The problem that I and many people, many former officials, had with Justice Gomery's second report was that it said that public servants should have, and have, a separate constitutional personality from the government the voters send them. Now, the basic principle in government, as it functions, is elected people are boss. At the end of the day, what elected people want to do and be accountable for, they have a right to do, as long as it's not illegal. That's really quite basic.
Justice Gomery had a different take on it. He particularly said, and this is the British accounting officer theory, any time your minister wants to do something that you don't think is a good idea, you get a written instruction to demonstrate that you didn't go along with that.
Ministers are people whom you deal with every day, every week. You can't go around asking for written instruction every time there's a disagreement between the two of you. You have to have a working partnership.
The other thing is that from the point of view of most officials and most former officials, the principle that the minister is in charge and that ministerial responsibility applies is very important. What was ingenious about the Federal Accountability Act, which, when I looked at it, solved all of the problems I had had with the British system, was that it said, first of all, officials function within a system of ministerial responsibility--elected people are in charge, you don't have government by the unelected--and number two, if you have a disagreement, there's a particular way of dealing with it.
You see, there were two conflicting pieces of legislation. All the departmental acts read that the minister has the management and direction of the department, but the Financial Administration Act says the deputy minister has certain responsibilities vis-à-vis the Treasury Board. How do you square that? Well, this squares it. It says that you function within a system of ministerial responsibility, but if the minister wants to do something that you think is improper, you, as the deputy, take it to the Secretary of the Treasury Board, you talk about it, and you say, “What do you think?” If the Secretary of the Treasury Board shares your view that this shouldn't happen, you report that back to the minister. If the minister says, “I want to do it anyway”—it's the minister's right—the next step is for the minister to deal with the ministers of the Treasury Board.
Now, the attractive feature of that is, instead of having officials vetoing what ministers do, it gets settled between elected people, the ministers of the Treasury Board and the minister of the department. Of course, ultimately, a matter could be referred to the Prime Minister, but it preserves that principle that I've always thought, and that most officials and former officials think, is really important: elected people are in charge.