Mr. Chairman, Madam Vice-Chairs and members of the standing committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before you. Especially as an American, it's a great honour to appear before this committee.
What's probably most useful for you, given my background and expertise, is for me to lay out the American perspective in as brief a context as I can.
From our point of view, the primary facts in the international system are the arrival of China as a superpower and the primacy of Asia. China will represent roughly one-fifth to one-quarter of global GDP, while Asia as a whole will be half of global GDP, and that share will grow.
Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that China is pursuing regional hegemony over Asia, essentially seeking to establish a predominant influence over the world's largest market area. From this position, Beijing would be able to dominate the world economy and use this power to exercise decisive influence in other countries' affairs.
From America's perspective, my view is that this means the primary U.S. foreign policy interest must be denying China regional hegemony over Asia. This will require that Washington lead a coalition of states with the will and the capacity to block Beijing's hegemonic ambitions. This ecumenical coalition is likely to centre on Asian countries like Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam and the like. We can think of this as an anti-hegemonic coalition bound together by this shared goal.
Central to the success of any such coalition will be a sufficiently strong military component. Why? While much discussion of China focuses on Beijing's immense economic power—and this concern is surely in order—the military threat China poses in Asia is real, severe and urgent.
The reason is somewhat paradoxical: While China is very strong economically, Beijing will find it very difficult to translate its economic leverage into decisive political influence. In fact, it's finding this out right now with Australia. Because of this, China is likely to look to its immensely powerful military as a tool to pursue this goal.
China's armed forces have transformed from a relatively backward military 30 years ago to a truly top-tier one today, which the United States military finds very daunting. Moreover, the PLA is no longer just a territorial defence force; it's now a “power projection” military, one that can project and sustain dominant military power.
Beijing's most dangerous strategy in this context is a focused and sequential strategy. In this model, Beijing would try to short-circuit or collapse the anti-hegemonic coalition through more limited uses of force. This would avoid the costs and risks of a total war but, if successful, would still achieve Beijing's transformational systemic gains. This approach could work, because the coalition depends on its members' confidence that they will be protected sufficiently to justify the risks of standing up to Beijing. If they think they'll be left vulnerable and subjected to Beijing's ire, though, they will be much more likely to make the best of a bad situation and cut a deal with Beijing.
America's goal in preventing this is absolutely central. Only America is strong enough to stand up directly to China, and Asian countries can really only prudently stand up to China if they know America will be there in force to defend them. Thus, the steel in the backbone of this anti-hegemonic coalition is American strength and resolve. Now, I emphasize that I don't say this in a chest-beating way; it's just the reality of the power situation in Asia and how vulnerable Asian countries must—and I think do—think about it.
Because of this, America must ensure it can effectively defend its allies in Asia against China alongside their own efforts. If America fails to do so, the coalition risks falling apart and leaving China dominating the world's greatest market. Accordingly, the U.S. defence strategy must focus on being able to defeat such Chinese action in Asia—in fact, this is what American defence strategy is supposed to be focused on—and it must be one that the American people can reasonably support, one that would be sane and rational to implement.
This requires a military strategy of denial: basically, the ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of a U.S. ally. Because Taiwan is effectively a U.S. ally and the front line of the U.S. defence perimeter, the United States must therefore be able to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. If we're able to do so, the coalition should stand strong and we will be able to check China's hegemonic ambitions, but this will be a highly demanding military standard.
Given the size of China's economy, Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and our and Taiwan's relative neglect of the Chinese military threat, the situation is now urgent. We are behind, and it appears we may be falling farther behind. At this rate, much of the best publicly available military analysis suggests that we may be on a trajectory to lose a war over Taiwan in the coming years. Accordingly, America must sharply reorient its military emphasis towards the western Pacific, while at the same time recapitalizing its nuclear deterrent and sustaining a low-cost counterterrorism posture.
The upshot of this is that the United States will need to reduce its military engagements, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe. As a result, America will not have a military capable of handling all three major Eurasian theatres largely on its own. This will create vacuums in other parts of the world, but there is no real choice. The United States is no longer the unipole: China is now another superpower, while other threats persist.
Meanwhile, while Europe in particular is important, it pales in significance to Asia. Russia is far less powerful than China. As a result, my view is that America will reduce its military role in Europe and the Middle East sooner or later. The question is how graceful that transition will be.
The solution, in my view, is clear. Allies must do more. Burden-sharing is no longer just a morality play from the United States but rather a strategic necessity for allied security. The best alliance model going forward, in my view, will be an interests-based division of labour. Rather than acting as if all U.S. allies are, if you will, a three musketeers-style “all for one and one for all”—an unrealistic approach that is bound to fail—the United States should encourage its allies and partners to act more in those areas where their interests are most directly impinged upon and their capacity to act is highest.
Hence, European NATO—