Thank you very much, Chair.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this committee in person, which is a novelty for me now.
I'm appearing as an individual and I'll speak to you entirely from a personal perspective and provide a personal analysis based on my 30 years of experience in international security.
I'll focus on two aspects of the war: first, how the war has evolved over the past year and where I think we are now, and second, what the challenges or the risks are in months ahead for Ukraine, NATO and NATO allies like Canada.
The past 14 months of the war have been a surprise in many ways. Many commentators, myself included, were surprised that President Putin would choose to launch a full-scale war against Ukraine. I could not understand why it was in Russia's self-interest to do so. I do think that one of the reasons Putin launched the war was that he thought NATO was weakened and that the west would have neither a strong nor a unified response. Putin was surprised. The reaction of NATO has been more robust, more coherent and more supportive of Ukraine than Putin expected and than I hoped for.
The war on Ukraine, as wars go, is still relatively young. Let me walk through how I see the evolution of the war since it first began in February 2022. It's been through a few phases.
The initial phase, as we know, when Putin and many western commentators thought Russia would do well militarily, do it rapidly and even be able to replace President Zelenskyy's government very quickly, was short-lived, which was another welcome surprise, and I'm glad.
The next phase was marked by a period of Ukrainian successes and rapid gains made possible by the resolve of Ukrainian troops, the inspirational Ukrainian leadership and the mobilization of Ukrainian citizens. Without taking anything away from Ukraine's extraordinary effort, western support was also a crucial part of the successful outcome. In particular, the training effort after 2014 by Canada, the U.K. and others was key, as was the early policy shift to provide lethal weaponry.
The third phase of the war started around 10 months ago, and we're still in it. Russia started to concentrate its troops and artillery to the south and east of the country, focusing on consolidating and expanding its control of the Donbass and on creating a buffer around Crimea.
At the time, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said he expected the war to last a very long time, and I'm afraid he was right.
Here we are today, 14 months after a brutal Russian attempt to invade all of Ukraine, with millions of Ukrainians displaced, tens of thousands of casualties and umpteen thousands of civilians murdered. Ukrainian critical infrastructure and cultural heritage have been destroyed, countless war crimes have been committed, and Russia has been under heavy sanctions, which are, in a way, some of the heaviest ones imposed on any country since World War II.
The fighting continues, and a new counteroffensive is being launched in what promises to be a grinding ground war, I think, along a 600-mile front. It looks like this conflict will last a long time.
Where do I think the international community, NATO and allies such as Canada need to focus in the months ahead? There are a few areas.
First, the maintenance of international support for Ukraine will be crucial, both in terms of political support as well as logistics. From my perspective, President Putin has more people to throw at the war in Ukraine and less to lose. He's shown a disregard for the fate of Russian soldiers and a propensity to use them as cannon fodder. A long, grinding war of attrition is in Russia's interest and in fact may be their strategy. They've said as much publicly, hoping to see support from the west start to crumble.
What do NATO and NATO allies need to do? NATO needs to put in place a longer-term strategic plan to provide weaponry and other support to Ukraine. For the past year, the rhythm of support to Ukraine has been marked by President Zelenskyy asking for something specific and then allies moving—sometimes quickly, sometimes more slowly—to find what is needed, to provide the training and to get it into theatre. This is different from a strategic plan that ensures a steady flow of predictable support. To achieve this allied defence, production and procurement need to be stepped up. Ukraine is burning through ammunition and weaponry faster than the west can provide it.
Most crucial, Ukraine's military needs to meet NATO standards. It provides a significant deterrent to Russia going forward. During the war and after the war, we need to work to wean Ukraine away from Soviet-era equipment and toward full NATO interoperability.
In terms of political support for Ukraine, I'll just say that this will take a lot of continuing diplomacy. We're already starting to see some NATO allies put positions on the table that are different—Hungary and Turkey—but it's not just about NATO; it's about creating broader worldwide cross-regional support not only to isolate Russia but to put pressure on Russia. That will involve talking to some countries whose positioning is perhaps less palatable to us, but they will be useful interlocutors with Russia.
Finally, another question that I expect will be high in the agenda of the Vilnius NATO summit is Ukraine's future relationship with NATO. There, what I expect is a very vigorous debate but no final conclusions. Will Ukraine be offered formal security guarantees? Will there be a clear path to NATO membership, with concrete steps, or will it be something interim until allies see where the war ends up?
I'll leave it at that point. In the question-and-answer period, we can look at some of the other areas in security and defence where Canada could help.
Thank you.