Evidence of meeting #7 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was threat.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mrs. Gallant.
With the final four minutes, I'll go to Mr. Hampson.
My first question has to do with Taiwan. Do you think that Canada should be changing our posture on Taiwan and changing, if you will, our public policy with respect to Taiwan?
Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
When it comes to Taiwan, one thing we should be working on and pursuing is welcoming Taiwan into the trans-Pacific partnership trade agreement and supporting Taiwan's position or seat in various international organizations where the Chinese have indicated they don't want them to be sitting any longer.
Liberal
Chancellor's Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee & Migration Council, As an Individual
Yes, absolutely. Taiwan is an important trading partner. It's important to send a strong message to our friends and allies in the region that we are strong supporters of Taiwan.
There is creative ambiguity going back to the Taiwan act of 1972. Occasionally President Biden has overstepped that and irritated the Chinese. We have to obviously live with that going forward. You don't want to precipitate a Chinese attack on Taiwan because they think it's going to declare its full independence.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I take your point, but we may be at the end of the utility of creative ambiguity.
Unfortunately, I have to move on because if I'm going to make my colleagues' lives miserable with the clock, I have to make my own life miserable with the clock.
Mr. Kolga, you and I first met over Magnitsky sanctions. They had some utility. The utility maybe hasn't been as exploited as it should have been by the Government of Canada. I would be interested in your thoughts.
Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual
Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Chair.
Yes, Canada has been reluctant in using Magnitsky sanction legislation. This is, of course, legislation that allows the Canadian government to target individual human rights abusers and corrupt officials in countries like Russia and China. We've fallen behind our allies in placing names on our own sanctions list.
The fact of the matter is that corrupt Russian oligarchs hold significant assets—I'm talking about hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars in assets—in this country. Targeting those assets with sanctions would send a very strong message to Vladimir Putin and would almost certainly cause him to change his calculus with regard to the situation in Ukraine and the conflict that he's trying to create with NATO right now.
We need to be using those sanctions more efficiently. We need to be targeting Putin in his own wallet through his corrupt oligarch enablers. We need to be updating that legislation to introduce some reporting and transparency to it to make it work more efficiently.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you to you both. This has been a fascinating hour of the changing nature of warfare and each of you have brought your own expertise to help the committee look at how the threat analysis is literally changing on an hourly basis. It was very helpful.
On behalf of the committee I want to thank both of you. It's been extraordinary beneficial.
With that we will suspend while we re-empanel. Thanks again.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I call the meeting back to order. We are again very fortunate to have two very excellent witnesses. We're going to ask Mr. Fadden for a five-minute statement and after that Mr. Taillon for a further five-minute statement, and then we'll go to questions.
Mr. Fadden, you have five minutes please.
Richard Fadden As an Individual
Thank you, Chair, I very much appreciate the opportunity of speaking to you.
I believe that the treatment of threats [Technical difficulty—Editor] and I want to start my remarks by suggesting a number of considerations that I hope will assist your work in assessing threats.
First, I suggest that an effective consideration of threats has two distinct parts. The first is relatively objective as it deals with the intent, the capability and the likelihood of actions against Canada. The second part is subjective and it's how a government, a minister, a group or a person chooses to view those actions potentially directed at Canada. For example, one government may consider that Russian activity in the Baltic states constitutes a threat to Canada that needs a Canadian response, while another government may not take that view.
The subjective part clearly changes over time, not least because governments change, but this perception of threats is important for the Canadian Forces and the requirement that they be prepared to act effectively in response to government action or not. While it is important for governments to have room to adjust their views, I suggest there is not a national consensus on these matters. This has consequences for all sorts of prioritization decisions taken by governments and eventually by the Canadian Forces.
My second meta point concerns the nature of current and future warfare for which governments and the CF must prepare. The danger that government direction, doctrine and operational preparedness be oriented to past threats must be consciously avoided. For example, it seems unlikely that Canada and NATO will see Russian tanks roll across the plains of central Europe, which was one of the main fears during the Cold War, yet it's a distinct possibility. What does that mean? Should we consciously beef up our air and land based anti-tank weaponry? It's not an insignificant cost and decision. It does have major implications for doctrine and procurement. I'd suggest that Canada's most likely to encounter threats requiring a response in the cyber-realm and by special and limited forces. This is not to suggest that more traditional forces and planning are not needed, but that we need to rethink this balance.
A third issue is the extent to which we, Canada and the Canadian Forces, can parse our operational capabilities by sharing capabilities with allies. It's not an easy thing to do, but it's not impossible. For example, we often rely on specific U.S. support. If we opt out of having, for example, an air defence capability and have a deal with another country, what does that do for operational effectiveness and readiness in that area?
This last point is closely linked to what I believe is an accepted fact. Canada is unlikely alone to deal with an external threat of any significance. It's either through our settled alliances, NORAD and NATO, or an ad hoc alliance that we're going to meet those threats. This in practice also means that both elements of threats of which I spoke earlier are very likely to be a product of consensus. The question in my mind is to what extent can Canada alone reasonably define threats that originate beyond our borders? I don't think it's possible to do that across the board. We have to take into account the impressions of our close allies.
Another issue linked to the subjective part of a threat relates to the fact that governments broadly are aware of the capabilities of the Canadian Forces and are unlikely to ask them to do something they cannot effectively deliver. Thus, in these circumstances the Canadian Forces are seen to be operationally ready. This is a relatively dangerous situation, because it does not take into account the objective part of threats that I talked about a moment ago.
Let me talk for a couple of minutes about those areas where I think there are gaps in the Canadian Forces' operational readiness. The first, and I think the individuals appearing before me mentioned this, is cyber-capability both offensive and defensive. I would also add to this that I think there's room for discussion here as to what portion of the cyber-environment the military should deal with as opposed to CSE, as opposed to other parts of the Canadian government. It's not extraordinarily expensive compared with other parts of the defence establishment, but overlap is not very useful.
Then there's our capability in the Arctic. We have no bases. We have limited comms. We have limited surveillance, and likely far from enough training in a very difficult area.
Thirdly, I think we lack significantly surveillance capability overall against Russian, Chinese and North Korean threats. Much of it is linked to what we are doing with NORAD.
Fourthly, I think we need to have a measure of agreement nationally on the nature and extent of threats. I say this because I don't think it exists, and no government is going to want to spend billions of dollars more on the Canadian Forces unless there's some measure of a national consensus on what the threats are that we have to face. We don't have that right now.
Lastly, we need to prioritize. A number of the questions from your members pointed to this, and I don't think we've been very successful in doing this. We can't effectively say that we're going to ignore Europe or we're going to ignore China, but we do not currently have enough resources to do that.
Lastly, truly, the CF lacks personnel, both because it has retention and recruiting challenges, and because its personnel cap is likely too low. I leave it to others to discuss whether the forces have the right mix of skills for the kind of work that we're likely to face, but I'm not convinced that the case has been made.
As well—others can do this better than I—budgeting and procurement decisions and policies frequently negatively impact operational effectiveness because they make the acquisition of replacement or new equipment too slow, too complicated and too expensive.
I'll stop there, Chair, and I am happy to try to answer any questions you might have.
Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon As an Individual
Thank you.
I am here as an academic and a private citizen who is deeply concerned by the approach to the activities of the Chinese Communist Party. For me, an important reference is the 1999 publication of Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America. I believe, and a number of my other colleagues firmly believe, that we've been operating in that environment since 2000.
The authors, Colonel Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, both PLA colonels, had an idea of conducting a multi-faceted approach in the conduct of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. The authors explored a full spectrum of non-kinetic but focused warfare to include the diplomatic, financial, trade and biochemical to regulatory, smuggling, drug, media and ideological, among others. This typology would be married with other forms of more known warfare, such as nuclear, conventional, guerrilla and terrorism as a potential PLA war-fighting strategy.
Some in the academic and the intelligence communities have argued that the greatest security threat to Canada's economic well-being is the increasingly pervasive intelligence and economic espionage threat orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party. This is not a new revelation, as Canadian diplomats and intelligence leaders, such as the former ambassador to China Mr. Mulroney, Mr. Fadden and the present director, Mr. Vigneault, have clearly and openly stated their concerns regarding the ever-expanding and problematic activities of the CCP. Moreover, China experts, such as Dr. Burton, have further reinforced these misgivings regarding China's spectrum of nefarious activities within Canada and our allies.
Our American allies have also surfaced their uneasiness—more aggressively, I may add—about the range of the CCP activities domestically and internationally. In 2020, at the Hudson Institute, FBI director Christopher Wray posited that the FBI is opening a new China-related counter-intelligence case about every 10 hours. Moreover, he stated that of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counter-intelligence cases currently under way in the country, almost half are related to China.
To fully understand the CCP's strategic threat to Canada and our allies, we must appreciate that President Xi views that the CCP is conducting a generational fight for strategic, economic and technical leadership to replace the United States and dominate the global commons. For President Xi, his plan incorporates a whole-of-state strategic approach to become not just an international economic competitor but the only global superpower.
From an intelligence standpoint, the spectrum of tradecraft and methodologies employed by the Chinese government's bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus can be subtle, diverse and sophisticated. Canada and our [Technical difficulty—Editor] intrusions, stealing personnel, corporate and financial data to the more traditional aspects of corrupting individuals, utilizing sex, ethnicity and greed in the pursuit of sensitive information, access or materials.
Chinese—
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Mr. Chair, I don't like to interrupt the witnesses, but I would like to point out that there is no more interpretation.
Liberal
As an Individual
The Chinese communist leadership fully appreciates that to eclipse the west it needs to make dramatic leads in full-spectrum technological innovation and application. The pursuit of intellectual property, as well as penetrating business, academic and other centres of research and development in order to appropriate or steal R and D appears to be a consistent, yet effective, methodology.
One American example of the foregoing is the Chinese scientist Hongjin Tan, a lawful permanent resident in the United States who stole more than one billion dollars' worth of trade secrets from his Oklahoma-based petroleum company employer. He was subsequently arrested, found guilty and sent to prison. Some analysts and observers have argued that since 2012 and the coming to power of President Xi Jinping we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the Chinese Communist Party's intelligence activities amongst western nations.
A number of intelligence personalities, journalists and CCP analysts have argued that their intelligence activities have reportedly infiltrated different levels of government, be they local, provincial or federal. This has enabled the CCP diplomats, administrators and intelligence personnel to gain access in order to influence Canadian public policy and public opinion.
A number of Canadian citizens have bravely reported their experiences with the CCP influencers, and some politicians have noted manipulation of the Chinese Canadian community, as recently did Conservative Mr. Kenny Chiu. In fact, two McGill University researchers and research conducted by the Atlantic Council reportedly observed that there were anonymous articles circulating on Chinese-language apps and websites that misrepresented a private member's bill that Mr. Chiu had tabled, and allegedly negatively influenced his electoral campaign during the 2021 election. This incident, by itself, must be investigated and fully explored.
A decade before, in 2011, CTV News surfaced that a Conservative MP was reportedly engaged in a flirtation with Shi Rong, an attractive journalist for the CCP state-owned media outlet, Xinhua. Strangely enough, this publication had been suspected as having connections to the Chinese intelligence apparat.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
That brought it to a close very quickly. Thank you. I think you'll have a fair bit of time to work in your conclusion.
Mr. Doherty, you have six minutes please.
Conservative
Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our colleagues for being here.
Mr. Taillon and Mr. Fadden, as a matter of fact, you took away a lot of what I was going to say. For a time in the early 2000s, I worked on a number of inter-agency security projects. I was shocked when I was doing my work to find out how many times a day our systems were attempted to be compromised by foreign actors, whether through cyber-threats, economic disruptors, etc. The work that we were doing looked at the potential threats for both kinetic and non-kinetic as Mr. Taillon mentioned, the bio fears, as well as economic.
I think it was Mr. Fadden who said there is not a general consensus as to the actual threat that's out there.
Could you maybe share with us the number of times a day that our systems are attempted to be compromised by foreign actors?
As an Individual
I think it's fairly certain that we're talking about millions of times every day, multiple of millions, and this goes on day after day after day. Sometimes they're successful and sometimes they're not, but the number of pings, if I can use the vernacular, are in the millions.
Conservative
Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC
Mr. Fadden, would you say that China presents the most significant national security threat to Canada?
As an Individual
In the medium to long term, absolutely. We should call them for what they are. They are a strategic adversary.
I remember a while ago the Prime Minister was asked if he would agree with this definition and he declined to answer. They're not an enemy—we're not at war—but they're far more than a competitor. It goes to my point that we don't really understand as a country the nature of the threat: kinetic, cognitive, all of them.
The first thing we need to do in dealing with China is to recognize the nature of our relationship with them and call them a strategic adversary.
Conservative
Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC
I remember one of the very first debates we did. I stood in the House and said that it's not all sunshine and lollipops, as my colleagues across the way would like to think. Every day we have foreign actors who are trying either influence or disrupt our well-being as a nation.
Mr. Fadden, do you believe Huawei presents a significant national security threat to Canada?
As an Individual
I absolutely do. I think it acts as an agent of the Chinese party state. As has been said earlier today, and as I can repeat in detail if you want, they have clearly indicated that acquiring information, intellectual property and intelligence from western countries is part and parcel of their basic approach to governance. Huawei will give them the opportunity of using any number of entry points into our communication system, both the old-fashioned one and the digital one. Whether they do this or not, it's not really.... We don't know because I don't think we've proven that yet, but why would we give them the opportunity, given they've already said clearly that it's part of their objective?
Huawei, beyond a shadow of a doubt, operates as an agent of the Chinese party state, so it seems to me it's beyond reasonable debate. There's a significant risk for us in allowing them to operate.
Conservative
Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC
I always say that speculation is a fool's practice, but I'm going to ask you to speculate as to why you believe the Canadian government has failed to act on this file and ban Huawei.