Thank you very much.
Good afternoon, everyone. I'd like to thank you very much for allowing me to present to the committee. It's great to see there's interest not only in supporting clean tech but also in trying to figure out the more technically complex and business-complex aspects of policy to make things work.
To give you just a little bit of background, my name is Miriam Tuerk. I am an electrical engineer from the University of Waterloo and a serial entrepreneur. Clear Blue Technologies is a small tech start-up company in Toronto, with two other co-founders. What we make is a small box, the size of a Kleenex box, that acts as the brains of an off-grid street light, an off-grid security camera, an off-grid oil and gas pipeline sensor—any sort of device that is managing and controlling mission-critical infrastructure that needs power.
If you think back to 30 years ago, every one of us had a phone line into our house, and maybe even into our bedroom, if we needed phone service. Today, even though we all use a lot of telecom, the last mile of telecom is now mostly wireless. Power systems are doing the same. With the drop in power consumption by going to LED lights or going to digital systems, you can now have a security camera that only needs seven watts continuous, or an oil and gas pipeline sensor to make pipelines secure drawing only three or four or five watts. But it's really key to have those three or four or five watts, and doing it with solar or off-grid instead of all of that cabling and distribution is the technology we're building to enable.
Clear Blue is an early-stage start-up. We're doing about a few million dollars in revenue. We've hired about 30 people in Toronto. We're very pleased and honoured, only two years into the revenue phase of our business, to have customers in 29 countries around the world.
The committee has asked us to talk about the risks to clean-tech adoption, and I have basically three key points I'd like to talk about.
First, we have now moved into what I'll call “wave two” of clean-tech adoption, which means that what's being put out there is more innovative technology. It's not just saying that we're going to have a solar panel or a wind turbine. It's more asking how we can use innovative technologies and new technologies to get clean-tech adoption and to use clean tech everywhere.
The second piece is that you're getting more pervasive adoption. It's not just a project by Ontario Hydro. Every business at every level, every government at every level, is doing clean tech and integrating it. It's covering the entire economy.
Those two things, innovation and pervasive adoption, are a challenge. As with everything, technology change is happening faster and faster. We have a situation where Canada's personality trait in both government and business is that we tend to be very risk-averse to the adoption of new technology. Because we're conservative late adopters, that mentality had less of an impact during wave one of clean tech, but now that we're in wave two, where there is more innovation and things are moving more quickly, the fact that we are late adopters and we're slow adopters starts to really show the difference between how Canada can move forward in the marketplace versus how other countries and other sectors in other regions of the world can move forward. For example, Germany and China are moving much more quickly than we are in wave two of clean tech, in innovation and in adoption.
The last point I would make is that the clean-tech marketplace is happening more out of Europe and in emerging and remote markets, mostly because a lot of the infrastructure is being built in emerging and remote markets. The good news is that Canada has lots and lots of remote markets, so we have expertise and experience that we can share with the world. I think it's key for the government and industry to keep our eye on Europe and emerging markets and less so on the U.S., because the U.S. does not have remote markets that other territories have and they're not focused internationally.
The question that was asked is how we can de-risk what we're trying to do in that market. I think there are three key risks that are the challenge for this committee.
Risk number one is the financial risk that companies and governments face. Risk number two is the performance risk. The third risk, which I think can sometimes be forgotten, is the time risk.
Businesses and municipalities that are very risk-averse tend to ask themselves what will happen if it doesn't work or what will happen if they have to replace it. Keeping this slightly confidential, because I don't want to shoot those people who are trying to move forward, I'll give you an example. The City of Mississauga is currently looking at putting solar off-grid street lights throughout a lot of their parks areas because they don't have cabling entrenching, they are remote, and their power companies are starting to charge for all of that distribution and infrastructure. As they are doing the business case internally, some people want them to include the entire cost of replacing the off-grid solar street lights with grid-tied street lights just in case they don't work. The fear of financial risk—it has to be cheaper, and double-count the cost—and the fear of performance risk are two key examples that we see there.
Another example is that of a first nation in northern Ontario that wants to put street lights across its entire area. It wants them to be solar and off-grid, but the Ministry of Transportation doesn't want to approve this new technology that it doesn't really want to try out.
I will point out to you that by 2020 between 10% and 15% of the world's street lights will be solar powered. If you go to the Middle East, whether it be Saudi Arabia or Qatar, or into Rwanda or Southeast Asia, they're going 100% solar street lights, and yet we would have jurisdictions that say they're not sure they could even do a few on a first nation's area.
The last risk is anything that you bring forward from a policy perspective that adds time to the process because of extra application processes or extra approval processes. Risk to the approval actually slows things down.
There have been many good attempts at putting in place policies that are meant to help, but sometimes they make it more difficult. I will give you the example of the government's process for tenders for demonstration projects. It's such a complicated, long process without a high chance of success that it's not worth the time, and we, as a company, can say just forget it and we'll move forward without it.
Another example is STDC. It's a fantastic avenue, but it is set up for large physical installation demonstration projects. Now that we have wave two of clean tech, in which we're doing innovation on a small level, we don't fit that program.
What are my ideas? First of all, I will say that there is 10,000 times more expertise in the room than what I have about policy or what you should do, so I will defer to the committee on those things. But the key thing is to figure out how you de-risk the financial risk, how you de-risk the performance risk, and how you de-risk the time risk.
I would recommend putting in place simple financial incentives that work in both the public and private sectors. For example, tax credits don't help municipalities or government agencies or first nations or groups like that. Try to do it in a way that involves very simple math. In other words, I either qualify for it and I apply for it and I know I'm going to get it, as I would with SR and ED, for example, versus my having to do an application and not knowing whether I will get it. If I know the formula and I know I'm going to get the tax credit or the financial incentive or the benefit, then I can just move ahead with the project.
Make the definition of a successful project less restrictive. I'll give you an example. In the province of Ontario, Ontario Hydro has a program under which it will pay an incentive for replacing street lights with LED street lights. This is to promote the adoption of clean technology, but they will only pay that back if it's connected to the grid, which has all kinds of non-green energy aspects. If it's replaced with a solar street light that's off-grid, they won't pay the tax benefit.
This is an example of wave one; we're just going to go to LED. Yes, the financial benefit works, but with wave two, where we have more innovative technologies that we want—I encourage it for jobs and new industry and entrepreneurship in the country—the model doesn't fit. Try to create a non-restrictive policy that can be used for future innovations that none of us have even thought about.
In terms of the vehicles for this—and I'm almost done—EDC would be a fantastic vehicle. They provide performance bond guarantees and financial risk guarantees, so you could put it through that process. But make sure you solve the banking problem first. With the banking problem we have, even when you have full EDC support, which we, for example, get for many projects, the banks don't take that into consideration. There's a banking issue with it.
My last recommendation is to make it a simple calculation or qualification, or make it a pre-qualification. If you're going to do a demonstration project, allow the vendor to apply, get approval before they bring the customer to the table, and if they have the approved project, then they can go and find a customer. It's very embarrassing to bring a customer to the table and then not get approved. You're better off not to even bring the customer to the table.
Those are my comments. Hopefully that was not too much information in seven minutes.
I thank you very much, and I have a documentation of what I said which will be forwarded to you.