I'll be speaking on our behalf for now. We're here to talk about something at the heart of Canada's nuclear industry. In principle, it's the restructuring process that's taking place within Atomic Energy of Canada over the next year.
The Society of Professional Engineers and Associates represents the scientists and engineers who work at AECL, Atomic Energy of Canada, both at Sheridan Park in Mississauga and in Montreal and at client locations around the world. Our members work in the part of AECL that is directly focused on the development and commercialization of Canadian nuclear technology. Collectively, we represent most of the intellectual property associated with nuclear power plant design in Canada.
We care deeply about the future of our company, not only because of our careers, but because we are committed to the continued success of CANDU technology, which has been the pride of Canadian engineering for nearly half a century. In point of fact, our members are highly sought after, not only by other nuclear businesses, but by a variety of other high-tech companies.
If the future of AECL were jeopardized, I have no doubt in my mind that I and every other AECL scientist and engineer could quickly find work elsewhere. However, this is not an outcome we would like to see, nor would it be an outcome to the benefit of Canadians, I believe, and hence we have taken this opportunity to take time out from our day jobs to come and speak with you today.
Let me be clear: we welcome the possibility of a restructuring of AECL. There's clearly the need and the opportunity for improvement in the way the company does business and operates. The stated objective of the restructuring process is to encourage a vibrant and financially healthy CANDU nuclear industry in Canada.
However, like most Canadians, we believe that some form of continued government control is essential to this goal. So, too, is cooperation between federal and provincial governments. We are concerned that other objectives, such as reducing government funding for research into nuclear medicine or changes in arrangements for the production of isotopes, will distract from the need to focus on the success of the CANDU industry in Canada.
In terms of context, this reconsideration of AECL's future is not happening in a vacuum. There is a nuclear renaissance taking place around the world, and it's being fueled by two factors.
As you've already heard, one of those factors is expansion of nuclear power in Asia, particularly in China, India, and some other countries, as well as in England, South America, the United States, and possibly even Canada. The other is the refurbishment of existing nuclear infrastructure around the world.
Business in the coming two decades is in the order of trillions of dollars. Canada is in the enviable position of being one of only five countries that can deliver a turnkey nuclear project anywhere in the world. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were many more countries with this capability; however, because of a hiatus in nuclear construction since the mid-1980s, only a few have survived.
The CANDU reactor, for example, was originally a joint creation of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ontario Hydro, and Canadian General Electric in the early 1960s. By the late 1980s, Ontario Hydro could build CANDU reactors on its own, which it did; it built most of Bruce B and all of Darlington. However, following the breakup of Ontario Hydro into 13 successor companies and the dispersal of this expertise, this ability has been lost. Indeed, the Ontario government is looking only at external parties to build new reactors in Ontario.
A similar story exists in Great Britain. Great Britain was a pioneer in the civilian nuclear power industry and its scientists and engineers designed all of their current domestic fleet. However, now that they need new reactors, they've had to solicit external bids because they can no longer build their own. Indeed, many of their good engineers and scientists came to Canada to work for Atomic Energy of Canada and Ontario Hydro.
Although few Canadians know it, our members have never stopped building nuclear reactors. From AECL projects in South Korea in the early 1990s, then in China, and then in Romania, we've kept our intellectual capital in place and our construction and project management know-how current. This has been critical, since frequent practice--as well as knowledge--is required for nuclear success.
It's important to have integrated capabilities. In order to be able to design and build a nuclear reactor, you need a comprehensive, integrated organization with capability in all fields of engineering, physics, and materials science. You also need technicians and technologists with hands-on capability in all aspects of assembly and construction, as well as field experience.
AECL is currently such a comprehensive organization; however, it has some systematic issues that prevent it from acquiring capital and limitations in the scope of its business that make it difficult to compete with fully integrated companies such as AREVA, the French government-owned nuclear vendor, which has business through the entire supply chain, from mining to reprocessing and reuse of fuel.
Nuclear science and engineering are constantly evolving. Improvements can stem from the lab, but are only realized on the ground. Conversely, opportunities and challenges identified through practical experience often require substantial research, development, and testing in order to achieve breakthroughs.
New fuel design, for example, is an activity that is closely integrated between research and engineering sites in AECL. Much of the improvement in nuclear reactor performance worldwide over the last 20 years has been driven by new “high burnup” fuel design. Research and engineering in concert are required for the design of improved fuel; otherwise, development is jeopardized. For example, recent advances in foreign fuel cycles that are creating potentially large business opportunities in Asia for AECL have come about because of close collaboration between scientists at Chalk River and engineers at Sheridan Park.
Therefore, a simple geographical split between research and development, which is in Chalk River, on the one hand, and engineering, which is in Mississauga and Montreal, on the other, will not be trivial and could jeopardize our ability to design, build, and improve our business. It is important to recognize that AECL's commercial business is not simply centred in its engineering sites. There are hundreds of engineers, scientists, and technologists at the Chalk River research site that are an essential part of this commercial business.
Our goal, SPEA's goal, is to ensure that restructuring leads to an enhanced Canadian nuclear industry. A separation of AECL along simple geographic lines could have the opposite effect, something that members of this subcommittee--not to mention potential investors--should be aware of.
There were hard-won gains in efficiency with the last restructuring. In the early 1990s, under then CEO Reid Morden, AECL's engineering company in Mississauga and Montreal and its research company at Chalk River and Whiteshell were combined into one operating unit, with one set of senior management. This step was taken at the time because of a perceived inefficiency of operating two separate organizations that were both integrally required for successful nuclear operation.
While a painful process, over the course of more than 15 years a great many synergies were developed between the research and engineering divisions, to the betterment of both. Reversing the integration through a new division of the company would inevitably lead to higher costs, diverging incentives, and greater difficulty in working on common projects and objectives.
There is no question that the AECL in existence today is a composite of at least several different enterprises. There is, of course, the commercial business, in which we and many at Chalk River work. There is also the production of medical isotopes, the problems in which helped give rise to this committee's review in the first place, I believe. In addition, there is a wing of the company that focuses on basic research, akin to that which happens in any number of government research laboratories across the border in the U.S. and around the world.
Today there are complex links among these different parts of AECL that would not be so easy to sever. Would it be possible to do so? Certainly, but the cost and complexity should not be underestimated. It is notable, and perhaps important for your review, that each of these different parts of AECL has varying track records of success, both in terms of the use of financial resources and in the achievement of objectives. This committee might find it useful to consider how each of these functions should be financed in the future and in fact how they've been financed in the past.
We would suggest that a continued commitment of public resources to research and medical outcomes, for example, would be completely appropriate. At the same time, we would question whether resources should be diverted from the commercial business to fund these other efforts, as has occurred in the past. Such continued cross-subsidization would create a considerable obstacle to the future success of Canada's nuclear industry, which faces tough competition from other companies around the world.
Ultimately, the challenge of completing a successful restructuring is how to improve the Canadian nuclear industry's position in a growing business without destroying our current capabilities. While individual components or businesses within AECL may be perceived as valuable on their own, they cannot be parcelled out neatly without sacrificing the capability to successfully design and build nuclear reactors. Regardless of the potential interest of commercial parties in fragments of the AECL business, selling bits of the company to the highest bidder is not a strategy that will return value to Canada and Canadians.
Our members take pride in AECL's unique capabilities. There are few areas in which Canada can compete on an equal footing with the United States, Japan, France, and Russia, but the nuclear industry is one of these. At any given time, CANDU reactors can be found among the top ten in worldwide performance. For example, from the last operating cycle for which there is complete data, from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008, I think few people know that the top two performing reactors in the world out of 440 were CANDU reactors. One was the Candu 6 unit at Cernavoda 2 and the other was Darlington Unit 3.
In terms of lifetime performance, for example, three of the top five reactors in the world are CANDU reactors. We're very good at building power reactors and have built the last seven projects on time and on or under budget, something unmatched in the industry.
Restructuring could lead to a more vibrant Canadian nuclear industry poised to take advantage of great opportunities worldwide. Alternatively, if done badly, restructuring could lead to a decline in our made in Canada technology. We're here to ensure that the former outcome prevails.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.