Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can add a bit more with regard to our internal regulation and looking at the seriousness of this issue. Going back to 2005, the initial indications from the people in North Bay that there were difficulties on that base, reported through their chain of command to 1 Canadian Air Division, which asked for the services of the Canadian Forces national counter-intelligence unit to launch an investigation as to what occurred in this regard, they are looking at, again, the kinds of security issues and risks that the departmental security officer mentioned, looking at that whole thing, because again, leadership takes this very seriously. If there were indeed any kind of disciplinary action required, automatically it would go across to the Canadian Forces national investigation service in that regard.
So those investigations were launched. In addition to that, the military police launched an administrative review on how this situation could have percolated to that point.
Following the conclusions of those, and again, given the context that the deputy minister just mentioned—these policies that were not sufficiently specific because they had not been updated after 9/11, as we've described earlier—that provided the context. So having done an administrative review, a national counter-intelligence review, a national investigative service review, we then launched our own chief of review services to have a look at this, in the fall of 2006, with their director of sensitive evaluations and investigations, so another review of the situation, and then based upon the technical valuations of what was occurring, going into the mitigation measures.
That is just to say that these processes happen in parallel and are complementary to each other to ensure that the action plan is as comprehensive as we can make it to ensure for the security, and indeed the credibility, of this facility as we move forward.