First, let me say that right up until November 30, there were e-mails. There was an e-mail sent on November 29 by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission with an attached report that even had boxes ticked off to say that it wouldn't affect employees or the public.
It was clear to me--even as stated in an e-mail of November 30 from AECL, and of course there was more information provided in that e-mail--that they still believed they would be able to resume operations some time in early December.
The point I'm making is that I don't believe the CNSC or AECL even had a sense of urgency up to that point. That wasn't conveyed. They still believed they would be able to resume operations.
Obviously at some point between that Friday afternoon and the Monday when I was briefed, communications between the two agencies appeared that indicated that they would not be able to restart.
We had some discussions. Again, I was officially briefed by the department on Tuesday, December 4. As we started gathering the facts and information, it was clear there was an issue between the two agencies. In fact, I was told then that AECL believed they could restart more safely than before.
That is why I intervened and called the president and CEO of the commission to gather the facts. It was very important. And I was speaking to both agencies throughout this. Every time I called the president and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, I also called the lead person at AECL up at Chalk River, Dr. Torgeson. I did that because it was important that we have all the information.
We believe it's very clear that the president and CEO of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission had the powers to act, had the powers to deal with this matter in her executive responsibilities in that role, and that she did not fulfill or carry out those duties appropriately, obviously.