Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the standing committee. On behalf of the Conference of Defence Associations, I'm very pleased to actually contribute to your discussions today on defence procurement and the state of readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces. As the chair has mentioned, I'm a former vice chief of the defence staff. I'd be happy to also talk about some of those experiences during the Qs and As.
This committee is studying an important subject, given the troubling trends and threats we're seeing internationally. We hope your work will help inform the government's thought process on the defence policy review announced in last year's budget. We look forward to the results.
Given the committee's focus, the first point I would like to register is somewhat obvious: When it comes to military readiness, this is obviously a “come as you are” fight. We have what we have. The Canadian Armed Forces are living today with the organizational and readiness consequences of past Government of Canada policies and the related political, military and bureaucratic judgments, decisions and processes, including the procurement processes, that have left our armed forces today poorly adapted for the world we live in. This includes critical vulnerabilities. It includes capability gaps that are measured against traditional threats as well as emerging threats and levels of personnel and material readiness in the armed forces that are well below what's necessary for carrying out and sustaining the military missions and meeting the strategic objectives that successive governments have set out for us in our defence policies.
If we collectively as Canadians are surprised by the state of our armed forces, we shouldn't be. As members of the standing committee may know, on April 16, in fact two months ago today, our organization, the Conference of Defence Associations, with the CDA Institute sponsored and released an open letter signed by over 60 prominent former deputy prime ministers, foreign ministers, defence ministers from both sides of the aisle, national security advisers, deputy ministers, all the former chiefs of the defence staff, diplomats and business leaders. The signatories all highlighted the fact that issues of national security and defence are rarely treated seriously or as a priority in this country other than in times of great peril. The letter was a call for urgent government action, given that we are surely in such a moment of peril now.
With years of restraint, cost-cutting, downsizing and deferred investments, it's no wonder that Canada's defence capabilities have atrophied. While there have been some very positive announcements about NORAD modernization, the CF-18 replacement and some excellent capabilities that have been added to our inventories over the past few years, the truth is that many of our military systems are outdated and are technologically outmatched. Further, our forces are woefully inadequate in terms of the size, modern equipment, sustainment and the infrastructure to protect our own territory and our maritime approaches. We're also falling short in making meaningful contributions and sharing the burden of collective defence and security with our NORAD and NATO allies and partners.
The poor state of our military readiness, however, cannot all be squarely placed on Canada's approach to defence procurement. Given the rapid changes we're seeing in our societies, with incredible and disruptive technological advances, and given the rise of authoritarian revisionist powers, Canada isn't alone in needing to adapt our forces to the volatile, uncertain and unpredictable world we live in. However, we seem to have dug ourselves into a much deeper hole than many of our allies.
These are questions for the Government of Canada: Should they be treating the problems of military readiness as a crisis and urgent? Is this a government and personal priority for the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and her cabinet colleagues? Is there recognition that we can't afford to carry on with business as usual?
The unfortunate fact is that business as usual, when it comes to defence procurement, means that the military requirement is often not the most important or relevant factor, and sometimes can be of secondary or even tertiary concern when it's measured against other policy objectives associated with economic, regional or societal benefits. Business as usual means that most acquisitions, especially major capabilities, will most certainly be late to need, will more often than not fail to meet the military requirements originally set out by military planners and will inevitably cost more than they should. Few would argue that we're getting the best value for money. Ultimately, when we spend more than we need to on capabilities, this leaves a lot less money for other important military requirements.
It's doubtful there's been any other defence topic in Canada that's been more thoroughly scrutinized, studied and debated than military procurement. Despite commitments by governments over the years to make our system more effective and efficient, it would seem that incrementalism is the best we can expect with our current approach.
Fundamental change, if that's what the Government of Canada wants, is unlikely to happen without three conditions being set.
First, it's a willingness to revise policies and the applicable regulations and procedures to clearly differentiate defence procurement, military procurement, including having the dedicated staff capacity, from the rest of the procurement of government services.
Second is a reframing of the calculation of risk dealing with the bureaucratic and political aversion to risk associated with many defence procurements. All procurements carry financial, political, process, program and technological risks but defence procurements are fundamentally about the risk to life, national security, life, health, potentially even mission success. They don't always seem to get the right weight they deserve.
Finally, as has already been described, procurement is complex by design and there's nobody in charge and that has to be fixed.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.