Public Accounts Committee on Oct. 24th, 2006

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

I'd like to call the meeting to order and welcome everyone here. Bienvenue à tous.

Colleagues, we have this afternoon a presentation from the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation. With us is Geoff Dubrow, the director of capacity development with that foundation. He is accompanied by Philip Chin and Greg Gertz. Geoff's presentation is entitled “Maximizing the Effectiveness of Public Accounts Committees”.

Before I introduce Geoff, I want to point out that this part of the meeting will go until about 4:45. Then we're going to adjourn for two minutes and reconvene in camera to discuss future business. We're going to attempt to finalize the firearms allocation report. We have concluded it, but we want all members to have one last look at it. Too, there is one minor motion of a housekeeping nature that I want to have passed.

Before we call upon Mr. Dubrow, I believe Mr. Fitzpatrick has a point of order.

[Brian Fitzpatrick, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

I want to table certain documents and request that they be made available to all members on the committee. They are documents that I obtained through access requests, and I think they're pertinent to our study on the firearms issue.

One letter is dated January 27, 2004, and another letter is dated March 3, 2004, from Mr. Baker, addressed to the associate national defence minister and the Minister of State for Civil Preparedness. I think it makes abundantly clear that the minister was briefed on what was going on in the firearms registry by the contents of the letter and the enclosures that were sent with it.

With regard to my point in filing those things, I am of the view that the political ministers had the knowledge of what was going on. I think these two documents just support that point and make it clear.

The other document that I think may have some relevance is dated January 26, 2004. It's from the associate defence minister, and it's addressed to Commissioner Baker. It would probably be directed toward the $15 million sum and how that should be dealt with.

I draw your attention to the third paragraph from the bottom, where the associate defence minister says: “Also the 'registry operations' line item increases notably in the next fiscal year. Are there ways to mitigate this increase available.” Although it doesn't really direct itself to one or two, it does direct itself to the $15 million item. It seems to be sort of a suggestion from a political minister to Commissioner Baker that maybe something should be done to mitigate that item.

So I just want to table and make those available to all members of the committee so that we have those bits of information in hand when completing our report.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Fitzpatrick. If they are deemed to be relevant, we can come back to those documents. They are deemed to be tabled.

Before I turn the microphone over to Geoff, I first want to thank him and his organization for being here today. I would point out that Geoff is the director of capacity development at the Canadian Comprehensive Audit Foundation, and he's been involved in international democratic development for the past ten years at least. He's had a number of posts here in Ottawa and internationally. He has had the lead in these published articles on audit oversight and accountability.

Geoff, a Fulbright scholar, holds a master's degree from the University of Toronto and a master's in public administration from Cornell University. He is presently a PhD candidate at Carleton University.

To all three of you, again, thank you very much for being here today.

The floor is yours, Geoff.

[Geoffrey Dubrow, Director, Capacity Development, Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to offer my greetings on behalf of Michael Eastman, our executive director, who unfortunately—unfortunately in the sense that he's missing this meeting—is at an internal audit forum in Nova Scotia today, but he sends his best regards.

I have a couple of very preliminary remarks. I remember very well, when Mr. Williams was chair, he mentioned on several occasions that witnesses would prefer to go to the dentist rather than appear before public accounts.

[John Williams, Conservative, Edmonton—St. Albert, AB]

I've said that, Mr. Chair, many times.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

I'm appearing before the committee at your invitation, Mr. Chairman, but I'm assuming that the members will go relatively easy on me. Would that be a fair assumption?

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

I can't make any assumptions.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

I do want to thank you. I understand that I've been allocated about 20 minutes to speak. I'm very mindful of the members' time, so I'll try to stick to that.

I do want to say that in preparing for this presentation, I've consulted with members of all parties on this committee and with people from the Library of Parliament as well, who have always been an incredible help. I also reviewed the transcript of June 22, the meeting that took place with Ned Franks and Jonathan Malloy, for some background.

I also want to mention that I've given you a copy of a capacity survey that we have written for public accounts committees, which I'd be very happy to refer to during our meeting—the document is available both in English and French—and at the end of the meeting I'll actually give you a document that highlights the survey results from our Public Accounts Committee Capacity Survey that we did across Canada.

To turn to the purpose of our visit here today, the

CCAF has developed a draft strategy, which I'd like to share with you, on how to maximize the effectiveness of public accounts committees. This draft strategy builds upon the findings of our guide, the CCAF's A Guide to Strengthening Public Accounts Committees. We presented this draft strategy to the public administration committee of the National Assembly of Quebec at the end of August, then at a joint session of the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees (CCPAC) and the Canadian Council of Legislative Auditors (CCOLA) in September 2006. We've made several other presentations to other legislatures and are scheduled to do a few more in the fall and winter.

The purpose of making this presentation today is to engage members of the public accounts committees in a dialogue about how they can maximize the effectiveness of their public accounts committee.

We recognize the critical role played by public accounts committees in the Westminster system. Looking at the three predominant models of supreme audit institutions in the world, the Westminster system is the one that's most dependent upon Parliament to act on the reports of the Auditor General.

Ironically, as you all know, the success of a PAC in the Westminster system is highly dependent upon contingencies such as the electoral cycle, electoral landslides, politics, the type of issue being examined, the extent of turnover of committee members, and the extent to which committees follow up to ensure that the government has implemented its recommendations.

First, I'd like to say a few words about how the PAC study was organized.

A survey on various aspects of their work was sent out to the fourteen PACs in Canada -- one federal, ten provincial and three territorial. We compiled the replies, but chose not to single out any particularly jurisdiction.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Dubrow, perhaps I could interrupt you for 10 seconds. I have received word from the interpreters that they're having a tough time keeping up. Perhaps you can slow down a bit.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

Sure. I'm trying to make that 20-minute limit.

The research study that was published contains six different sections, including the Guide, the thickest of the documents. My presentation today will focus on the findings reported on pages 19 through 33 of the guide. Basically, these pages contain our findings and suggestions for strengthening PAC powers and practices.

I will now present some of the study's key findings. However, I want to do so in the context of a draft strategy that CCAF wishes to unveil for discussion purposes. I want to use this opportunity to initiate a dialogue with members of this PAC concerning ways in which CCAF can be useful in helping to strengthen the capacity of this committee.

So without further ado, let me introduce to you briefly, on slide five, the draft strategy that we introduced at the Canadian Council of Public Accounts Committees meeting in September.

There are five phases to the strategy. It's a strategy on how to maximize the effectiveness of public accounts committees. I want to emphasize that it's just a strategy. It's a set of ideas to engage the committee in discussion. It's not the solution, it's not the model, and we're not expecting that all public accounts committees will follow it, but there are some good ideas in here and that's what we're hoping to launch a discussion on.

If we start at the very top of the strategy, on laying the foundation, I'll talk about this in more detail in a few minutes, but this is really the preconditions that need to be in place for a public accounts committee to be effective. One example is the opposition chair issue, but I'll get into more detail later.

We suggest that at the point where the preconditions are in place for an effective public accounts committee, the committee can start setting an objective for their meetings and planning. We suggest that committees operate best when they're non-partisan. I know one must take account of political environment when one says that; nonetheless, the conclusion from our study is that committees tend to operate at their best and in a most effective manner when they are non-partisan.

So that's number two, setting a non-partisan objective and planning for the meeting, and I'll get into some findings from our survey on that.

The third area is holding an effective hearing. Here you'll see the term “MPs”, and I apologize for that. What we really should have said was “legislators”, because this is not intended to suggest that this is in particular for members of this committee but legislators in general, asking pertinent questions, and witnesses participating as partners in the process.

The fourth phase is adding value, and this is really the reporting role of the public accounts committee, issuing their recommendations and following up to ensure that the government has actually implemented those recommendations.

And finally, the fifth area--and this is an area that got a lot of attention in Quebec City when we did this presentation there--is the issue of how committees can communicate the value of their work to the public and to the media. The question I'll put forth later is, is this something that in general you would find useful?

Let me start by talking about the preconditions for an effective public accounts committee. We propose that before embarking on a path to strengthen the effectiveness of public accounts committees, there are certain underlying conditions that must be in place for a public accounts committee to be successful. Within the scope of its powers, a PAC must be able to call meetings, meet outside the legislature's session, and initiate inquiries.

All committees, according to our research, can meet while the House is recessed, and about two-thirds can meet while the House is prorogued; three-quarters have the powers to initiate inquiries not specifically referred to them by the House or outlined in documents referred to in committee.

Finally, committees must have an opposition member chairing the committee. That's the case in all legislatures in Canada and at the federal level, and that's a Commonwealth standard practice.

PACs also need to have regular and frequent meetings and sufficient time allocated to a hearing in order to be effective. Ten jurisdictions responded that meetings were held on a regular and frequent basis, one jurisdiction answered to the negative, and three did not reply.

In terms of the capacity of a public accounts committee to exercise its powers, we looked at whether committees had adequate resources such as financing, and research and technical support. On adequate financing, eleven jurisdictions said, “Yes, we do”; and three declined to respond. I think that was a polite decline on their part.

On adequate resources--and these are the kinds of things that will flag the interest of the committee--I know this is not the case here, but we asked whether committees had in-house research staff provided. In six out of the fourteen Canadian jurisdictions, 40% do not have any in-house research staff serving the public accounts committee. Given the reliance of legislative auditors on public accounts committees, we look forward to talking to some of these jurisdictions and getting a sense of how they're coping with the workload without any research support.

Another basic precondition for the PAC to exercise its powers is that reports of the legislative auditor are permanently referred to the public accounts committee. This is the case in twelve of the thirteen jurisdictions that responded in the affirmative to this question.

In terms of strong committee leadership, there was a question on the working relationship between the public accounts committee and the legislative auditor. All the jurisdictions that responded said their relationship was strong and, because of the reliance of the public accounts committee on the legislative auditor, obviously this was an important precondition for the success of the committee.

These are the minimum conditions. Once most or all of these preconditions are in place, then PAC can set its sights on maximizing the effectiveness of its work. The rest of the presentation focuses on how PAC can do so.

The PAC's role is to set an objective, namely to strengthen the public administration in a non-partisan manner.

For discussion purposes, we submit that members of a PAC must be motivated by a clear common mission. Historically, that mission has been to strengthen public administration. I submit that a PAC functions more effectively when it works in a non-partisan manner.

In terms of the framework of powers and practices, planning is an important part of an effective PAC meeting. Agendas and advance briefing notes, clear objectives and work plans for hearings, having subcommittees or steering committees examine specific issues and advance briefings with the legislative auditor are all planning activities that can increase the focus and output of PACs.

At least 10 of the jurisdictions stated that agendas and advance briefing notes were prepared and that objectives and the work plan for hearings were clear. However, -- and I think you'll find this interesting -- only about half of the 14 jurisdictions had steering committees designed to plan future work.

Only about half of the committees have a planning subcommittee that actually performs the planning function.

To suggest the link between planning and non-partisanship.... One suggestion I've heard raised is for PAC members to “huddle” prior to a PAC meeting and discuss the strategy for pursuing different lines of questioning among parties. I'd be interested in the committee's views on whether this would increase the coherence of lines of questioning during a committee hearing.

Turning to membership of the committee, issues surrounding membership can influence the degree to which a PAC functions in a non-partisan manner. This includes whether ministers are allowed to sit as members of the committee, whether there is continuity on the committee and whether members are considered to be non-partisan in their activities.

In our survey, we asked whether members of the PACs were appointed by the legislative assembly at the beginning of the first session to serve for the life of the Parliament. We were told that this is common practice in 9 out of the 14 jurisdictions.Thus, in five jurisdictions, committee members are not appointed for the full term of the legislature.

Where members are appointed only for the duration of the new session -- following which a new committee is struck -- we received comments that this arrangement makes it more difficult to coordinate the work of the committee with the output of the Auditor General's office. One legislature replied that while the committee is appointed for the duration of the legislature, substitutions occur so frequently that the committee's continuity is undermined.

In terms of ministers sitting on the committee, the general consensus seems to be that this practice renders a PAC hearing highly ineffective. While some jurisdictions do not preclude ministers from sitting on PACs, it appears that by convention, ministers sit on a PAC only when the size of the government caucus so dictates.

The committee chair plays a crucial role in setting an impartial objective. Given the unique role and objectives of oversight committees in Parliament, I wish to draw to your attention the fact that only in eight of the fourteen jurisdictions are chairs appointed for the life of the Parliament, barring any unforeseen circumstances. This leads me to conclude that turnovers at the chair position during the life of a Parliament must make planning difficult.

I'll go now to slide 13. That was just talking about phase two, which was the planning and non-partisanship. If we look at phase three of our draft strategy, it's on holding an effective hearing. One of the conclusions was, again, going back to strong committee leadership, the important role of the chair in managing the process--and we took this right out of a quote of one of the people who were interviewed for the study--“out of the dynamics of shifting politics”. In other words, as public accounts committees sitting in legislatures tend to sometimes weave in and out of political issues, the role of the chair, our survey finds, is to make sure the committee stays on track and focuses on a non-partisan objective.

Similarly, the role of the chair is very important in articulating that objective. If there was a planning meeting and good planning was done in terms of preparing an issue that is non-partisan, the role of the chair in reminding the committee of that and intervening where necessary was also deemed very important.

Finally, the third issue in terms of committee leadership was making witnesses feel more comfortable answering questions, and that's an issue I'll be very happy to get into as we get to it.

In terms of the powers and practices of the committee within the context of holding an effective hearing, one of the key privileges that an effective PAC must have, of course, is to be able to call any witness necessary. All public accounts committees in Canada responded that they have this power. It goes without saying that factual and non-partisan information is key to holding the government to account. We found that out of the 14 legislatures, 12 had the power to send for papers and records, but only eight had the power to access cabinet documents.

We did ask in the survey whether PACs have adopted practices that permit productive lines of questioning to be taken to their logical conclusion. In this committee, I would assume that implies that either a member would have his or her eight minutes extended or would borrow time from someone else. I do understand that this practice was tried recently in the committee, and I wonder if using this practice on a more regular basis, here and in other jurisdictions, might be useful for the committees. In our survey, 11 of the committees replied, yes, they do allow such a practice. However, our survey does not really allow me to conclude how often that practice is used. That would be something that I think we'd be very interested in looking into.

I have one more comment on the effective hearing issue. Looking at the June 22 transcript of this committee, where two academics engaged in a discussion with the committee about how to maximize its effectiveness, I noticed several references to witnesses “muddying the waters”, so to speak--and I think that's a direct quote out of the transcript. So clearly the relationship between government witnesses and public accounts committees is an issue of concern.

The question we put to PAC members at the CCPAC-CCOLA meeting was whether they feel that a non-partisan objective, coupled with planning and preparation of committee members, might lead to witnesses feeling more comfortable answering questions--put another way, whether a committee that was looking for solutions could engage bureaucrats in helping to find solutions in a non-partisan way, and whether a committee travelling along that path could make bureaucrats feel like part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

I note here the Auditor General's annual report in 2000, where the Auditor General states: Accountability requires that people accept responsibility for their mistakes--that goes without saying. Excessive emphasis on laying blame, however, can be counterproductive. If we wish to empower employees and encourage them to innovate, then we must be prepared to accept the risk that, at times, mistakes and wrong decisions will be made. When that happens, we should focus on learning from the experience rather than assigning blame.

I'd be very interested in the committee's views on the idea of a confidential exit survey for witnesses. Such a survey could help the committee ascertain whether more needs to be done on the part of the committee to make witnesses feel comfortable with the hearings process, and whether that would lead to more effective answers and less confrontation and frustration on the part of members of committees. I note that the Senate has an exit survey for witnesses--and I do have a copy here--though I note that it focuses more on how witnesses were served by staff of the committee, rather than their interaction with the members.

The next phase involves issuing value-added recommendations and doing a follow up.

The PAC should have the power to prepare substantive reports for the legislature. Twelve committees report that they have the power to do that, while two acknowledge that they do not. Needless to say, the power to make recommendations and the power to require the government to follow them ensure committee effectiveness.

Follow-up meetings with witnesses and a report card on how the government is doing on implementing recommendations add value to the whole process. Only seven committees have responded that they have an effective follow-up process. Only six rely on the services of the audit office to follow-up on the committees' recommendations and the same number receive updates from the legislative auditor on the implementation status of the recommendations. Thus, this is an area in which much more can be done.

Last but not least is the fifth pillar of our strategy, and one that I hope will interest members. First, just for some background as far as the public and media are concerned, while nine committees issue press releases following public accounts committee hearings, only six have televised hearings or webcasts.

I would argue that in general there needs to be more thinking in Canada as a whole about how to engage the general public in a more comprehensive manner. One suggestion I want to put forth—and I want to say that I would make this suggestion directly to this committee, if there were interest—is that a non-partisan communications service develop a text for committee members' householders that breaks down the often highly technical work the PAC does into language that constituents can understand.

In our meetings across the country we're asking PAC members whether the incentive to strengthen planning and to engage in non-partisan lines of questioning would increase if it were easier for PAC members to share the accomplishments of their committee with their constituents. After all, an effective committee should be able to explain to constituents how they are increasing accountability in Ottawa and playing a strong role in guarding the public purse.

That concludes my written remarks, but of course I'll be delighted to answer questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

First of all, Geoff, I want to thank you and your two colleagues, Philip and Greg, for being here today. It's been very helpful.

Before we get to the questions, I want to clean up a housekeeping matter. I think it was back in June that this committee decided to purchase on behalf of all members the booklet prepared by the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation. It's an excellent booklet. But because of some changes in our membership, we missed two or three people, and we decided to go back and catch them. I believe Monsieur Laforest does not have a copy. And I believe Monsieur Proulx....You do have one? Mr. Nadeau should have one. Do you have one, Ms. Ratansi? Okay.

Having gotten that out of the way, I want to point out to members that we don't have time to complete two full rounds with our normal eight-minute first round and five-minute second round. We don't have time to complete two rounds, so if members don't take their eight minutes, that would be encouraged. We'll follow the list and go as far as we can.

We'll start with Ms. Ratansi for eight minutes—if you need them.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you for being here. It has just reinforced the conference we have been to.

I'd like to go to your presentation, but also to the public accounts committee and how it works. With the diverse jurisdictions we have and diverse competency levels we have, how do you at CCAF assist jurisdictions where there is a skills shortage? For example, you say 40% do not have in-house research and 50% do not have steering committees.

Public accounts is an important factor, and these jurisdictions that we met were having some challenges. How do you work with them to ensure that the competency levels, the stability...? Mr. Williams has been here for 13 years, and he's the most stable factor....

How do you maintain that, and how do you create an environment where people would love to be around on public accounts and not just...?

That was my first question. If you answer it, I'll give you two more to answer afterwards, and that will be mine, surely.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

Thank you very much for the question; much appreciated.

On the issue of capacity and lack of research support, we just unveiled the strategy a couple of months ago. We haven't started working yet with the legislatures that are in that position. But perhaps our main strategy would be to help the legislature or the government and the auditor general in that particular jurisdiction to raise awareness about the importance of the public accounts committee.

One of the problems we're trying to make clear to jurisdictions when we go there is that the public accounts committee is not, in our view, just another committee. I was going to say not just another legislative committee, but in fact it's not a legislative committee, it's an oversight committee. It has special needs because of the fact that an auditor general, in order to take action on findings, requires a public accounts committee to issue recommendations. Because of that, I think one of the messages we have to try to get out in those jurisdictions is that public accounts committees are not the same as other parliamentary or legislative committees, and they therefore sometimes need more resources in order to be able to do their jobs.

You also asked--if I understood your question correctly--how we get members to want to be on the public accounts committee. There was an allusion to that issue, I remember, when Jonathan Malloy said that the public accounts committee was not always seen as one of the “sexy” committees.

If we go back to the draft strategy, that's really why we've added that fifth pillar. As Mr. Chairman will recall, we talked about this in Charlottetown. One of the issues that comes up is that it's much easier for a member on a legislative committee--the transport committee, say--to tell their constituents about the law passed on the building of the Trans-Canada Highway and the crucial amendment they made. It's easier to make a connection with constituents so that they understand that. To my understanding, it's much more difficult for a public accounts committee member to do that given the very technical nature of some of the issues they're looking at and the fact that those issues are changing all the time.

So when we talk about incentives, that really is one of them. Perhaps helping legislators communicate their value added to the public would increase their incentive to want to be on this committee and to be involved.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

You're right; accounting has this label that it's boring, but it's the most important aspect of control and accountability.

Can you tell me what role the auditors general of the different provinces are playing in overcoming competency issues? If the legislature does not have, say, the right skill sets in its PAC, then how does the auditor general rely on it? And what have the auditors general done? We have some classic examples of different jurisdictions that were having quite a lot of fun.

Finally, where have you come across good PACs--

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

I can't answer that question.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

--and what benchmarks have you adopted from them?

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

Thank you very much for your questions.

In terms of the role of the AGs, we did ask a number of questions. I'm not sure how many you'd like me to give you from the list, but I have about ten of them.

There obviously is an attempt on the part of the legislative audit community to work closely with public accounts committees. In our survey we did look at a number of issues--for example, whether the legislative auditor attends public accounts committee meetings and acts as a source of expert advice to the committee. We found that 12 did.

We looked at whether the PAC regarded the legislative auditor as an expert advisor to be consulted with when preparing its work plans and reports--so not only being a witness, but actually being involved in the process of preparing its work plan and its reports. Out of 14 jurisdictions, seven said yes.

Two jurisdictions actually hold a retreat with officials of the audit office to plan future work schedules, but only two. In 11 jurisdictions, the legislative auditor and audit office brief new committee members on the public account committee's roles and responsibilities.

We have a whole bunch of findings. I'd be happy to go on if you'd like me to; this just gives you an idea. I would just say that our survey found that there is an attempt on the part of legislative auditors to support the work of public accounts committees by acting as resources, as experts, etc.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

The last question was, which is the best PAC you've come across, and what benchmarks have you taken from them? Considering that Mr. Williams was here for 13 years, you must have given him some support.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

I think there's one dangerous question that I can't answer: which is the best PAC?

In terms of benchmarks, we haven't gotten there yet. If you go back to the guide, there's a fourth section related to the issue of self-evaluation and planning for excellence. In our capacity building, we want to start a round of meeting the legislatures, talking about these issues, and then we can start talking about it. It would be a little premature for us to go in and talk about planning.

I think of one PAC I met—not this one—which right now is embroiled in a political issue, in which the PAC is simply not functioning. So before we get into the issue of benchmarking, I think we want to do a round and try to establish a dialogue to talk about the roles and responsibilities of the members of the PAC. Then we can focus on that benchmarking issue.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Ms. Ratansi.

Monsieur Laforest, huit minutes, s'il vous plaît.

[Jean-Yves Laforest, Bloc, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be splitting my time with Mr. Nadeau.

Good day, Mr. Dubrow. I'm happy you were able to make your presentation to the committee.

My question concerns the portion of your presentation where you talk about the aim of non-partisan work plans. You stated that the primary objective, or role, of public accounts committees is to strengthen public administration. I totally agree with you that when the reports submitted are excellent, there is no room for partisanship.

However, aren't we deluding ourselves if we believe that participants in this process can genuinely set aside any partisan feelings? Political parties are a fact of life in a parliamentary system. Take, for instance, some of the past scandals, be it the Gomery inquiry or some other incident. It's extremely difficult for members to remain impartial in such cases because in a parliamentary system of government, they are affiliated with a political party that defends certain beliefs.

[Geoffrey Dubrow]

Thank you for your question.

First, I'd like to say something in English before I attempt to continue in French.

There are two types of accountability: horizontal and vertical. Vertical accountability is the accountability of the politicians to the electorate, and horizontal accountability is the kind of accountability we're talking about, which is the accountability of government by oversight agencies.

The theory I would put forward for public accounts committees is that our system of horizontal accountability tends to work best when the issue being discussed is not of an issue that's going to threaten the government's vertical accountability, i.e. the government's re-election. I'm not talking about any government in particular; this is a general observation.

Similarly the public accounts committees tend to function optimally when.... What I'm trying to say is that this also affects the opposition. It's not only government's re-election, but when the opposition sees an issue that they can use politically.

That's a very logical question. Since we do operate in a parliamentary system, it's impossible to avoid partisanship at all times. For that reason, we emphasize the important planning and leadership role that the committee chair must assume.

For example, when a non-partisan idea is presented, or when a plan for discussing a report by the AG, a non-partisan office, is put forward, the chair's role is to ensure that questions raised are non-partisan and outside the political realm.

However, you're correct in that this will always prove to be a challenge, given our system of government.

[Richard Nadeau, Bloc, Gatineau, QC]

Good day, Mr. Dubrow.

Based on your observations, do PAC members behave differently, depending on whether a minority or majority government is in power? I've not experienced a majority government, but is this in fact something...