Evidence of meeting #29 for Natural Resources in the 40th Parliament, 3rd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was regulations.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Max Ruelokke  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board
Stuart Pinks  Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board
Gaétan Caron  Chair and Chief Executive Officer, National Energy Board
Bharat Dixit  Team Leader, Conservation of Resources, National Energy Board

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

I call the meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone.

We have two items on the agenda today. The first is a continuation of discussion on a motion that Mr. Cullen brought before the committee in the spring. This actually isn't a part of our study on energy security, but a continuation of the spring study.

All of the witnesses or groups have been here before. It's great to see you all back again.

I want to remind the committee that at the end of the meeting we will take a few minutes to discuss and to pass our committee report on the NRU medical isotopes off to Parliament if we can. We have some motions that we have to deal with on that matter. How much time do you think will be necessary for that? Would it be ten minutes?

Go ahead, Mr. Cullen.

11:05 a.m.

NDP

Nathan Cullen NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC

I'm not even sure there's anything votable in this last session. We are seeing some dissenting reports, but there's nothing yet to vote on. I thought this was more of a--

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

We have to choose a title; there is no title. We have to pass it, and then we have to determine some other issues.

11:05 a.m.

NDP

Nathan Cullen NDP Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC

Oh, that's very important, the title. Okay. It would be a maximum of ten minutes, I would say.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Okay, we'll leave ten minutes at the end. I want to make sure that we leave adequate time.

We'll start our meeting, then, with the witnesses appearing in the order stated on the agenda. We'll start with Mr. Max Ruelokke, chairman and chief executive officer of Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board.

11:05 a.m.

Max Ruelokke Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board

No, it's the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

I'm sorry; yes, I've gone one too low. It's the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board. You could have said anything you wanted and then attributed it to somebody else. It was a real opportunity.

11:05 a.m.

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board

Max Ruelokke

I do have to live next to my colleagues in Nova Scotia.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Yes, okay.

Thank you all very much for coming. We look forward to your comments. Each group has up to ten minutes for opening comments, and then we'll get to questions.

Go ahead, please.

11:05 a.m.

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board

Max Ruelokke

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be here again today and to have this opportunity to talk to you about offshore emergency response in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area.

When we talk about emergency response, we really need to take a broad view of what ian emergency is. An emergency response plan will typically list ten or more types of occurrences that will be classified as emergencies, all of which will require response. Many of them will present far greater hazards to human safety than will an oil spill.

Emergency response plans are designed around a requirement for operators to respond to all types of emergencies that occur on or immediately adjacent to their facilities.

When I say “operator”, I mean an offshore oil and gas company that's licensed to operate in a particular area. Throughout this presentation, when I refer to operators, I'm referring to oil and gas companies.

Operators would activate the same emergency response plan for a blowout as the operators involved did for the Cougar helicopter crash in 2009. At that crash, you should know that the first responders to the crash scene were a fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters, all under contract to the operators, not Department of National Defence search and rescue helicopters, which arrived a considerable time later. This certainly demonstrated that we have a very robust emergency response capability in our offshore area

There has been a lot of media attention about the environmental and economic consequences resulting from the Macondo blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, and rightly so. However, it is very important for everyone to remember that the first thing that happened when this tragedy occurred is that 11 people died and 17 more were injured. This fact may have been lost in much of the ongoing media coverage about the Macondo incident, but it has not been lost on regulators. Safety is, and always will be, paramount in all decisions taken by this board and by my colleagues on the other boards.

When assessing a drilling application, we are essentially looking for three things: whether the operator has the appropriate equipment to do the job safely, whether personnel are adequately trained to do the job, and whether the necessary procedures are in place for safe operations. Prior to issuance of the operations authorization, a number of statutory obligations must have been met, including those of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, as well as regulations and obligations arising form Transport Canada and from the independent third party certifying authority. Operators must file a safety plan, an environmental protection plan, and a contingency plan that includes an oil spill response plan. In addition, they must submit documentation respecting financial responsibility.

Finally, they must provide a declaration of fitness, attesting that the equipment and facilities to be used during their programs are fit for the purpose, that the operating procedures relating to them are appropriate, that the personnel employed are qualified and competent, and that the installation meets all necessary Canadian standards. Only after all of this documentation is presented to and approved by the board may an operator proceed with the activity.

Drilling and well control are critical aspects of offshore operations and are addressed extensively in the regulatory framework. This involves a review of the operator's well planning and the technical capabilities in respect of well encasing design, well control matters, kick prevention and detection, and establishment of severe weather operating limits, as well as a review of emergency disconnect requirements and an assessment of the relief well drilling arrangements. Emphasis is also placed on ensuring that personnel have the requisite training in well control and blowout prevention. A review is conducted to ensure suitable redundancy of the blowout preventor activation and control systems in the event of any situation that could result in a disconnect from the well.

Oversight of these matters is achieved in a systematic manner through the board's safety assessment system, which includes a review of the operator's safety management system and confirmation that the operator has identified the hazards and the measures to be put in place to reduce the risks of those hazards to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.

Although we have a robust regulatory regime and exercise substantial oversight of offshore activity, accidents can and unfortunately will happen. Therefore, it is important to have plans in place to address the impacts of incidents when they occur. Operators provide our offshore petroleum board with a contingency plan that includes an oil spill response plan. The board's safety and environmental professionals review these plans for each project.

Response plans include details on how relief wells could be drilled if necessary. However, what the response plans have not included to date is any detail on the subsea containment of a blowout. As we saw from the Macondo activity, it was containment that ended the blowout before the relief well was completed.

We are currently watching keenly the development of new containment capability by the Marine Well Containment Company formed in July by Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Shell, and ConocoPhillips, and joined recently by BP. Collectively, they have committed over $1 billion U.S. to develop advanced containment capability, equipment, and specially trained personnel to combat any future subsea blowouts or other loss of containment in the Gulf of Mexico. We--and I suspect other regulators in other offshore regimes--are examining ways to ensure that a similar or the same capability would be made available to deal with any blowouts in our offshore area.

Oil spill response plans describe a three-tier system. Tier one spill response involves activation of on-board spill response equipment sufficient to address small-scale spills of less than 100 barrels. If the equipment on site is insufficient, the operator will move to a tier two response, which involves mobilizing equipment located in St. John's, available to the operators through the Eastern Canada Response Corporation and typically capable of dealing with spills of up to 100,000 barrels. If the equipment available on board and through the ECRC is insufficient, the response moves to tier three, which means that operators have to acquire response equipment elsewhere in Canada or internationally, much of which is in specialized depots, such as in Southampton, U.K., and can be mobilized to Newfoundland and Labrador within 24 hours. Each operator exercises their emergency response plan quarterly, and collectively the operators conduct a field exercise each year, which involves the deployment of spill response equipment.

The question that has been on everybody's mind, particularly since the Macondo incident, is whether we are ready for a large-scale release of hydrocarbons into the environment as a result of offshore oil and gas activity in the event such an unfortunate incident should occur. For some people the concept of readiness implies that companies be able to recover most or all of the oil released into the environment. This is simply not currently achievable. We do expect that the Macondo tragedy will result in considerable additional research and development into improved spill response capability.

The reality is that oil spills in the marine environment are addressed through several processes, both natural and mechanical. The North Atlantic Ocean is a harsh environment, and recovery of oil from that ocean is very difficult even in the best of weather conditions. However, the biggest threat to marine mammals and birds is oil slicks. Therefore, emergency response measures also consider the value of oil dispersal as a means of minimizing impacts. At this time, we do not sanction the use of chemical dispersants as an oil spill response measure, but we are reviewing this in light of the Macondo experience, in consultation with experts at Environment Canada and Fisheries and Oceans.

If there were a major spill on the Grand Banks, environmental assessments done for the projects to date include detailed modelling of the potential fate of a spill at locations in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area. Using 40 years of weather data, these models indicate that even if a large spill were to occur, it is unlikely that oil would approach the Newfoundland and Labrador shoreline. The impacts of a spill occurring this far from the Canadian coastline nevertheless would be serious and would require immediate response, but it would be a situation substantially different from what we saw in the Gulf of Mexico.

I have just a couple of quick points before closing.

Production of oil from our offshore area started in 1997. As of the end of March, 2010, nearly 1.2 billion barrels of oil had been produced, and of that 1,100 barrels of crude had been spilled, less than one barrel spilled per million barrels produced. In the Gulf of Mexico, prior to the Macondo tragedy, for every one million barrels produced, 13 barrels had been spilled, and that figure is only for spills of greater than 50 barrels. There have been no blowouts in our offshore area. Obviously, we would prefer to have no injuries and no spills, but we believe that the record for our offshore area is quite reasonable.

In the wake of the Macondo incident, the CNLOPB, like all regulators, is keeping a sharp eye on lessons learned. It will help us to improve our performance as regulators and to improve the performance of those we regulate. We are confident in our robust safety and environmental protection regime, but we are always open to ways in which it can be improved.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions when you have them.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you very much, Mr. Ruelokke.

We go now to the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board. We have two gentlemen with us today, Stuart Pinks, chief executive officer, and Keith Landra, director of operations, health, safety and environment. Welcome.

I understand that Mr. Pinks will deliver the comments. Go ahead, please.

11:10 a.m.

Stuart Pinks Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here this morning.

I think most of you are aware that both our chair and I appeared before this committee back on May 25. Today, I'd like to take the opportunity, especially for new members of the committee, to provide a brief update of what was stated previously, and then move on to provide the committee with an update on other relevant information on developments since that time.

Since the drilling of the first exploration well in 1967, there have been a total of 207 wells drilled to date in the Nova Scotia offshore area. During this time, there have been two producing projects brought on stream, with a third under development. At present there is no drilling activity taking place in the Nova Scotia offshore area, nor is there any drilling being proposed in the near term.

The Sable offshore energy project, which is operated by Exxon Mobil, is the only currently operating project within our jurisdiction. It involves the production of natural gas from five separate fields in shallow water about 225 kilometres off the east coast of Nova Scotia. Production from this project began in December 1999 and is expected to continue well into this decade.

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Excuse me, Mr. Pinks; the interpreters aren't quite able to keep up. Could you slow it down a little, please?

11:15 a.m.

Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board

Stuart Pinks

Shall I go back, or continue from here?

11:15 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Go ahead.

11:15 a.m.

Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board

Stuart Pinks

Now under development is Encana's Deep Panuke offshore gas development project. It involves the production of natural gas from an offshore field located approximately 250 kilometres southeast of Halifax, and it's also in shallow water. Production is scheduled to begin in the last quarter of 2011. The Nova Scotia offshore area is predominantly a gas-prone region; only small amounts of light oil have been discovered to date.

In authorizing any work activity to be conducted offshore in Nova Scotia, the board holds operators accountable for taking the steps necessary to prevent the occurrence of hazardous incidents or spills. However, should a major accident, spill, or uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons occur during an authorized activity, the operator would be fully accountable and responsible for attending to any consequences and for any resulting damages. The CNSOPB would normally lead the government response in such situations and would coordinate with other federal and provincial government departments and agencies as appropriate. The exception is in cases of a leak from an export pipeline, for which the government response would be jointly led by our board and our colleagues at the National Energy Board.

Both the Sable project and the Deep Panuke project produce natural gas. Some of the producing fields do, however, contain some associated light hydrocarbon liquids called condensate. Given the properties of condensate, which is like a blend of kerosene and naphtha, the resultant surface sheen, should there be a release, would have a thickness measured in microns. It is very thin. Its overall size would be limited, given that it would rapidly dissipate through evaporation and through dispersion within the upper water column. This is very different from a crude oil spill.

All operators have a contract with an environmental response organization, such as Eastern Canada Response Corporation, to provide additional resources and expertise as and when necessary in responding to a spill. The regulatory regime in place for preventing the occurrence of hazardous incidents and spills and for assuring an appropriate response to such incidents is comprehensive and robust.

It is interesting to note that the U.S. government, in response to the Deep Water Horizon incident, has recently issued two new sets of rules for oil and gas operations being conducted on their outer continental shelf. The first rule requires operators to develop and implement safety and environmental management systems, something the offshore boards have required of operators for many years. The requirement for safety and environmental management systems has been ingrained in the new offshore drilling and production regulations promulgated here in Canada last December. These regulations actually go further, in that they also require operators to develop and implement safety plans and environmental protection plans that, among other things, describe how the operator's safety and environmental management systems will be applied to the actual activities that are to be carried out.

The second new set of rules in the U.S. amends drilling regulations related to well control. Board staff are currently reviewing these new U.S. requirements in detail to determine if there are any changes we need to make on a go-forward basis.

The new offshore drilling and production regulations make operators fully accountable for safety and environmental performance and drive them to adopt best standards and practices for conducting their work. A key element of our legislation is the ability of the board to issue comprehensive guidelines to aid operators in understanding and interpreting how they may achieve regulatory compliance. A set of four guideline documents has been issued for comment and interim use in association with the recently promulgated drilling and production regulations. These guidelines identify, among other things, recognized best standards and practices for conducting work, along with the requirements for regulatory filings when seeking board authorizations and approvals.

Another important update I wish to deliver to you today pertains to the international regulatory response to the Gulf of Mexico incident. The CNSOPB and the CNLOPB are members of the International Regulators' Forum, which is a group of nine regulators from around the world that regulate health and safety in most of the largest offshore oil- and gas-producing regions, including the U.K., Norway, Australia, and the U.S. This international regulators forum, which we refer to as the IRF, has been operating since 1994 for the purpose of driving forward improvements in health and safety in the sector through collaboration and joint programs and through the sharing of information and best practices. The National Energy Board has also stayed abreast of IRF initiatives, having been actively involved in three of the IRF conferences that this group has put together since 2005.

In September the IRF had a two-day extraordinary meeting hosted by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, the new division of MMS in Washington. This meeting was the first extraordinary meeting convened in the forum's 17-year history and was called specifically to address issues related to recent offshore oil and gas incidents, particularly the loss of well control related to the Montara well off Australia and the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. During the meeting, IRF members discussed how to best respond to these incidents from a regulatory perspective. Additionally, many of the industry associations talked to the forum or briefed the forum on initiatives to improve the safety of offshore operations.

At the conclusion of this meeting the IRF confirmed its commitment to improving the safety of offshore operations and to providing leadership in global offshore safety regulations. These matters were also discussed at the third IRF offshore safety conference that was held in Vancouver, British Columbia, in early October. Hosted by Canada, the conference saw close to 200 delegates representing industry and regulators from 17 different countries, who came together for three days of productive discussions on a range of offshore safety topics. Following this conference, IRF members met and approved the strategic agenda focusing on the following topics: safety, culture, leadership, blowout preventer integrity, operational issues, performance indicators, operator competency, capacity criteria, the use of standards, and industry best practices.

In closing, I hope this update serves to maintain your confidence and that of the Canadian public in Canada's offshore regulatory regime.

Thank you for this opportunity.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you very much, Mr. Pinks, for the information you've given today.

We'll go now to the third group before us. From the National Energy Board we have Gaétan Caron, chair and chief executive officer, and Bharat Dixit, team leader, conservation of resources.

Welcome, both of you. Go ahead with your presentation, please.

11:20 a.m.

Gaétan Caron Chair and Chief Executive Officer, National Energy Board

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, honourable members of Parliament.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to providing you with an update on the status of Emergency Response to Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling.

On May 11, just weeks after the blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, the National Energy Board committed to reviewing the safety and environmental requirements for offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic.

Since I last appeared before you in May, more than 115 different groups and organizations have registered to participate in our Arctic review, including northern communities, aboriginal groups, environmental non-governmental organizations, other regulators, governments, and industry.

On September 20 the NEB announced that the Arctic review would be conducted in three phases. The purpose of phase one, which is in progress, is to gather the best available knowledge about offshore drilling in an Arctic environment. To further build our knowledge base, the NEB also released a call for information on September 30, inviting anyone with expertise or knowledge to provide this information to the NEB. More calls for information are expected.

The board will also consider the recommendations of the U.S. government's national commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and offshore drilling, which we now expect to be available in January 2011.

Phase two of the review will give the participants an opportunity to examine the information collected, to ask questions, and to provide their comments on the information. Once phase two is complete, the board will then consider all the information gathered and produce a public report to be used in our examination of any future applications for offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic. This review will be public; it will be transparent, and there will be opportunities for people who are concerned about these issues to get involved.

Meetings are already being scheduled to discuss the Arctic review with northern communities. For example, on November 24 we will be in Inuvik to meet with the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation. In early December we will also be meeting with the Inuvialuit Game Council and the Wildlife Management Advisory Council.

The NEB intends to visit other northern communities, including communities in Nunavut, to hear their concerns.

I would like to stress that it is very important for the NEB to meet with and listen to northern communities. They are the people who will be most affected by any decision made regarding offshore drilling in the Canadian Arctic.

In an information package we released just last Thursday, we described the process by which people can ask for meetings with us as part of phase one for fact-finding and information gathering. We have asked people to tell us by January 31, 2011.

We have also announced that we intend to retain consultants and experts in order to acquire some of the knowledge we need, and we have asked for anyone registered in the review to suggest by the end of November areas where current information may be lacking or insufficient and which may be secured by contract.

Finally, we announced that we would make up to $300,000 in funding available to assist participants with travel costs related to attending phase two meetings. These meetings are scheduled for next spring in Inuvik, Iqaluit, Yellowknife, Whitehorse, and other locations as necessary. The meetings will provide Canadians with the opportunity to examine the information we have collected to date and to question each other about this information.

One of the topics the NEB will examine during the review is the area of emergency response. Our focus is on preventing accidents from happening in the first place. At the same time, the NEB must be ready to respond to any emergency situation at any time. If an offshore drilling spill or incident were to occur in the Canadian Arctic, the NEB would be the lead federal agency. It is our job as the lead agency to hold the operator accountable for anticipating, preventing, mitigating, and managing incidents and oil spills of any size or duration.

To ensure that the company is fully prepared to respond to an incident, the NEB enforces a comprehensive set of rules on emergency preparedness. A critical requirement for offshore drilling, which is set out in section 6 of the Canada oil and gas drilling and production regulations, is the need for companies to provide an emergency response plan, which is reviewed in detail by the NEB before any drilling authorization may be issued. If there are gaps in the plan, the company would have to address these gaps before the board would consider permitting the drilling to occur.

The regulations also call upon industry to identify the scope and frequency of the field practice exercises, as well as to coordinate these efforts with federal, territorial, and municipal response agencies. As lead agency, we would have the key role in emergency response. To prepare for potential future offshore drilling, our staff has participated in six emergency response exercises in the past six months alone, and more exercises will take place in the future.

Before any project is approved, the NEB must be satisfied that an operator's drilling plans include robust safety, emergency response and environmental protection plans which meet the Board's standards. The NEB reviews every single application to make sure that workers and the public will be safe and the environment will be protected.

Safety, environmental protection and conservation of the resource are the only relevant factors the Board may examine when considering an application under the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act. This is stated explicitly in the purpose of the Act.

As part of the review, the board will be looking very carefully at new U.S. safety rules released in early October. At first glance, as my colleague Mr. Pinks said, I can say that many of the changes being implemented since the moratorium has been lifted in the U.S. are already included in Canada's regulatory regime. As an example, the new U.S. regulations require companies to acquire an independent third-party certification demonstrating the safety of rig operations, something that is already addressed in our legislation. The new U.S. regulations also call for industry to develop an integrated safety and environmental management system. Canada's regulations already require operators to have safety and environmental management systems. In other words, the United States is moving towards where Canada has been.

The last topic I'd like to raise, Mr. Chair, is learning from others. As Mr. Pinks said, Canada is an active participant in the International Regulators Forum. The IRF held its latest major conference in Vancouver just two weeks ago, and several NEB staff, including Dr. Dixit and me, attended the three-day conference.

My own personal learning from that conference is that the key players in the offshore regulatory world, including the United States, Norway, Denmark, the U.K., Ireland, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Canada, are very united around the concept that we need to promote the safety culture in offshore drilling; that we need to rely on management systems to promote that culture; that the role of regulators is to hold the industry accountable for the desired safety, environmental, and emergency response outcomes; and that audits of these management systems and field inspections form a key part of the enforcement tool kit of offshore safety regulators, including the NEB.

Thank you, honourable members of Parliament, for the opportunity to provide you with an update on the status of emergency response to offshore oil and gas drilling at the NEB.

11:30 a.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Leon Benoit

Thank you, Mr. Caron.

We go now to questions and comments. Each member has up to seven minutes. We will begin with the official opposition.

Mr. Tonks, go ahead, please.

11:30 a.m.

Liberal

Alan Tonks Liberal York South—Weston, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here.

Those were very comprehensive and enlightening observations. Sometimes, Mr. Chairman, one would like to have the public in the room when these presentations are being made, because I think they would give the public more confidence that the regulatory tools and the outreach to the international community that has been described are being developed to make sure we have the absolute best practice in place.

Having said that, as a layperson I'm not very aware of the actual mechanics of containment, relief wells, and the engineering and technical responses. I appreciate very much the overview with respect to management processes, accountability, and closing the accountability loop.

Mr. Ruelokke, with respect to response plans, you acknowledge that the offshore Arctic and drilling in the north involve a climate and a set of circumstances that are different from those in the gulf in terms of post-event occurrences.

As part of your testimony, you talked about containment. You almost made it appear as though containment and the research that is going into containment is as necessary as, and perhaps more necessary than, the drilling of relief wells as an emergency precaution. At least that was my inference.

Could you expand on that a little, please?

11:30 a.m.

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board

Max Ruelokke

Certainly. It's a very good question. I'm happy to try to deal with that.

When I refer to containment, I'm talking about containment efforts that are put in place after an incident has happened, so after there's some sort of failure of equipment and procedures like we saw in Macondo. You will recall--we'll all recall--that several things happened simultaneously in the aftermath of the Macondo incident. The first thing was that there were two relief wells spudded in the immediately adjacent area to make sure that one of them would succeed. Everybody knew that was going to take a number of months, and it did take quite a number of months.

There were also, simultaneously, a number of activities focused on trying to contain the oil at the wellhead, where the oil was coming out of the blowout preventer. The first one involved a large structure. Because of the presence of gas coming from the well at the well border, hydrates formed and caused freezing, so that actually caused that big container they had lowered over the well to lift off it.

There were a number of other efforts made to put devices on top of the well to contain the oil. Eventually, that was what happened. They put a device on the top of the head that caused the spill to cease.

To get there, though, they were kind of starting from scratch. There had really been no organized plan of activity aimed at containment of that nature for that kind of spill. What has happened since then, of course, is that BP itself has learned a lot of lessons, and it had folks from other operators helping as it was doing that.

You'll note I refer to something called the Marine Well Containment Company, which is a corporate body formed initially by the four oil companies--Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips--which have since been joined by BP. They've committed over $1 billion to develop and have in place containment equipment similar to what was used on Macondo but that could be deployed almost instantaneously or within a matter of days and not weeks or months.

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Alan Tonks Liberal York South—Weston, ON

Okay, that's great.

I asked that question because I was thinking that you were thinking that containment was after the spill and thinking of how you contain it in a very wide range. I'm relieved that what you're talking about is the actual containment at the drill site.

11:35 a.m.

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board

11:35 a.m.

Liberal

Alan Tonks Liberal York South—Weston, ON

My second question is from a National Energy Board perspective--and it's for whoever wants to answer it. Inasmuch as the experience has propagated the kind of intense technical and construction analysis from the gulf, is that information being fed into the post-event requirements when an application is made? Are we accelerating that kind of analysis and putting it on a trajectory to policy and to what is required when an application is received?

11:35 a.m.

Chair and Chief Executive Officer, National Energy Board

Gaétan Caron

Mr. Tonks, thank you for that question.

I can say unequivocally that yes, the safety offshore community of regulators, as we promote management systems--which is really a plan to review the learning loop--applies that philosophy to itself. Any incident like the one in the Gulf of Mexico is fed into our thinking process as we prepare for future applications.

In our case we have the privilege, Mr. Tonks, of actually having devised a process that will go to the bottom of things and hear from everybody about what containment looks like when it succeeds or what makes containment fail. As a regulator, we have to address the two scenarios: what if things go right and what if things go wrong? Those are things, honourable member, that we must look at before we even consider approving a well.

That's fed into the process; it will be fed into our Arctic review, and it is part of the ongoing journey of never assuming that we have done all that can be done to promote safety for the workers and communities. We must always assume that we can do more. That's the basic safety culture that we must promote with operators and that we must have within as a safety regulator.