Evidence of meeting #6 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was ukraine.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I call this meeting to order.
This continues the study of the threat analysis affecting Canada, and the Canadian Armed Forces' operational readiness and ability to meet that threat.
We have two outstanding panels. The first panel is Andrew Rasiulis—I'm probably mispronouncing it and I stand to be corrected—and Elbridge Colby. Each of them has been briefed on the time available to them.
With that, I call on Mr. Rasiulis for the first presentation.
3:35 p.m.
Andrew Rasiulis Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
In addressing the threat analysis affecting Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces, I will focus today specifically on Europe and the Ukraine-Russia conflict. While we acknowledge that the committee's study encompasses a global perspective and that Canada has defence concerns in other regions of the world, Canada's largest military deployment is currently in the European theatre.
In the question and answer period, I will be very pleased to address threat concerns relevant to the Canadian Armed Forces in the other important regions, as well as questions relevant to the nature of threats faced by the Canadian Armed Forces along the spectrum of conflict, from terrorism to conventional warfare.
The immediate threat faced by Canada and consequently directly relevant to the Canadian Armed Forces is the crisis between Ukraine and Russia. The spectre of a large-scale conventional war between Russia and Ukraine, with a potential spillover effect into nearby NATO countries, is a clear and present danger. Commensurate diplomatic activity is taking place to de-escalate the confrontation. Canada is front and centre and fully engaged in both the defence and deterrence side of the equation and the dialogue and diplomacy side.
What is this conflict about, and what are the potential outcomes?
The conflict has been described by some as a battle between democracy and autocracy, or the liberal rules-based order versus realpolitik, the realist school of politics, among nations, based on national interests and power—chiefly economic and military. In the latter understanding of the world order, the concept of spheres of influence plays a key element and is at the heart of the current crisis.
Ukraine is the object of this current contest. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic emerged as an independent country, as did many other former Soviet republics, including Russia. The political, socio-economic and military convulsions that followed in the former Soviet space have come to a head in the current standoff based on whether Ukraine should join NATO or remain a neutral buffer state between the west and Russia.
In short summary, from 1991 Ukraine followed an official policy of non-alignment, balancing itself between Russia and the west—specifically NATO and the EU. There was a dramatic shift in policy in late 2013 and 2014, when Ukraine took a shift towards Russia. This in turn led to the Maidan revolt by western-leaning Ukrainians, ousting the pro-Russian president. In turn, this led to a revolt by Russian-leaning Ukrainians in the eastern Donbass region of Ukraine.
Concerned about the move of Ukraine towards the west, and particularly NATO, the Russians moved swiftly to seize Crimea and protect their Black Sea fleet based in Sevastopol. At the same time, they provided critical military and political support to Ukrainian rebels in the Donbass. Fighting in the Donbass was eventually stabilized in February 2015, with peace agreements known as the Minsk accords.
During the question and answer period I would be happy to elaborate on these accords and the Normandy process aimed at implementing these accords, thereby bringing the conflict in the Donbass to closure.
Russian frustration over the failure thus far to implement the Minsk accords and strong Ukrainian political efforts to join NATO have led the Russians to use large-scale military force exercises to influence the outcome of this standoff in a manner favourable to Russian security interests.
We are therefore today faced with hard choices and outcomes that could potentially affect Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces. There is a flurry of diplomatic activity at the level of U.S.-Russia, NATO-Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—the OSCE—in Vienna.
The diplomatic steps taken thus far suggest no agreement on the question of Ukraine's future options with regard to NATO, but there are prospects for negotiation on arms control and on confidence- and security-building measures, including a possible discussion of a new security architecture for Europe.
In the interests of time, I am prepared to outline the diplomatic options in greater detail, as well as the potential role for Canadian diplomacy, in the questions and answers.
3:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Okay. Thank you very much. I'm sorry, but I'm running a hard clock here. I appreciate your presentation.
Say hello to Elizabeth for us.
3:40 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
She's sitting right back here. She's saying hi to you.
3:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Colleagues, she was at one point a clerk on the Hill here—an outstanding clerk on the Hill, if I may say so.
With that, Mr. Colby, you have five minutes, please.
3:40 p.m.
Elbridge Colby Principal and Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative, As an Individual
Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice-Chairs and members of the standing committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you. Especially as an American, it's a great honour to appear before this committee.
What's probably most useful for you, given my background and expertise, is for me to lay out the American perspective in as brief a context as I can.
From our point of view, the primary facts in the international system are the arrival of China as a superpower and the primacy of Asia. China will represent roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of global GDP, while Asia as a whole will be half of global GDP, and that share will grow.
Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that China is pursuing regional hegemony over Asia, essentially seeking to establish a predominant influence over the world's largest market area. From this position, Beijing would be able to dominate the world economy and use this power to exercise decisive influence in other countries' affairs.
From America's perspective, my view is that this means the primary U.S. foreign policy interest must be denying China regional hegemony over Asia. This will require that Washington lead a coalition of states with the will and the capacity to block Beijing's hegemonic ambitions. This ecumenical coalition is likely to centre on Asian countries like Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam and the like. We can think of this as an anti-hegemonic coalition bound together by this shared goal.
Central to the success of any such coalition will be a sufficiently strong military component. Why? While much discussion of China focuses on Beijing's immense economic power—and this concern is surely in order—the military threat China poses in Asia is real, severe and urgent.
The reason is somewhat paradoxical: While China is very strong economically, Beijing will find it very difficult to translate its economic leverage into decisive political influence. In fact, it's finding this out right now with Australia. Because of this, China is likely to look to its immensely powerful military as a tool to pursue this goal.
China's armed forces have transformed from a relatively backward military 30 years ago to a truly top-tier one today, which the United States military finds very daunting. Moreover, the PLA is no longer just a territorial defence force; it's now a “power projection” military, one that can project and sustain dominant military power.
Beijing's most dangerous strategy in this context is a focused and sequential strategy. In this model, Beijing would try to short-circuit or collapse the anti-hegemonic coalition through more limited uses of force. This would avoid the costs and risks of a total war but, if successful, would still achieve Beijing's transformational systemic gains. This approach could work, because the coalition depends on its members' confidence that they will be protected sufficiently to justify the risks of standing up to Beijing. If they think they'll be left vulnerable and subjected to Beijing's ire, though, they will be much more likely to make the best of a bad situation and cut a deal with Beijing.
America's goal in preventing this is absolutely central. Only America is strong enough to stand up directly to China, and Asian countries can really only prudently stand up to China if they know America will be there in force to defend them. Thus, the steel in the backbone of this anti-hegemonic coalition is American strength and resolve. Now, I emphasize that I don't say this in a chest-beating way; it's just the reality of the power situation in Asia and how vulnerable Asian countries must—and I think do—think about it.
Because of this, America must ensure it can effectively defend its allies in Asia against China alongside their own efforts. If America fails to do so, the coalition risks falling apart and leaving China dominating the world's greatest market. Accordingly, the U.S. defence strategy must focus on being able to defeat such Chinese action in Asia—in fact, this is what American defence strategy is supposed to be focused on—and it must be one that the American people can reasonably support, one that would be sane and rational to implement.
This requires a military strategy of denial: basically, the ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of a U.S. ally. Because Taiwan is effectively a U.S. ally and the front line of the U.S. defence perimeter, the United States must therefore be able to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. If we're able to do so, the coalition should stand strong and we will be able to check China's hegemonic ambitions, but this will be a highly demanding military standard.
Given the size of China's economy, Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and our and Taiwan's relative neglect of the Chinese military threat, the situation is now urgent. We are behind, and it appears we may be falling farther behind. At this rate, much of the best publicly available military analysis suggests that we may be on a trajectory to lose a war over Taiwan in the coming years. Accordingly, America must sharply reorient its military emphasis towards the western Pacific, while at the same time recapitalizing its nuclear deterrent and sustaining a low-cost counterterrorism posture.
The upshot of this is that the United States will need to reduce its military engagements, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe. As a result, America will not have a military capable of handling all three major Eurasian theatres largely on its own. This will create vacuums in other parts of the world, but there is no real choice. The United States is no longer the unipole: China is now another superpower, while other threats persist.
Meanwhile, while Europe in particular is important, it pales in significance to Asia. Russia is far less powerful than China. As a result, my view is that America will reduce its military role in Europe and the Middle East sooner or later. The question is how graceful that transition will be.
The solution, in my view, is clear. Allies must do more. Burden-sharing is no longer just a morality play from the United States but rather a strategic necessity for allied security. The best alliance model going forward, in my view, will be an interests-based division of labour. Rather than acting as if all U.S. allies are, if you will, a three musketeers-style “all for one and one for all”—an unrealistic approach that is bound to fail—the United States should encourage its allies and partners to act more in those areas where their interests are most directly impinged upon and their capacity to act is highest.
Hence, European NATO—
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Mr. Colby, I'm sorry to interrupt. Thank you for that.
Thank you to both of you for your presentation.
Ms. Findlay, you have six minutes, please.
3:45 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Thank you very much to our highly qualified witnesses for being with us today. We really do appreciate it.
I'll start with Mr. Rasiulis, because he presented first, to talk for a moment about Europe.
We certainly seem to have all indications that Russia will invade Ukraine this week and that any diplomacy that has been followed has either been rebuffed or ignored, including recent overtures by Ukraine to Russia directly.
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
On a point of order, I would like to let the clerk know that someone who is supposed to be a panellist is watching and is not yet in the room. She needs to switch rooms in order to ask questions.
3:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Apparently, Ms. O'Connell has now been promoted. She'll be pleased to know that.
Please continue. Sorry about that.
3:50 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Okay.
With that, maybe I misunderstood your testimony, sir, but it almost sounded to me like you were saying that the invasion of Crimea and other overtures from Russia are justified because they want to protect their spheres of influence. Is that what you were saying?
3:50 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I'm not making moral judgements. I was simply stating what has happened and why the Russians did it from their perspective.
On the question of diplomacy versus a war option, this is a big week. We've heard statements coming out of Washington and other places that say that Wednesday could be a day when the Russians start a further conflict in Ukraine. They have the capability, but at the same time, the American statements have been very clear that they do not know what Putin will do. So the decision has not been made. The capability is there. It's for him to exercise the option.
This morning I would draw your attention to an Associated Press report that the Russian foreign minister, Lavrov, briefed Putin, saying that the American proposals merit further discussion. That's the American counter-proposals to the Russian proposals, which were made a couple of weeks ago. That is a new development today, and a very important one. It signals Russian intent to continue a dialogue. It also comes at the same time that Scholz, the German chancellor, arrived in Kyiv. He spent the day talking with Zelensky. Tomorrow he flies to Moscow for meetings there.
3:50 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Thank you. I appreciate that. With respect, though, to what we're here to address, which is the threat analysis with Canada and Canada's role, do you agree that Canada should take a principled stand for a democratic country like Ukraine, which, although not in NATO, is a NATO ally, to try to deter a Russian invasion?
3:50 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
I believe Canada should stand for its national interests. Its national interests have been identified as supporting Ukrainians' territorial sovereignty. The issue of NATO accession is not just for Canada. It's a question for the alliance as a whole. That right now remains undecided. In fact, there is no consensus in the NATO alliance to accede Ukraine to NATO membership. However, Canada has been extremely active in supporting reform of the Ukrainian armed forces and thereby helping the Ukrainian forces to deter any Russian moves against them, as well as to defend their territory.
I think Canada has been playing exactly where it should be—defending our national interests by promoting a strong NATO deterrent in Europe, but opening the options for potential diplomacy, because at the end of the day, I believe Canada's national interests will be solved by a peaceful settlement of this and not through a conflict.
3:50 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Mr. Colby, thank you very much for being here.
I realize that you're coming from a mostly American perspective in your statements; however, we are a close ally of the United States and very much dependent on it in terms of our military capabilities. Would you characterize the threat from China, then, as something that Canada should be very concerned about as well?
3:50 p.m.
Principal and Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative, As an Individual
Absolutely, Madam Vice-Chair. I mean, the way I would put it is that if the United States is worried about China dominating Asia, everybody else, including Canada, should be very worried, because if we are concerned and we're 20% to 25% of global GDP, the Chinese will have immense leverage over everyone else. I have a similar message for the Europeans.
Whether Canada should.... Again, I say this as an American, so it's not my place to say, but whether that logically means that Canada should be taking an active role in the western Pacific I think is a further step. I wasn't able to finish my thought, but I think a division of labour model is going to be more effective. I certainly think Canada should be very, very acutely concerned about the potential for Chinese domination of Asia.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
[Technical difficulty—Editor] the decision or being the one advising on the decision, would you ban Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications firms in Canada's 5G networks?
3:55 p.m.
Principal and Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative, As an Individual
I would, absolutely. Yes.
3:55 p.m.
Conservative
Kerry-Lynne Findlay Conservative South Surrey—White Rock, BC
Do you think the United States sees Canada as a trusted partner or someone that the U.S. needs to worry about?
3:55 p.m.
Principal and Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative, As an Individual
I certainly don't worry about Canada. What I would say, Madam, with all due respect—and I honour Canada's incredibly storied history in the world wars and so forth, and the Cold War—is that more Canadian effort in the defence space and more contributions to collective defence would be most welcome.
At this point, the way I think about it is that Australia is our best ally. Australia is spending well over 2% of its GDP on defence. It's standing up directly to Chinese coercion in the most concrete way possible, at great suffering to the Australian economy and people, and it's orienting its military towards collective defence, towards the defence, essentially, of Taiwan even. That's really the gold standard out there.
Of course, we're all part of Five Eyes together. The United Kingdom is spending about 2%. There's no reason we can't encourage Canada to meet the same level, and if what was just being said before is the case, this is the best way for Canada to contribute to that global order.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mr. Colby and Ms. Findlay.
Before I call on Mr. May for six minutes, Clerk, have we arranged for Mr. Fisher to get back on?
We're looking into it. Okay. The long-lost Mr. Fisher....
With that, we have Mr. May for six minutes, please.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
Bryan May Liberal Cambridge, ON
Thank you to both panellists today. This is great testimony for our work here.
My questions are going to be for you, Mr. Rasiulis.
Previously, sir, you stated that Canada has put in a very measured response that puts the emphasis on diplomacy while not ignoring the deterrence side of the equation. In your opinion, how do diplomacy and deterrence work together? How should these two sides of the equation be used and how has Canada's response evolved as the situation has escalated?
3:55 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
A long-standing tradition of NATO has been the Harmel two-track approach, which was developed during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. On the one hand, we had a robust deterrent posture in Europe. On the other hand, we had a measure of détente and arms control negotiations. It was a way of keeping a balance between force and diplomacy. It worked quite well in NATO's interests and in Canada's interests.
In the current situation, Canada has been punching well above its weight in terms of providing not only military training to the Ukrainians but also Canadian leadership in the forward presence in Latvia, where we head up a battle group. That is part of the NATO deterrent package to defend NATO territory and at the same time strengthen Ukraine's reform measures for its own armed forces. Ukraine is not part of NATO but is a partner of NATO.
We have been extremely robust in that area. Where Canada has not played a very strong role in this particular scenario, whereas historically we're very active diplomatically as well as militarily, is that we have not stepped up very much in terms of looking for the diplomatic solutions. The French, the Germans and the Americans have been largely leading in this area. However, Canada's decision—the Prime Minister's decision—to not accede to the Ukrainian request to ship weapons to the Ukraine, and instead to reinforce our training efforts with non-lethal aid, I believe and assume, opens up the possibility that Canada may be stepping up behind the scenes to do what Canadians have historically done with quiet diplomacy. It may be working to assist the Americans and the French and the British in their efforts to try to find a diplomatic solution out of this very devastating potential war that could occur.
There is the balance. Given Canada's latest position in not granting the weapons request, I believe it's leaving itself open for quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, but because it's quiet diplomacy, I don't know about it. I can only assume that it's happening.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
4 p.m.
Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, As an Individual
Yes. Historically, Canada has played a very balanced role. We have a great history during the Cold War of maintaining this balance, being stalwart NATO members but at the same time being very effective diplomatically, in various multinational fora, to look at problem-solving.
At the end of the day, Canada's interest, which I always refer to, because we have to look at this through Canadian national interest, is to have a peaceful world order that allows us to trade. This is our fundamental interest. We are out there promoting diplomatic solutions but maintaining a robust military presence, because the military, at the end of the day, underlies security. Without the military, you're not going to get very far, but the military is not by itself the solution. It works in conjunction with diplomacy. The two go together.