Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It's my pleasure to be here.
I will confine my remarks to providing a brief description of my perspective on managing risk in the public interest. Then I will specifically focus on how this relates to nuclear safety matters and the issues at Chalk River. Finally, I will provide you with some specific suggestions on governance of nuclear safety and future improvements.
Management of risk in the public interest should be guided by a balanced assessment of the detriments and the benefits. I have spent approximately 20 years working on this subject with professionals, experts, and my colleagues at the University of Waterloo.
We have tried to promote a rational basis for managing risk in society, particularly those risks that relate to the health and safety of persons and the environment. This has been a difficult area of public policy-making. It has suffered from a lack of careful planning, because images of catastrophic failures command the attention of the media and the public. They distort perceptions, and they drive public controversy. The decisions are thus heavily influenced by sensational reports, and the balanced views tend to get drowned out.
The fundamental challenge to a rational approach to managing risk is that we must simultaneously address the needs of a diverse public with diverse values across all groups in our society.
Against that background, my colleagues and I have reduced the essential issue to two key propositions.
One, the risks that we are all exposed to shall be managed to maximize the total net benefit to society. This requirement is a sufficient and effective guide to support rational efforts directed at reducing risk with the goal of improving health and safety.
Two, the decisions to serve the public interest must be open and apply across the complete range of hazards to life and health under public regulation.
In simple terms, then, all decisions should weigh all benefits and all detriments. When comprehensively assessed, the net benefit to society should be positive in terms of lives saved or life extension achieved. This is just as applicable to nuclear safety as it is to any other aspects of our lives in which safety is important.
Now I will turn to the Chalk River situation. There never was, and there does not exist, a substantive nuclear safety risk at the NRU reactor at Chalk River. A significant breakdown in communication between CNSC and AECL, lack of clarity in the licensing process, and inflexibility on the part of the regulator have all contributed to the needless creation of a crisis.
Parliament's swift actions averted imminent harm to patients and the well-being of Canadians. I remain proud of the way that was handled by Parliament. In basic terms, Parliament clearly made the determination of net benefit to Canada quickly and effectively by ordering the restart of the reactor, dismissing the concern over a very low risk associated with operating the reactor without the two backup pumps.
That was, in my view, a major failure of judgment on the part of the CNSC, the expert agency. It did not provide a clear, comprehensive, and understandable assessment of the essential risk. Instead, the regulator chose to hide behind an indecipherable set of licence conditions.
It has been argued that CNSC's role is strictly to look at safety and not to consider a balancing of risks and benefits. I disagree with such an approach, because it does not provide a thoughtful or meaningful assessment of the situation and, as the actions of Parliament have shown, it does not pass the litmus test of reasonableness.
More to the point, there are several stipulations in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act that provide the mechanisms for bringing reasonable and mature judgment to the fore. I will simply cite these sections of the act to enter them into the record and not read the words, in the interest of time.
The specific sections of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act are as follows: paragraph 3(a), purpose of the act, with emphasis on the word "reasonable"; section 8, objects of the act, with emphasis on the words "to prevent unreasonable risk"; and section 4 of the Radiation Protection Regulations, which provide compelling language to keep the exposures to radiation “as low as is reasonably achievable, social and economic factors being taken into account”.
In addition to the act, the commission policy P-242 requires consideration of cost and benefit information in its decision-making.
Rather than be accused of selectively reading into these documents, I would simply draw the conclusion that there is sufficient language in the act that, had CNSC chosen to interpret these in a helpful way, the commission may well have come to a different conclusion and not forced the government and Parliament into the crisis situation. This comprises a significant failure of duty and judgment.
Risk at Chalk River is low. CNSC member Linda Keen indicated at this committee that there is an international standard that calls for frequency of fuel failures in a nuclear reactor to be one in a million. Such a standard does not exist.
Furthermore, she indicated that the chance of such an event occurring at Chalk River reactor is one in a thousand. The implication is that the situation at Chalk River is unsafe by a factor of one thousand. This is fundamentally flawed and incorrect. It is only a statement of frequency of earthquake and does not take into account the safety provisions in place, thereby distorting the representation of the risk.
No meaningful inference can be made from such an assertion. To arbitrarily pick one part of the risk equation and compare it with a standard that does not exist or is not applicable to this situation is not helpful.
Unfortunately, this assertion has created an unnecessary negative international exposure for Canada. I find this troubling and I am sure most Canadians find it unsatisfactory.
Now I would like to turn to my last point: what may we learn from this experience? To improve nuclear governance, I have seven specified suggestions.
My first suggestion is that there be an amendment to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act explicitly requiring that CNSC shall, in its decision-making process, take into full account the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the decision and ensure that the decision is consistent with a determination of net benefit to Canada. Such an amendment is also fully consistent with the cabinet directive on streamlining regulation issued in 2007.
Second, specific regulations to implement this key change would be required. This will help CNSC staff and licensees. Also, it will help drive an assessment process that is richer and truly takes into account a desire to serve the public interest. A comprehensive weighing of the benefits and risks that best reflects the knowledge and information specific to the issue at hand will be a key improvement to governance in the future.
Third, improve clarity around what is not a licensing requirement to fix the shortcomings of the regulatory process.
Fourth, reduce the potential for the arbitrary exercise of regulatory authority through a focus on transparency of the decision-making process. This is required to help promote a better dialogue between the commission staff and the licensees.
Fifth, separate the function of the president, as chief of staff, and the chair of the commission, as a tribunal would help reduce conflict in roles.
Sixth, establish a mediation process to help resolve situations when deadlock occurs.
Seventh and last, improve the effectiveness and predictability of the nuclear safety and licensing process. This is a critical need if Canada is to create the right conditions for development of nuclear technology in helping to meet the challenges of climate change and contribute to reducing greenhouse gases across the economy.
In conclusion, I am afraid Canada's reputation as a country with a strong, credible nuclear regulator has been damaged by this unfortunate breakdown in process. I believe Canadians are looking to Parliament to step back from the politics of the day and help restore confidence, credibility, and trust in our nuclear regulatory system.
I thank you for your patience, and I am happy to answer any questions.
