The most noticeable thing that changed in Fukushima is something that our technical expert called “beyond design“ accidents.
Those facilities were designed with some very conservative accidents in mind. They assumed events based on historical records of seismic events, tornadoes, all kinds of ice storms and so on, and then they designed those facilities way, way back, about 30 years ago.
What Fukushima taught us here was that we can get too preoccupied with the technical analysis. What we decided to do is to assume a doomsday scenario, as I call it, that there will be a big, big accident. So what can you do to actually prevent it? By preventing it, we mean we don't try to preserve the asset; what we want to make sure of is that there will be no releases. What happened in Fukushima is that they were not able to bring water to the plant fast enough.
All the things we've done in Canada is create a post-Fukushima action plan with many, many mitigations to deal with how to make sure that we cool the plant. That means water, being able to draw water from the lakes, making sure that we can bring in back-up power fast enough to cool things.
I can go on for a long time on some of the technical details, but that's the lesson we've learned.