Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ms. Doyle, for joining us today to give us a clearer picture of what really happened. I have to admit that the more witnesses we hear from, the less clearer things seem to be. I do not want to trouble you with timeline issues, but I think it is important to talk about this.
I was rather surprised to learn from the testimony of MDS Nordion officials and from several newspaper reports, that MDS Nordion had implemented their emergency protocol as early as November 22 and that the company had even assessed the potential shortage. They had assessed that shortage at 30%. Ultimately, it was deemed to be 35%. On November 30, they even notified their shareholders that in the event of an extended shutdown, there could potentially be some financial repercussions.
I was rather surprised to learn this and to hear the minister's comments. I would like to quote a passage from the minister's testimony on January 16 last. I believe you accompanied the minister to that meeting. At the time, he said this:
There was an urgency to this situation, we should make no mistake, as the events unfolded on December 3, once that urgency started to materialize.
This observation leads me to believe that some officials at AECL and at Natural Resource Canada did not inform the minister as early as November 22 of the need to implement his emergency protocol. We were informed by MDS Nordion that Ms. Guindon represented NRCan at a meeting during which the reactor shutdown was discussed.
What did Ms. Guindon subsequently do with this information? Did she share it with you, the Deputy Minister who has a duty to inform the Minister, as early as November 22?