National Defence Committee on Oct. 30th, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Pursuant to the motions adopted on September 16 and September 23, the committee is meeting to continue its study on the modernization of NORAD.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses. We have Andrea Charron, director, centre for defence and security studies, University of Manitoba; and Peter Bates.

I appreciate you both for being here.

Andrea, you're on Zoom. With the buttons in your system, use the hand function and the mic with regard to language interpretation.

Mr. Bates, if you would, please consult the card to make sure that we provide for proper feedback and so that incidents don't occur. There's language translation there as well.

I will now invite Andrea Charron to make her opening statement.

You have up to five minutes.

[Andrea Charron, Director, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the invitation.

I want to focus my remarks on the importance of NORAD modernization for NATO and allies, the need for integrated air and missile defence, and a dedicated, named operation for the defence of Canada.

A defended North America means that allies and NATO are stronger. Given that many of the vital supply chains and defeat capabilities—including NATO Joint Force Command Norfolk—on which allies depend are based in North America. If it is not defended, then allies can be held at risk.

The functional logic that led to the establishment of NORAD in 1958 still stands. NORAD has been the front line of defence for North America ever since. The world is in a new age in terms of the variety, speed and accuracy of air and missile threats that demand integrated air and missile defence. This is the goal of golden dome, NORAD's mission to represent a component of IAMD. However, its integration into a system of systems within a single chain of command vital for IAMD does not exist yet, and, as suggested by James Fergusson, should be the goal for Canada and the United States.

General Guillot, commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, envisions three domes that would make up the golden dome for America—a domain awareness dome, of which NORAD is essential; an air dome for aircraft, UAS and cruise missiles, which again includes NORAD; and an ICBM dome.

This means that the United States will not have one exquisite system but several systems that need to be linked initially with off-the-shelf sensing, queuing and defeat systems of which Canada plays an important role, and from which it can benefit with Canadian-based systems. Canada has the option of refusing to be part of golden dome, which would result in the United States deploying over-the-horizon radar and land-based defeat capabilities near the Canada-U.S. border, violating Canadian airspace as necessary, and flying in the face of the logic of a joint approach to the defence of North America.

It also risks the marginalization of NORAD, which is cancellable on 12 months' notice. This would also put more pressure on our ally, Kalaallit Nunaat—Greenland. If Canada is not a participant in the defence of North America, there are other strategic locations to exploit.

The priority for North American allies is domain awareness. This includes sea floor-, land- and space-based systems, and NORAD modernization anticipates many of these systems. However, linking them, protecting them, analyzing the data and ensuring the CAF has the digital backbone and zero trust-compliant links with the United States and allies cannot be underestimated.

NORAD and NATO need to share more information and conduct exercises together to signal to adversaries that there is no seam between North America and Europe to exploit. Greenland is on the edge of this seam but is now part of USNORTHCOM. Canada needs to get to know the Danish Armed Forces better. We need liaison officers. We need to exercise with them, and we need to think of Greenland as integral to North American defence. A Canada-Greenland-Denmark co-operation agreement would further knit NORAD and NATO efforts.

While attention to the northern approaches is important, we cannot forget the western, eastern and southern approaches. The United States is opaque on far too many NORAD-related projects. The Permanent Joint Board on Defense meets too irregularly.

Basics like the fact that there is no named operation for the defence of Canada can be fixed immediately. Every time the quadruple-plus-hatted 1 CAD commander scrambles the jets, he draws from a generic O and M budget. Two of the most basic needs of the military—operations and maintenance—are lumped together, so Peter must steal from Paul for what is the number one priority of Canada, which is its defence.

I have some recommendations for the committee.

First, present a categorical multi-party statement that the defence of Canada is a core national interest and table it in Parliament.

Second, name NORAD operations in Canada and supply a dedicated budget.

Third, ensure that NORAD modernization remains the number one CAF priority and that projects are operational as soon as possible. Prioritize domain awareness projects and resist the urge to add to the CAF agenda.

Fourth, recommend a Canadian NORAD czar to coordinate whole-of-government actions and lobby the U.S. government. The CAF and NORAD cannot fulfill this role.

Finally, ensure that the functional logic that created NORAD guides all discussions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you; I appreciate your opening statement.

Peter Bates, you have up to five minutes as well.

[Peter Bates, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Good morning.

My name is Peter Bates and, from 2014 to 2019, I served as the Canadian political adviser to the commander of NORAD, providing strategic insight and policy advice to the command.

Since 1958, NORAD has guarded the skies and approaches to North America. Unfortunately, the NORAD we have today is not the NORAD we need. We are now engaged in a war with Putin's Russia in Ukraine, in Europe and here at home. Russia's leadership have repeatedly declared that they see themselves at war with NATO and that Ukraine is only the beginning. While they often lie, in this case we must take them at their word. Flagrant Russian violations of allied airspace, industrial sabotage, attempted murder in Europe and ongoing efforts to undermine our societies and democracies demonstrate the seriousness of their intent.

Through two world wars and beyond, North America's critical value to our friends and allies has been the ability of Canada and the United States to project combat power, military forces and munitions overseas to Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Our current adversaries, Russia and China, have invested heavily in anti-access and area denial capabilities to prevent us from doing so effectively in the future. Imagine how much more effective those capabilities will be if they can also disrupt and degrade our ability to even dispatch forces, equipment and munitions from North America.

Russia's aerial bombardment of Ukraine already demonstrates the damage that modern conventional weapons can inflict. Ukraine's targeted response against key military, industrial and infrastructure targets within Russia itself illustrates the potential of such a campaign to weaken and disorient an opponent, ostensibly even one more powerful.

NORAD's wartime mission must be to defend those assets key to our ability to project military power to support our allies and to defeat our adversaries overseas. Canadian and U.S. defence strategy has always been that we will fight forward to defend ourselves at home. NORAD must be the shield above North America that permits us to fight and win overseas.

Unfortunately, it is a long time since either Ottawa or Washington regarded NORAD as a genuine warfighting command. For Ottawa, NORAD has become a symbol of our unique partnership with the United States. For Washington, NORAD is a quaint and largely ignored adjunct to United States Northern Command.

Current Canadian plans for NORAD modernization emphasize improved sensors, domain awareness and strengthened command and control. This is vital but not sufficient to meet our continental defence needs. While you cannot defend against threats that you cannot detect, you cannot defend if you cannot defeat at least some, if not all, of these attacks. Today, NORAD is only marginally capable of doing either of these things.

NORAD's last major modernization was the binational North American air defence modernization of the 1980s, responding to a commonly agreed threat from the Soviet Union in an era of partnership and growing economic integration. This is not the situation we face today.

Under the Trump administration, the bilateral partnership we have enjoyed for decades with the United States is over, at least for now. Trump's tariffs and threats demonstrate a personal animus against this country. It is unlikely that the Trump administration would even agree to a mutually beneficial joint NORAD modernization effort. Trump would probably insist on additional payment by Canada to the United States for the protection that NORAD provides. I regard his golden dome missile defence initiative as a similar rent-seeking effort, not a serious, achievable defence program. If NORAD and its modernization attract presidential attention, Trump may even threaten to withdraw from the NORAD agreement completely.

In short, we are already at war. NORAD must be postured and provisioned to defend key national assets critical for the protection and support of Canadian and U.S. forces outside of North America, to support our partners and allies, and to engage in combat with peer adversaries overseas if necessary.

The Trump administration is not a reliable partner for Canada and is fundamentally opposed to the bilateral partnership that NORAD represents. We must continue to work with the United States where it is in our interest and to our benefit, and we must nurture relationships with those in the U.S. who continue to value that partnership, like General Guillot. NORAD remains a valuable forum for that effort.

However, we must be careful that NORAD does not become a focus for Trump's anti-Canadian impulses or rent-seeking initiatives. If the Trump administration were to decide to withdraw from the NORAD agreement, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to restore it with any future U.S. administration of whatever party.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Bates.

We'll proceed with our first round of questions for up to six minutes.

Ms. Gallant, you have the floor.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, Ms. Charron, you mentioned the NORAD czar. Who would be best to fill that role?

[Andrea Charron]

I don't have a particular individual in mind. It has to be somebody who understands NORAD and the Canada-U.S. defence relationship well and somebody who is respected by the U.S. and Canada and could pull together not only efforts by the whole of Canada but also efforts by the United States. I suspect it would be a civilian. It should be a civilian. They may or may not have a defence background. I'm thinking about the role that Brian Mulroney played, on many occasions, to try to lobby the U.S. government. Sadly, he's no longer with us.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

The Arctic Archipelago is beyond North American long-range radar. Given the satellite coverage gap that's coming, how can we put a stopgap into place so that we have coverage there, even though there will be absolutely no eyes on it for a period of time?

[Andrea Charron]

This is where the NORAD modernization projects are thinking about this. There is the Arctic over-the-horizon radar system that will be coming online, and there is the AWACS. We do have satellite coverage. We do have the benefit of allies as well. You're right: We have a gap between the north warning system eventually reaching the end of its operational life—and we are going to extend that for as long as possible—and these other systems we're waiting for, the Arctic and, potentially, polar over-the-horizon radar systems.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

You mentioned what was needed. What is the shortest time frame to fill the stopgap, until that equipment is put in place for the modernization?

[Andrea Charron]

I believe most of the dates are into the early 2030s. Anything that the Government of Canada can do to accelerate them and bring them online faster is helpful. That's why I said we should not add to the CAF agenda while it has this as its number one priority.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Bates, if Canada decides not to be part of golden dome and if we don't offer any finances, what measures could the current U.S. government take to pay for our mutual defence? If we're not going to contribute to golden dome, and if we're going to receive the benefits, how could we be made to pay?

[Peter Bates]

We're not necessarily going to receive the benefits of golden dome if we're not participating in the program. The United States previously, with the existing missile defence system, made it clear, when we did not agree to participate in anti-ballistic missile defence, that we would not necessarily or inevitably be covered by that particular system, which was designed to defend the territory of the United States.

The president has already made statements in which he said that if Canada were to become the 51st state, it could get golden dome for free, and if not, they're going to charge us up to $80 billion.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

In your remarks, you mentioned that we “must take” Putin and Xi Jinping “at their word”. Why do we have to take them at their word?

[Peter Bates]

It's due to the continuing incursions into NATO airspace in Europe. The sabotage, including bombings, explosions, fires and attempted assassinations of industrial figures, demonstrates that the Russians are quite seriously at war with us. The problem is that we have fallen into the trap of referring to what we call “hybrid” war or “grey-zone” war. I don't like the terms “hybrid” or “grey zone”. I think we need to come forward and accept the fact that we are in fact not in the opening stages but in the middle stages of an ongoing conflict with the Russian Federation.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

In your estimation, is the Canadian public aware of this? If not, how should it be made aware?

[Peter Bates]

I am hoping to make them more aware through appearances like mine, today, before this committee, and I thank you for the invitation.

I think people are becoming aware. I think the government is certainly aware, if you look at the programs the Prime Minister has indicated with regard to CAF modernization and CAF recapitalization. If we look at our allies, the German government, for example, has announced that it intends to have a regular armed force of 260,000 personnel by the 2030s. The French government indicated some time ago that they are preparing for a major war in Europe.

I think, around the world, particularly among our allies, there is the recognition that we are already in conflict. We are already in a war. We are providing incredible materiel support to Ukraine as it fights on our behalf.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Algonquin—Renfrew—Pembroke, ON]

You mentioned grey-zone and hybrid warfare. What would it take, do you think, to trigger a kinetic response on the part of North America or Europe?

[Peter Bates]

Right now, a full kinetic response from the alliance would require Russian incursion into an allied country. The most likely victim would be the Baltic states, where we have the Canadian brigade right now in Latvia.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Bates.

Thank you, Ms. Gallant.

Viviane Lapointe, you have up to six minutes.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Bates, the modernization program introduces massive new digital infrastructure. We've heard previous testimony about the fragility of a single point of failure incident. In your opening remarks, you mentioned that Russia and China may have the ability to prevent our deployment of defence. Are you talking about the disabling of digital infrastructure? How should Canada build our cybersecurity and redundancy into these systems from day one? What lessons can we draw from allied modernization efforts as well?

[Peter Bates]

Digital infrastructure is not the only vulnerability I want to highlight. The other vulnerability that we're facing is that, throughout the Cold War and up until 1991, Canada and the United States had an abundance of military facilities. The United States had half a dozen embarkation points for U.S. military forces to leave the United States. It now has two. The example that comes to mind is this: If the RAF had depended on two major operating bases in the Battle of Britain, the Battle of Britain would have turned out very differently. Today, in Canada, we have two major operating bases for our fighter force. That's it. The ability of the Russian Federation in particular to attack those bases from within its own territory has only increased over the last 20 years.

Yes, the digital infrastructure is one risk. We can address that by multiplexing, by producing alternative command centres, as we have in the NORAD construct. We have the command centre in Colorado. We have the command centre in Winnipeg. We have the command centre in Florida. We have one in Alaska. If one of those command centres is disabled or is out of communication, others can pick up the slack. Similarly, we can.... In fact, in some ways, with digital it's much easier to switch those kinds of capacities. It's something that we need to be aware of, and we need to be very careful in installing this digital infrastructure. We also need to be very careful in looking at our physical infrastructure and the quantity of forces, equipment and munitions that we have to deal with real-world conflict.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

NORAD modernization places a really strong emphasis on achieving all-domain awareness, and that's integrating information across the air, maritime and land space and the cyber domains. From your operational experience, what are the biggest integration challenges in achieving that vision? Where is Canada best positioned to add unique value with that?

[Peter Bates]

The unique value that we've always had at NORAD is the incredible capability of the Canadian Forces members. We have some of the best-trained, most effective military members. We just have too few of them. The folks I worked with in NORAD for five years, both Canadian and American, were top-class people trying to do the best work they possibly could for both of our countries. We have sent our best people down to Colorado. We have many of our best people at DRDC, looking at the issues of over-the-horizon radar. One of the issues with over-the-horizon radar is that traditionally it hasn't worked over the Arctic because of atmospheric disturbances. They've done an enormous amount of work to try to obviate that. We may, in fact, have the potential of an over-the-horizon radar that will work in the Arctic, which is incredible, and it's Canadian. In many ways, it's a Canadian advance. I would say that that's where our value-add is. We think hard, we work hard, and our folks know what they're doing.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

Dr. Charron, modernization investments also expand Canada's operational reach in the north. From your perspective, how do these initiatives enhance Canada's ability to monitor and respond across Arctic regions? What significance do they hold for strengthening our northern defence and situational awareness capabilities?