Part of the problem with the judge advocate general's superintendence of military justice, under section 9.2 of National Defence Act, is that “superintendence” is not defined. The judge advocate general views this as supervising how the code of service discipline is used. For 20 years, “military justice” was not defined under the National Defence Act, and under Bill C-77 we defined “military justice” as the code of service discipline. We're using one statutory term to define another statutory term for whatever reason, but what that has meant for the last 25 years is that the judge advocate general will supervise in a public fashion the actions of not only legal advisers advising on military justice but the director of military prosecutions.
You have to remember that if the JAG is going to issue direction to the director of military prosecutions, the default is that it's going to be public and it's going to be in writing, which is why it's problematic when the minister issues direction to the director of military prosecutions directly, because that bypasses the role of the judge advocate general.
A lot was said in the 10th meeting of this committee about having the minister give direction directly to the director of military prosecutions, akin to what the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General does in the Department of Justice. The difference is that the Attorney General is a law officer, the chief law officer of Canada. While the current Minister of National Defence is a lawyer and past ministers of national defence have been lawyers, and it's very easy to advise them when you're a military lawyer, that's not always the case, nor are they a law officer.
The reason why the JAG would give direction to the director of military prosecutions is that it's a lawyer giving another lawyer direction in a very public fashion. By making the director of military prosecutions responsible to the minister—appointed by the minister, accountable to the minister—the JAG is no longer superintending military justice when it comes to military justice before a court martial, because the JAG really isn't supervising the director of military prosecutions. But we're leaving that in evidently. It's great there's an amendment that says the JAG will respect the roles of the director of military prosecutions, the director of defence counsel services and the Canadian Forces provost marshal, or whatever they're going to called, but where is the evidence that the JAG hasn't been doing that?
This is an amendment with no real consequence because there hasn't been a failure of the JAG in those terms. In fact, if we look at the influence on the director of military prosecutions, we don't see the chain of command influencing Colonel Kerr, who's the director of military prosecutions. We don't see that kind of influence going on. There's no evidence of that kind of influence. What does influence those decisions is media scrutiny. For example, I am still trying out the reasoning behind the decisions in the prosecution of Lieutenant-General Whelan, who was prosecuted by court martial. I'm still trying to figure out what was going on there, and I was following it closely.
If we are concerned about the influence of those decisions-makers, if we think the director of military prosecutions is being influenced by the chain of command or by the JAG, I would want to see that evidence, because there hasn't been any evidence of that.