Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you for your invitation. It's my pleasure to be here, and I will stick to my ten minutes.
I will confine my remarks, in essence, to three aspects: the need for a reliable supply of isotopes, the technology choices and the future options, and suggestions on governance aspects and the public dialogue for acceptance.
In terms of the need for a reliable supply of isotopes, the shutdown of the NRU reactor at Chalk River has again brought into sharp focus the critical need for a reliable supply of isotopes to our hospitals. The most compelling and difficult issue, however, is the reliability and safe operation of a single aging reactor on which depends the well-being of so many, both Canadians and globally. To an outside observer and to those not associated with the isotope business, the realization of such extreme dependency and vulnerability on a single source is a matter of profound shock and incredulity. How did we get into this corner, and what's next for the path forward?.
Anything short of a revolutionary transition away from current practices in nuclear medicine that rely on the use of isotopes would suggest to me that a robust and a dependable supply will remain a critical need. The government's recent indication to exit from the supply side of isotope production by 2016 would make us dependent on sources outside Canada. For a resource this critical to the overall health and well-being of Canadians, the exit strategy does not appear to be prudent. The provision of a reliable supply of medical isotopes is far too important for the terms and conditions of supply and price to be determined by others.
If frustration with current costs is the primary driver for determining exit, what of the higher costs later, when we have conceded all control of any assurance of our own supply? Upon exit, we simply become a minor player with no influence. After a reasonable degree of success in the global markets, what is the compelling case for jeopardizing our own security of supply? As well, if we take the long view, could the exit strategy not compromise our ability to control health care costs if, over time, the use of isotopes continues to become more widespread in medical practice?
The fact that Canada has played a leadership role in the development and application of innovations in nuclear medicine and nuclear technology over the last 50 years is worth noting. That this has resulted in a significant positive contribution to quality of life and to health is again not to be dismissed lightly. That our global share of the business is respectable attests to some degree of success, and it has allowed us to enjoy relative stability for our own use. Why would we simply walk away? Is there not a case for nurturing our own strengths and for putting in place the solutions for realizing the benefits of this technology into the future?
Let me now turn to the question of technology choices and some suggestions for the way forward. One option is a combination of best-effort short-term fixes for the NRU reactor. That would allow us to muddle along until 2016 or so. Given the age of the reactor, this is the best that can be done in the short term, but this is not a credible or sustainable long-term solution. If we accept that the need for medical isotopes is not about to disappear, then a more robust solution is necessary. In light of our current difficulties, it makes sense to revisit the decision to cancel the MAPLE reactors.
I understand there are technical issues that need to be resolved, and there's a regulatory dimension to this as well. A strong recommendation by this committee to revisit the decision on the cancellation of the already built and partly commissioned MAPLE reactors is an option. If accepted by the government, this recommendation could pave the path for subsequent resolution of the technical issues.
Such a recommendation, coupled with a requirement on the agencies--whether AECL, industry, CNSC, or others--to develop an action plan with a formal quarterly progress report to this parliamentary committee, would provide a sufficient degree of focus, public accountability, and a high level of attention.
Whatever the business model--whether it is a public-private partnership, sole government ownership, or some other--the goal is to ensure that the national interest is taken into account, so we have to frame this problem as an important national problem, bring a sense of urgency to its resolution, and enlist the vast expertise within our regulatory bodies, industry, and the academy. However, in my view this will require an enormous amount of goodwill, a step-by-step problem-solving attitude, and vigorous measurement of progress against goals.
I believe this is the best path, and I remain confident that the technical aspects can be resolved.
Repairs to the NRU reactor, when completed, can only be viewed as short-term relief. It's an old reactor, and relying on it for too long would not be appropriate. A parallel path, followed with urgency, can bring the already-built MAPLE reactors to an operating state over perhaps the next six to 18 months, and such a strategy offers the best prospect for putting Canada on a firm footing for assurance of supply.
I will turn now to the problem that I characterized as that of governance and public acceptance.
How we set up the governance of institutions responsible for nuclear matters does have an impact on the quality of day-to-day decisions. In my appearance before this committee, I had indicated the need for an amendment to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act that includes a test of net benefit to Canada. If such a test were to be embedded in legislation, it would provide a stronger framework and guidance to the regulatory function, clarity of direction to industry, and broad public support for a coherent decision rationale in the public interest.
Again we are at a juncture that does not foster a meaningful discussion on how to do the balancing of trade-offs between real benefit now and what to make of low risks far into the future. We cannot allow ourselves to be stymied by perceived risks of reactor operation that place undue weight on hypothetical fears and end up denying patients the healing benefits of the reactor technology that yields large benefits for therapeutic and diagnostic use as part of medical treatment.
The costs are real, but not astronomical. The risk is not zero, but low, and the benefits are large and positive. The trade-off to serve the public interest is, to my mind, clear and simple.
Beyond specific aspects of governance and regulatory policies, there is a deeper and a more fundamental problem of public acceptance. Only you in the political arena can help with this problem.
In simple terms, there is a small but strong anti-nuclear sentiment that dominates public discourse on matters nuclear. Even though the safety risks are generally very low, social amplification of risk through the media gives rise to a political and cultural climate that makes it difficult for policy-makers to take a strictly rational approach. It reduces their comfort space of operation and forces the easier way out; witness the exit strategy proposed by the government.
Rather than taking the long view that emphasizes a balanced perspective, we run up against the problem of what I call the ugly duckling, the unpalatable pushed aside for yet another time. May I be so bold as to suggest that the time has come to shift the terms of debate around nuclear issues and help reduce the social friction, and that all parties will have to begin to articulate clearly the benefits of nuclear technologies? Over time, this would create sufficient space in the public sphere for a more informed dialogue.
The current crisis is but the simplest and clearest example of how we effectively ignore the enormous benefit of nuclear technology because the political comfort space is too narrow to allow for a more balanced and nuanced response. We create a cultural straitjacket that leads us directly to an exit strategy and an easier and quicker response to a problem; what it does not do is take into account the full consequences of the long term. For Canada, it would be truly unfortunate to walk away from having built and led a successful enterprise around the production of isotopes without a determined effort to fix the short-term problem.
I will now end with four simple recommendations to you.
First, confirm the need for a robust and dependable supply of medical isotopes for use in medical practice, and confirm whether the trend toward increased use is expected to continue.
Second, make a strong recommendation to revisit the decision on the cancellation of the MAPLE reactors. If accepted by government, a requirement to put in place an action plan for the agencies to establish clear timelines and implementation schedules to bring them to an operating state would be necessary. I think this is a credible path for a robust base for supply assurance long into the future.
Third, amend legislation to include a test of net benefit to Canada in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. This would provide a strong foundation for balancing difficult trade-offs in regulatory decision-making.
Fourth and last, make a social and political commitment to frame a useful public dialogue on matters nuclear to help create a positive environment for policy-makers to make rational decisions.
Thank you for your time. I'll be happy to answer questions.