Okay.
The other thing that preoccupied me, Monsieur Ménard, is this.
The Quebec law was developed on the basis of Quebec's jurisdiction in health care. At this time we are talking about Parliament's jurisdiction with regard to the Criminal Code. Consequently our approach could be much broader than the one adopted by Quebec, which was determined by jurisdiction over health care matters. That is why I believe that the Quebec law in some of its provisions may be used as inspiration, but with regard to the definition in the Quebec act of
“terminally ill”, it doesn't exist in the Supreme Court decision that “terminally ill” has to be a safeguard. In my opinion, it's not what the Supreme Court decision provides.
So I think that by reviewing the Quebec act in connection with our role in defining
what “grievous and intolerable suffering” is, those are the two criteria. It doesn't mean that you also have to be terminally ill or that you have to understand that intolerable suffering needs to lead you to terminally ill.
I think that the Quebec law is good as such, with regard to the province's jurisdiction regarding health care, but it is restrictive with regard to the criteria contained in the Carter ruling.
Do you share that interpretation or analysis of the Quebec legislation?