Natural Resources Committee on June 18th, 2009

[Dr. Jean Koclas]

I have not taken the position that we are facing rigid regulatory authority.

There are many different issues. Perhaps the regulatory authority is following very closely what is happening with the operation of the MAPLE reactor. Perhaps it is a little bit more than what AECL has been used to. I think if we have a positive coefficient of reactivity, fine. If we can predict that positive value, we can do the safety analysis and be happy with it, because we can predict these coefficients.

It is not the fact that the coefficient is positive or negative that is a problem. The problem is that you cannot calculate it. As long as you're able to calculate it, calculate its positive value, if you want, or modify it to force it to have a negative value that you can also predict, then you can go and make your safety case and have a full reactor operating under the normal regulations that all operators have to face in this country.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

The issue, as far as you're concerned, is the lack of predictability between the calculations and what was actually happening. That's what we need to be concerned about.

[Dr. Jean Koclas]

Yes.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Thank you.

While we're talking about the regulator, do any of you know when the regulator would have known that there were problems, particularly between those calculations and the reality? What year did they step in and say that there were issues there that needed to be addressed?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

The regulator was present at almost every test we did. They were in the control room. There was no delay.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Would that have started back in the early 2000s, before 2003, when you said that the positive coefficient rose?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

It was in 2000. We started commissioning in February 2000, and the regulator was present for almost every test we did in the next two years.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

That's interesting, because in testimony the other day I think the head of the CNSC said that she wasn't aware of any issues until 2006. She was unaware of any issues other than some construction and maintenance issues and those kinds of things. So that's very interesting.

I really want to address this issue of the fact that we have one thing that's supposed to happen and something else that actually does happen. It's easy for everybody to say that we need to get these things up and running and we need everything to be operating here, but somebody has to take responsibility for that, and that is the regulator. It would certainly be put back to the government by the opposition, I'm sure, if there were a problem. All four of you today have said that we need to get the MAPLEs up and running, but nobody is willing to address the fact that we have the issue of unpredictability and the fact that what this regulator has suggested needs to happen isn't the same thing that's happening when it's actually operating. If anybody has any suggestions about that, I'd be glad to listen to them.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Dr. Nathwani.

[Dr. Jatin Nathwani]

If I might, I'll comment on the question of regulatory inflexibility and net benefit, which was the question raised, and I'll help answer what you've just raised as well.

Let me make the point that the question of regulatory inflexibility is a bit of a historical thing. It happened then. Things have certainly changed in recent times with the way CNSC operates, as best as I'm able to tell.

What we got cornered into in the 2002 to 2006-08 timeframe was trying to prove a philosophical negative: Tell me something doesn't exist; I don't like positive reactivity, so try to prove to me that it doesn't exist. That's where the whole simulation question got stuck.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

It just seems that our information has been that actually it was predicted that there wouldn't be one, and then there was one. That was really the issue, not the fact that there could or couldn't be, although that may be an issue with the regulator, as well. The real issue was the divergence of the two things.

I would like to go to something else.

Dr. Smith, you talked about the HANARO fuel being similar and about being able to switch over, basically, that reactor to the MAPLE. We had testimony earlier that the main driver fuel is similar, but it certainly would not be a simple process to change a reactor like that over to create the isotopes. You would have to do a new analysis of fuel and those kinds of things. I'm just wondering whether you have any comment on that. Dr. Waddington seemed to think that this would be a long process. There would have to be a lot of analysis done in order to switch that over. Is that accurate?

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Just give us a short answer, please.

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

You have to do a safety case with the HANARO fuel. I don't see any impediment at the moment to sticking HANARO bundles in there. They're about ten centimetres longer than the MAPLE bundles. But you'd have to produce a safety case with that fuel.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

How long does that take? Is it years or months? I would assume it would be years.

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

I would say a year. You have people who are pretty experienced. It's a different fuel, and we'd have to start at the beginning, but I'd guess it could be done in a year.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

We have Mr. Tonks, and then we have to have a brief discussion: Mr. Cullen has indicated he wants to bring up an issue.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you.

You all seem to be in agreement that our strategic technology decision to occupy the international market was correct. You all seem to say that we should ramp up the NRU and try to fill a void that would be in place for the reactivation of the MAPLEs. And you all seem to be in agreement that the technology and the resources, with some tuning of the statutory legislative regime, would produce some value-added results.

At the last meeting we were told by the people at McMaster University that when fully activated the McMaster system could fill four times the Canadian need for isotopes. Do you think the fourth part of the strategy should be to accelerate that option while we do the other things you've suggested? Is this a viable strategy, given that we want to continue to meet our international responsibilities but that we may have to make some temporary adjustments to satisfy Canadian medical needs?

[Dr. Jatin Nathwani]

Given how critical the situation is, the multi-pronged strategy is perhaps the best and most defensible approach.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Would anyone else like to take a crack at it?

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Is there someone else who'd like to answer that?

[Dr. Harold J. Smith]

I agree with the multi-pronged approach. Don't cherry pick—give it buckshot.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Do any of you have additional information about McMaster and the TRIUMF, with emphasis on the McMaster technology?

[Dr. Daniel Meneley]

With respect to the statements made by Dr. Smith and McMaster, I think they are coincident. With a ten-megawatt MAPLE you could do this much, and with a five-megawatt McMaster reactor you could do that much. I think that fits pretty well.

I'd like to sneak in a point on predictability. Dr. Koclas was comparing apples and oranges. The extremely difficult power coefficient prediction is way beyond—

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I really want Dr. Nathwani. He was going to reply to the McMaster question. That's another factor in resolving a crisis.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Your time is more than up, Mr. Tonks. I'd love to hear both answers, but we have to go.

Mr. Calandra.