Thank you.
I think my report deals quite extensively with that issue.
I'm very conscious that this suggestion goes right back to the Somalia inquiry and has been extensively discussed in the literature. When you come to articulating it, if you look, for instance, at the Australian model, the inspector general's function there was overwhelmingly to oversee, for instance, criminal prosecutions of sexual offences. My recommendation was to take that out of the CAF altogether.
What would remain within the ambit of an inspector general in the Canadian system that has already created an ombudsman, or an Auditor General? Since these recommendations were made 20 years ago, we now have several mechanisms of civilian oversight. I was concerned about trying to carve out an additional civilian oversight role for functions that are currently exercised, in particular, by the Auditor General. The Auditor General's office has produced several excellent reports on a lot of these issues.
I was very concerned about having a lot of duplication of functions, so I saw no need for that. I think the existing oversight that is exercised by Parliament through these mechanisms, and through this kind of committee, has all the capacity.
The problem with CAF is not just oversight, which is after the fact, but civilian input into the process—in the justice system, in the education system and in the management of human resources. Oversight after errors have been made is helpful only to a point, but getting oxygen into the system throughout, I think, would be much more helpful.