National Defence Committee on Sept. 18th, 2025

[Ty Curran]

Under our defence policy, we identified three priority regions. Obviously, Canada and the Arctic and our defence of Canadians are paramount, but we identified Europe and the Indo-Pacific as other priority areas.

Under the Indo-Pacific strategy led by GAC, our biggest commitment is through Operation Horizon. It's a bit of a catch-all for a number of activities that we do: capacity building, training exercises and the three ships that we mentioned.

I think a fair criticism of Canada in the past has been that we don't always have an enduring presence in the region. We often come in and dip out, depending on other priorities, and so what we've tried to do through Operation Horizon is ensure that we have that enduring and sustained presence so we can ensure we're picking up on intelligence or information or deepening our relationships in that area so that we can benefit from that experience and use that experience for the ultimate security of Canada and Canadians.

[Eric Laporte]

Mr. Chair, if I may, it might be helpful to give a bit of context on the Indo-Pacific strategy as a whole and how Operation Horizon fits into that.

In 2022, the government launched the Indo-Pacific strategy, which is basically $2.3 billion over five years that looks at engaging in the region to bolster and diversify our trade as well as enhance our security. It has five interconnected strategic objectives for promoting peace, which is what DND does through Operation Horizon: expanding trade, investing, connecting people, building a sustainable and green future, and making sure that Canada is active.

Why are we engaging in the Indo-Pacific? Frankly, the region is the fastest-growing economic region in the world and accounts for almost two-thirds of global growth. By 2030, it will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class, and by 2040, the region will account for more than half of the global economy.

Our Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to advance and defend Canada's interests by supporting a more secure, prosperous, inclusive and sustainable region, while at the same time protecting Canada's national and economic security at home. One big element of the strategy is building and diversifying our partnerships, and since the launch of the strategy, we've reinforced those with Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, as examples.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Okay. Actually, that leads to a question. How is the Department of National Defence approaching co-operation with some of these newer security groupings we're seeing, like AUKUS, when Canada is not a formal member of those? How are we defining our co-operation in those types of alliances?

[Ty Curran]

There are a number of international groupings out there. Canada is a member of many of them, but not all, of course. We do think there are opportunities, when it makes sense, for there to be collaboration.

When we think of AUKUS, the root of that was nuclear-powered submarines, which is not an area that we expect Canada to make an investment in, but in pillar two of the grouping, where we can look at high technology co-operation, we think there are opportunities to do that, either with AUKUS or through partners there. Similarly, there are lots of other organizations out there, and we think we can benefit from their experience even if we aren't members.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Monsieur Savard-Tremblay, you have five minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Thank you.

Gentlemen, I'd like to go back and pick up where we left off earlier.

You talked about co-operation, rather than an alliance, among four players that each have their own interests. On that note, are there any key points to be monitored or any divergences to keep an eye on?

Next, I want to talk about India. I touched on this in a previous question. It's a more complex player in all of this.

What would you like to tell us about that?

[Eric Laporte]

Plenty of things.

Thank you for the question.

As has already been said, the four countries involved have different relationships with each other. I would say that China plays a predominant role in these relationships, but everyone is still independently involved.

Iran has a much closer relationship with Russia when it comes to material defence co-operation and political support on the nuclear issue, for example. Iran also has a very close trading relationship with China, particularly when it comes to oil.

As has already been mentioned, North Korea has a military relationship with Russia. It is also a very close partner of China.

These are things we are looking at. Perhaps General Ritchie has some examples he could add.

You also asked about India. On that topic, I would just like to say that we have a long-standing relationship that is quite close, based on mutual respect—

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

You're talking about India and what other country?

[Eric Laporte]

About Canada's relationship with India.

This relationship is based on principles such as the rule of law, sovereignty and so on.

At the G7, Prime Minister Carney had a bilateral meeting with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Modi. They're trying to recalibrate the relationship. Both sides even announced new high commissioners.

I put India in a different basket than the other four countries.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

I would summarize the relationship between India and China by saying that it's cold, but it's still a relationship. Would you agree with me?

[Eric Laporte]

Yes, I would say it's a very cold relationship. They have gone to war several times over the past two decades.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

How would you describe their relationship within BRICS, the group made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and where it seems to be heading right now?

[Eric Laporte]

As you said, it's still a relationship.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Based on your summary, then, India is not a security threat within the dynamic of the shifting international tectonic plates in the Indo-Pacific region.

What about the military aspect, Mr. Ritchie?

[Robert Ritchie]

Thank you for your question.

To add to my colleagues' comments, I would say that militarily, we are seeing drone and air defence technology exchanged between Russia and China, and between Russia and Iran.

Between North Korea and Russia, we mainly see a human contribution, the 12,000 people sent to fight the war in Ukraine. Conversely, from Russia to North Korea, we've seen a transfer of money, technology and experience, which continues to destabilize the peninsula.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

How much time do I have, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

You have another 30 seconds.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

What can I say intelligently in 30 seconds? I'll ask my question during my next turn, because I don't want to start another long question right now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Very well.

Mr. Kibble, you have four minutes.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Through you to the witnesses, I was just on board HMCS Vancouver, recently returned from Operation Talisman Sabre. Six days ago, we saw a PLAN aircraft carrier, their new one, transit the Taiwan Strait, exercising the right of innocent passage. Our RCN ship did that as well.

What's your assessment of PLAN's diplomatic protest against us for conducting those operations while they do it concurrently?

[Robert Ritchie]

Maybe I'll start with some military characterization and turn it over to colleagues....

Okay, I'll go straight to colleagues, please.

[Eric Laporte]

Yes, the Royal Canadian Navy regularly conducts transits through the Taiwan Strait. In this particular instance, we did it with the Australians. That was the first time we did it bilaterally with them.

Also, as is the norm, whenever we transit the strait, we often hear about it from our Chinese colleagues, both in Beijing and here, and also within the ministry of national defence and within the foreign affairs department. They démarche us and explain that we shouldn't be there and that we're hyping it up, and we explain that through UNCLOS, the Law of the Sea, we are allowed passage through the strait. It's a strait for international navigation, and so there's nothing preventing us from doing so.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Do you see this as their signalling clear intent of what they plan to do in that area?

[Eric Laporte]

Certainly, it's their intent to try to demonstrate that this is an area they consider to be theirs, and they want to diplomatically register that. There have been times when they also signal that militarily.

Maybe I could turn back to colleagues in the Department of National Defence in terms of the activities that the Chinese, either the Chinese navy or air force, do when our forces are in the region.