I'd like to follow up on the point Mr. Williams raised. I think there's another aspect to this whole thing that I find rather astounding in your ninth report.
I view the Comptroller General in a treasury department as being the person to monitor or police things. I think we've come a long way from the days of C.D. Howe, when things were run by the Treasury Board in those days. My understanding is that it was a career-ending move for a deputy minister to try to violate the rules or circumvent things in those days, when they had a genuine fear of the people who were running the Treasury Board.
In this case, what I find remarkable is that you have the acting Comptroller General stating the proper legal position: you must go to Parliament and get the appropriation, or you must report a blowing of the vote. From what I can gather, to shore up his position—not to get into debates about lawyers or accountants—he got a legal opinion that supported this position. Then all of a sudden senior people in other departments said, “Oh, we'll just push you and your opinion aside and we'll get another opinion that will give us a third option, and you just go away and leave us alone.”
It even gets to the point where we get a replacement for the acting Comptroller General, who adopts the second legal opinion and ignores the first. I find that whole process rather distasteful.
I think the Comptroller General and the Treasury Board should have a fair amount of power, and deputy ministers who step out of line in this place should get a good whack from that department. They shouldn't be pushed to the side; there's something wrong with that process.
Am I off the rails with this kind of view, Mrs. Fraser, or is there some legitimacy in the concern here?