Natural Resources Committee on Nov. 2nd, 2010

[Gaétan Caron]

Yes, I wish to confirm that, sir.

I would use the word “redundancy” in everything we do. There is redundancy in terms of blowout preventers that are built into that piece of equipment, but look at the whole regime, sir, as requiring redundancy. That's the way our Arctic review is structured. What do you need to do, industry, to do it right?

Question two: What do you do when things go wrong? See what we can learn from past accidents: Piper Alpha, in the eighties, an Australian incident that we're monitoring. There will be a public report before Christmas. That is as unexplainable, if you like, as the Gulf of Mexico, because of human error. Of course the Gulf of Mexico.... This creates a body of knowledge that creates breakthroughs in the way regulators regulate safety.

[Dick Harris, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Mr. Harris.

Mr. Anderson, for up to three minutes.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

I actually would like to go back to this issue of redundancy. I think when we here in the spring there was some explanation of what's required on an offshore rig in terms of redundancy, but I'd like you to just cover that again. I understand there is double, triple redundancy. The problem in the gulf seems to have been that they had started with bad cement work and then it impacted the blowout preventer. Could you go through what is required? And then we'll move on to another question.

[Gaétan Caron]

Dr. Dixit has something to say on that, sir.

[Dr. Bharat Dixit]

A similar question was asked when both Mr. Caron and I appeared before the Senate a couple of days ago. The key message I want to transmit here, using blowout preventer as an example of what we're talking about, is that we're looking for redundancy, we're looking for reliability, and we're looking for capability. Where we have the possible identification of hazards, we would look at all these aspects and at what we're going to be doing regarding those hazards. When that's the case, we look at these three aspects. Are they adequately covered? Only when we're satisfied can we move forward.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

In terms of capability and training, then, what training is either required or provided? If someone is on the rig and sees a situation, what typically would the person have in terms of training and education?

[Stuart Pinks]

In general, there's a training and qualification document that's been put together for use on the east coast. It identifies all the different types of training for all the different types of positions. Those are minimum requirements. The companies themselves will have a look at them, and they'll adopt those plus have internal training as well. That document is a living document and is continually reviewed and revised to drive up the standards for training and competencies.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

I wish I had a little bit more time here.

I'm just wondering if you have anything further to say about the five priorities of the strategic agenda set at the conference of regulators forum that you folks were part of. Anybody can answer that.

You identified safety culture, blowout prevention, performance indicators, operator competency, and use of standards. I'm just wondering if anything stood out at that forum that has really come forward.

[Stuart Pinks]

I think safety, culture, and leadership is probably number one. Collectively, as regulators, we want to figure out how we can deliver a message back to the industry. Industry operates the facilities. It's industry that's taking the risk. It's industry that's in business. Our role as a regulator is to figure out, from a safety culture perspective, how we hold operators accountable to continually improve safety culture. One of the measures we're going to use for going in and assessing that they have a reasonable safety culture and that it's working and is steadily improving....

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Where are you going with that, then? If that's the most important thing you've identified, where would you like to go?

[Stuart Pinks]

As I said, at the meeting in Vancouver, we identified five top priorities. Another one is blowout preventer integrity and operational issues. We have a work plan in place to have something that all regulators--members of the IRF and others--can use to zero in on that. We're hoping to have that by the end of December.

What we've done is put teams together for each of the five agenda items. The teams will draft their terms of reference and a plan of attack and a schedule. So it's a little bit premature to say that we're going to have something by date x. It's very much something that has just kicked off.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Thank you, Mr. Pinks, and thank you, Mr. Anderson.

Finally, for the last round of questioning, we'll have Mr. Cullen, for up to three minutes.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. Ruelokke, just quickly, the CNOPB put additional requirements on Chevron to report on the findings and their own lessons learned from the gulf. I know that Mr. Harris has had some correspondence with you. Have they given you any of those findings?

[Max Ruelokke]

We haven't received, to my knowledge, anyway, any from Chevron on a formal basis. We had ongoing discussions with their drilling team during the course of the Lona O-55 well and shortly thereafter. They assembled for that well the best expertise they had available within Chevron. They had colleagues who were involved in the BP incident....

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

But specifically, there is nothing formal yet, such as paper documents.

[Max Ruelokke]

No.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Are you going to make those public if you do receive them from Chevron?

[Max Ruelokke]

It depends on the information the operators give us. If it contains proprietary information, we have to seek their permission to release it. We would certainly do that.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Caron, the specific note you had, and this is an important part of it, said that the wells being planned are anticipated to take three seasons to finish. I wasn't talking about speculative wells. I wasn't talking about imaginary ice-blocked wells or ice-based wells. You know I was specifically speaking to the idea of what's being planned in the Arctic right now and how long it will take to drill a relief well in those places.

Your briefing notes say that the wells being planned will take three seasons. You could have said that. You could have articulated that the wells being planned will take three seasons. There are other wells not being planned that may be able to be done during the same season. Would that not have been a more direct and honest answer?

[Gaétan Caron]

The direct question I was giving you, sir--with the chair's requirement that I be brief--was the most direct I could find. It was about if it is possible to have a same-season relief well. As you know, it is our policy. So those wells that will be proposed to us must meet our policy.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

So here's the crux then--

[Gaétan Caron]

It has been proposed by the B.C. investment management corporation. They wrote to us as part of a review. They said they encourage the NEB to require companies to drill similar--

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Point of order, Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Leon Benoit]

Point of order, Mr. Anderson.