National Defence Committee on Sept. 21st, 2023

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

The question remains: To what extent does our exclusion from this group impact our ability to benefit from it and to secure our own Arctic approaches, our own shores, and to be a meaningful ally within the Five Eyes, which increasingly looks like three eyes?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Chair, I'm here to talk about IPS, and I think that's a good example of how we are being valuable to allies. We are very valued in the region, as both partners and allies, and yes, on AUKUS, we're not in pillar one. We're looking at how we can contribute to pillar two, but everything I just described in IPS is about working with regional partners, and we're wanted in the region. We're valued in the region and we're contributing in the region.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Perhaps you had something to add, General Prévost? It looked like you were....

[MGen Paul Prévost]

No, but I think that in the question I've heard some of the answers. AUKUS is three of our Five Eyes partners, and there's tremendous co-operation among the Five Eyes partners and in intelligence at all levels and at the highest level of classification.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Is there an appetite for an invitation for Canada to join AUKUS, then, so that we may benefit from the sharing among these partners?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Mr. Chair, we're working on it. We're talking to our allies, obviously, and the U.S. and Australia particularly. The way I like to say it is that we have something to contribute. When we look at Canada's economy and the technology we have here, we see that we have something to contribute and we're working with our allies on that.

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Okay.

Going back to the chair's questions earlier, could you give us, maybe in the time you have left—probably about half a minute—some of the specific threats posed by adversarial regimes in this theatre that we do need to address: subsurface, surface, in the air and in cyber?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

In 15 seconds or less, Mr. Chair, I think it's all domains. China is well advanced over there. The A2/AD that we call “anti-access/area denial” around Taiwan goes from space all the way to subsurface. It's a robust system.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

The question keeps coming up and coming up, and I'm not speaking on behalf of the committee, but certainly on my behalf, I'd be interested in your undertaking to give us the non-classified understanding of what the capabilities of China are so that we can understand in a broader sort of way the actual threat itself. Is that fair?

[Some hon. members]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Okay. That's—

[Shelby Kramp-Neuman, Conservative, Hastings—Lennox and Addington, ON]

That's a good question.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Collins, you have the last five minutes. Welcome to the committee.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair, and thanks for having me here today.

I've read a lot about China's long-term military modernization plans. How are we dealing with that with the our resources that we have at our disposal? Also, then, how are our partners assisting with that as well?

[MGen Greg Smith]

Mr. Chair, I can of course speak better to Canada. That's what the Indo-Pacific strategy is about. China is tremendously capable. My colleague has talked about some of that, and what we're doing, to my mind, is deterrence. We're showing that the rules-based international order matters and that you have to follow those rules.

The fact that we've done a Taiwan Strait transit recently is reinforcing that it is an international waterway in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. That's an example of our reinforcing the rules-based international order and of deterring China by showing that those are the rules we follow. This is how countries interact.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Can I ask about the strategy? How fluid is it? How will it change over time? How do you respond to issues as they arise over a period of time? I'm assuming that it is a fluid strategy. How do we gauge the success of that strategy? What check-in points do you use to determine when it's time to change course?

[Peter Lundy]

Chair, I can start, if that's agreeable.

The strategy is in fact fluid. As I mentioned earlier, it has a 10-year horizon, but it also has a kind of midpoint at five years, where we will do a full evaluation of the strategy and make the necessary adjustments.

There's also a robust governance structure in place that goes all the way from director level within the bureaucracy to the deputy minister level. The second committee meeting at the deputy minister level will take place next week. Those are opportunities to assess the implementation on the ground of the strategy and where we're at—are we meeting the necessary performance milestones?—and then to recalibrate and make those adjustments. That's the detailed implementation level.

At various points in time, certainly, ministers would want to weigh in on the trajectory of the strategy once they understand how it is being implemented on the ground, and there are those opportunities as well.

[MGen Greg Smith]

Chair, if I could just jump in from a defence perspective, it's a fully funded strategy. We're actually doing things and then we're basing on that and we're measuring: Are we achieving the right results? Then we can adjust off that.

Basically, we report to Global Affairs, which has that secretariat, but from a defence perspective, we're measuring equally how we're doing and changing if needed.

[MGen Paul Prévost]

Chair, I'll just add a piece on the fluidity piece.

Operationally, actions on the ground will vary from year to year based on our priorities and the partners we need to engage with, but I think the strategy is also about creating relationships, and relationships take time. We have selected partners. We will select partners. We can't just jump.... What we're trying to do is have a permanent presence and have long-standing relationships with people. It's fluid tactically and operationally, but in terms of a strategy, it's trying to establish long-term relationships.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

What role does AI play in the strategy in terms of a defence perspective? I talked about modernization earlier. How does that play a role in the creation and the implementation of the strategy, and also, from a defence perspective, what might we be concerned about with those other players in the region that are using AI to create problems?

[MGen Paul Prévost]

I'd say that probably the only aspect we're concerned about is the last question, the last point you raised about how other potential adversaries are using AI. It's something we're watching.

We don't have an aspect of AI in our strategy. There are a lot of roads in front of us on how we work with AI, but in terms of potential adversaries using AI, we are concerned about it.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have about 45 seconds.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Very quickly, then, there was a reference earlier to a human rights-based approach. Can I ask how the IPS takes into account the expansion of Canada's trade network? Does that come into play at any point in time in terms of the decisions we make as part of that strategy?

[Peter Lundy]

I'm sorry. Just so I can understand the question, Chair, it's about the trade dimension...?

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Yes. We have trade partners in the region. We have those relationships that are obviously important to Canada's economy. How does that play a role in the IPS?