I absolutely would agree with you. One of the things that I'm trying to point out is that there's a distinction between the procedure for assessing capacity and the substantive criteria, right? So yes, we have a procedure in place that can assess the decision-making capacity with children, but that doesn't actually answer the question of whether or not minor children or non-adults—children and teenagers or adolescents—should be able to be given access to physician-assisted death in the first place.
There's a huge ethical component, and ethical data that was not available at the Supreme Court with respect to children was available with respect to adults. The Supreme Court decision didn't just rest on an adult's capacity to choose physician-assisted death. It actually rested on a number of different evidentiary bases to determine, when the arguments were made under section 7—life, liberty, and security—the issues around dignity, the burden on other people, and so on and so forth. We haven't heard any data with respect to what a child's feelings are in terms of when they have a particular type of illness.
I think what I'm trying to say is, yes, absolutely, we have processes to assess a child's capacity, but we have not looked from that ethical data perspective at the substantive question of whether or not they should be given that access in the first place, which would involve consultation with pediatricians, families, and children, and then taking the next step in looking at the issue of process and determining whether or not they do indeed have the capacity to make that decision.
Does that make sense?