This happened just in the last couple of years when it came to the point of commissioning. Clearly, AECL had significant issues before that, but really, they were issues to do with what we considered to be a poor quality of management--this is all recorded in the CNSC proceedings--poor management of contractors, and really a lack of focus, as well as a poor safety culture, etc.
But I'd say that from about 2006 on, when they started the commissioning process, this is when it really became clear that the positive coefficient of reactivity was going to be a problem and that they hadn't predicted it. They were dealing with it in-house. One of the commission members, Chris Barnes, said to them that maybe they should get some outside advice. They finally brought in the Idaho laboratory quite late in the day, and I wonder if that could have been helpful earlier.
But that wasn't really the role of the commission. It was the role of AECL and its management to look at it. It really became pretty clear at the end that there were some serious problems and they were going to have to justify it.
But MAPLE hadn't been taken off line when I was fired as the president. It was still a live project. We saw them often. We saw them every six months because they needed permission to work on it, so it's really just in that period of time that you knew things were really going bad.