter of the framework identifies priority areas for Canada's international activities in the Arctic, including strengthening the rules‑based international order in the Arctic, more clearly defining Canada's Arctic boundaries, promoting a safe, secure and well‑defended Arctic and north, and expanding Canada's international activities in the North.

I understand that colleagues from the Department of National Defence briefed the committee earlier this month. It's important for me to emphasize that investing in our domestic defence and Arctic capabilities strengthens our position internationally. As such, Global Affairs Canada is strongly supportive of efforts to improve Canada's domestic capabilities and to enhance our defence posture in the Arctic.

Of course, our partnership with the United States is of critical importance to Arctic security. Canada and the U.S. are working closely to expand co-operation on continental defence and in the Arctic, including by modernizing NORAD.

Canada's security is also anchored by our membership in NATO. Of the eight Arctic states, five are current NATO allies, and Finland and Sweden are on track to join the alliance in the near future. As Secretary General Stoltenberg has repeatedly stated, NATO will protect and defend every inch of allied territory. This includes all of Canada's territory, including, of course, our Arctic.

While geopolitical tensions are front of mind today, it is important to remember that global climate change remains a grave threat to the Arctic and to its people, including northern indigenous communities. Canada is a leader on climate issues, including on the ways in which they impact our security. Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence are working to establish a NATO climate and security centre of excellence in Canada. Climate change impacts on the Arctic security environment will be one of the many topics that Canada and our allies will address through this centre of excellence.

As climate change makes the Arctic more accessible, albeit unevenly, international activities and interests will continue to grow, including from some states that do not share our values.

In China's case, its interests and ambitions regarding the Arctic are both economic and geostrategic, and reflect its growing participation in broader global governance. China sees itself as a “near‑Arctic” state, a designation without international recognition, and has described the polar regions as one of the world's new strategic frontiers.

Canada's evolving strategy towards China recognizes the complexity of the relationship between the two countries and the need to address challenges, compete, collaborate, for example, on climate change, and co‑exist where appropriate.

In closing, I would like to say that Canadians have long benefited from the protection afforded by geography, particularly the geography of our northern approaches. As the Arctic will continue to gain in strategic importance in the years and decades to come, the natural protections once afforded by an ice-covered and distant Arctic will no longer be sufficient to guarantee Canada's security and sovereignty. That's why Global Affairs Canada will continue to work closely across government and with regional allies and partners to minimize and manage regional tensions, to confront threats and to respond to shared challenges.

Thank you, and we look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Madam Kramp-Neuman, you have six minutes, please.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you for your comments this morning.

I'd like to start by suggesting that there has been some concern, and the chief of the defence staff has suggested that our ability to maintain our sovereignty is certainly in question in the north and will be challenged in years to come. Can you confirm that?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, it's an old axiom of international relations that sovereignty must be exercised and demonstrated to be retained. I would say, as I said in my opening comments, that it is something our military, various levels of government and people of the Arctic do every single day.

That said, as the effects of climate change make the region more accessible, the necessity for Canada to exercise and demonstrate that sovereignty is only going to increase. That will require investments in military capabilities, in infrastructure and in all aspects of northern life so that we can demonstrate our sovereignty going forward. My point is that it will require investments for the future.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Perfect.

Moving on, with regard to pilots, our ability to recruit and train and retain pilots is definitely essential to defending our Arctic. I'm just curious about what your mindset is. Do you have concerns with regard to the media outlets in the United Kingdom and Canada that are making reference to former Royal Canadian Air Force fighter pilots in the employ of the People's Republic of China to train their fighter pilots in western tactics?

Number one, are you aware that this is happening, and are you concerned that this could challenge the Arctic airspace?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, I'm aware of the media reports, certainly. As for the implications, I'm afraid it's something I would have to defer to the Department of National Defence.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

This committee as a whole understands that there's a tenuous hold in our Arctic. It's not just due to a lack of materiel in terms of equipment; there's a lack of trained personnel in our military. Has this complicated our ability to project our rights in the diplomatic sphere? How much more can military capability suffer before even more allies begin to challenge our ability to project our own sovereignty in the north?

[Kevin Hamilton]

Mr. Chair, I don't think there are near-term threats or challenges from adversaries to our sovereignty in the north, but that day is coming. That's why I think there's agreement across government and certainly between Global Affairs and the Department of National Defence that investments in our military directed at the north—cold weather training, more fighter jets, the modernization of NORAD over the next 20 years to the tune of $38.6 billion—are all instruments and demonstrations of the exercise of our sovereignty. Make no mistake: We do recognize that the challenges to our sovereignty are possible in the years to come.

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Thank you.

This is my last question. With Finland's and Sweden's accession into NATO, we certainly do have a new dynamic in the Arctic Council. Can you speak to whether or not the Department of Foreign Affairs has issued a new strategy document concerning the Arctic, considering developments in the war in Ukraine and the fact that the majority of the Arctic now falls under Article 5 of NATO?

[Kevin Hamilton]

I'll defer to my colleague, Heidi Kutz, on the question of the Arctic Council and documentation.

I should say that from Canada's perspective the impending accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is wonderful news. It gives us a better 360° awareness of the threat in the European high north as well as the North American Arctic. It is a new dynamic. It is in our judgment a positive dynamic, but I'll ask Heidi to speak to the Arctic Council dynamics.

[Heidi Kutz, Senior Arctic Official and Director General, Arctic, Eurasian, and European Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Sure. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would just first of all qualify, of course, that military activity and co-operation are explicitly excluded from the work of the Arctic Council, which still does stand as a key organization in terms of its support for the environment, climate change and sustainable development co-operation. Members are likely aware that Canada originally paused its participation in the Arctic Council in order to determine a way forward under the Russian chair through to 2023. Canada and our like-minded partners have condemned Russia's invasion and remarked on its invasion as being contrary to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which stand essential to the Arctic Council.

Nonetheless, the seven like-minded states under the council have reinitiated their co-operation with each other. That does exclude co-operation at this time with Russia, but again, these are in non-military areas by way of the original declaration of the Arctic Council.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Fisher, you have six minutes.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll stay with Ms. Kutz on the Arctic Council, if that's fine.

On March 3, shortly after Russia illegally invaded Ukraine, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States declared that they will no longer attend meetings of the Arctic Council as long as it's chaired by Russia.

On June 8, Canada and the allies declared their intent to resume co-operation on a limited number of previously approved Arctic Council projects that do not include Russian leadership or participation .

Can you outline what that looks like? What does that participation look like? When we think about the Arctic Council, how has it been impacted since the illegal invasion?

Also, we've heard at this committee that surprisingly enough, prior to the invasion Russia was reasonably “co-operative”—I'll try to stretch the imagination here and use that word—on Arctic-related matters with other members of the Arctic Council. How do you see this relationship changing and maybe impacting our priorities in the Arctic?

[Heidi Kutz]

Thank you very much for the question.

I'll reiterate that the sequence is correct as you've outlined it.

In March of this year, like-minded states condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We put an immediate pause on our own participation in the council and any travel into Russia, in light of the fact that Russia is the current rotating chair of the council through to 2023.

Also, as informed by and in light of the importance of the council's work and the contributions that it makes to northern communities and to the stakeholders who are involved in it, in June of this year, after assessing all options, the like-minded states re-engaged in those project activities under the council that did not involve the Russian Federation.

Every two years at the ministerial, the Arctic Council approves an agenda of projects. Upwards of 100 projects are normally in play during a regular term. With our re-engagements in the projects, the council may work on issues of environment, sustainable development, indigenous knowledge and the whole gamut of activities. Canada has re-engaged in about 70 of those activities with partners.

Of course, we're concerned about the future of the council and its sustained health and stability. We're currently taking into consideration and working behind a smooth transition of the chair, which will next pass to Norway in the spring of 2023. We're doing what we can to maintain as much activity under the council as possible in the meantime and we're focusing on a successful and smooth transfer of the chair.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you so much.

Mr. Hamilton, in January of 2018, China released its Arctic policy paper and declared itself a “near-Arctic state”. I think you said in your testimony that this term is not recognized.

Can you share the implications of China's Arctic policy on Canada's Arctic sovereignty? Also, can you signify what China means when it refers to itself as a “near-Arctic state”?

[Kevin Hamilton]

That's quite correct. This is a self-appointed term that the Chinese have given themselves. This term, “near-Arctic state”, means nothing in international law. We interpret that they mean they have an interest in the Arctic region.

We've seen in past years a lot of Chinese research in, for instance, international waters in and around the Arctic. They are an observer in the Arctic Council. They certainly have interests. As the ice melts in the High Arctic, they have long-term interests in transit points. That's why it's so important that Canada reinforces its sovereignty over key stretches of water, such as the Northwest Passage.

We are very alive to and wary of how China has articulated its approach to the Arctic.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Do I have any more time, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have a bit more than a minute.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you for that, Mr. Hamilton.

In that paper, China's developing military projection capabilities are mentioned. That would extend into the Arctic region. It seems counterintuitive to some of the things that we're hearing.

What is their thought behind developing military projection capabilities in the Arctic region?

[Kevin Hamilton]

China is engaged in a campaign of increasing its military projection capabilities globally. The Arctic seems to be part of that intent, although they have had some setbacks, as we can see through open sources over the last year. Their icebreaker, for instance, didn't leave port this year. It was very likely undergoing repairs and so forth.

At this moment, we don't assess that China has the capability to project military power towards the Canadian Arctic. They can certainly send vessels and they can undertake activities that might concern us, but projecting a blue-water military capability across the Pacific towards our Arctic is not something we assess as a challenge right now. It is very likely that it will become a challenge in the future, however.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Ms. Normandin, you have six minutes.

I think we should declare Canada to be a near-Caribbean state, particularly between November and March. What do you think? Do you think that would stand up in international law?

Go ahead, Ms. Normandin.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd be curious to hear the answer.

Mr. Randall or Mr. Hamilton, my question is more about ocean law. In your work at Global Affairs Canada, how important is it to know what's in our territorial waters? Is it important to know whether it's a commercial or scientific vessel, where it went, where it left and where it's going?

For the purposes of your work, how important is it to have an accurate, real-time picture of what's happening in our territorial waters?

[Stephen Randall, Executive Director, Oceans, Environment and Aerospace Law , Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Mr. Chair, in terms of territorial waters and internal waters, the Arctic Archipelago has straight baselines drawn around it. The Northwest Passage, for instance, is considered internal waters to Canada, so there is no right of passage there. There would be a right-of-transit passage through the territorial sea, which is 12 nautical miles beyond our baselines. There is a right to that transit if it's innocent passage. It is important to know what exactly someone is up to in terms of being innocent passage. However, there is a right of transit for states to have their maritime vessels go through those areas. It's important to know what they're up to, but it's not something that we can control access to.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I asked you this question because we received a report this morning from the Auditor General of Canada on the Arctic, which identified a number of gaps in Canada's surveillance capabilities.

The report points to long‑standing problems that have yet to be addressed, including oversight particularly in terms of surveillance and, more importantly, the transfer of information between various departments. It also talks about outdated fleets and communication transmission systems that are not up to date.

Has your department noticed this reality of the lack of information that the Auditor General is raising today?