I'll take two aspects of that question.
First, going back to the bad old days of the national energy program, we did have a program called the petroleum incentives program. I think that was responsible for.... Of the 275,000 barrels a day of production right now, plus the Hebron project that is under development, all those finds were through the risk sharing that took place through the petroleum incentives program.
When the petroleum incentives program died—and it died in the early eighties, when we were preoccupied with trying to get our deficits under control—exploration on the east coast died with it. The level of exploration contracted quite dramatically, of course, as it did in the north.
We're now at the point where, I think this year off Newfoundland, we're talking about five exploration wells. That's quite a dramatic change from a few years ago when we were lucky if we could get a well or a well and a half in a 12-month period.
These are very expensive undertakings. Without some kind of risk sharing, I think we're going to be looking at a much slower pace of development, and I don't know whether we'll be able to replace the reserves we're consuming under that. So that's one aspect of having a broader national approach to at least risk sharing in that case.
The other example speaks a bit to energy corridors. I take the point that our witness from Calgary made about not wanting to guess and not being tied down to a physical corridor. In some respects I believe the important part is actually defining how corridors work.
We had the case in the early sixties with the upper Churchill project and Newfoundland having to sell their power at the border. If you look at the revenues generated by that project up until 2006, $1 billion in revenues went to Newfoundland and $19 billion went to its neighbour because of the arrangement of having to sell at the border.
I think there is a role there in brokering some broad policy around, at least, those two issues.