Public Accounts Committee on April 2nd, 2009

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

But would the commission have a secretariat now? Would it have staff working? Or is it just ignored?

[Sheila Fraser]

There is a secretariat for the commission. There are two people working in the secretariat.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

What do they do?

[Sheila Fraser]

They have had what I'd sort of say are almost special projects. They've been working at doing all the establishment of the commission. They were also responsible for reviewing the appointment process at the Immigration and Refugee Board. They seem to be looking at different appointment processes in various organizations, but the commission per se is not operating.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

In the process of this audit, were you given any explanation as to why this legislation was not being followed?

[Sheila Fraser]

No, other than the fact that the chair who had been proposed was not accepted and those events happened; nothing beyond that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much.

We'll start the second round with Ms. Ratansi for five minutes.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you.

I'm going to focus on the national security intelligence information sharing. I find in your observations that there's been a very great concern about balancing privacy with public security.

All of us understand that the safety and security of citizens are the responsibility of the government and Canadians have to feel comfortable, but when you target a specific community because of events that take place in 2001, and you pick on those communities, you have indicated that there is a lot of intrusion. How do you balance that intrusion, and how does the information being shared between Transport Canada and RCMP work either to help or to hinder Canadians?

How has it impacted the rights of Canadian citizens? I can think of numerous examples. We had the example of Maher Arar, and now we have an example of a citizen sitting in Sudan who has not been able to get out because information was supplied by some Canadian body.

How often do you find, in your opinion, the agencies or departments hiding behind the security concerns and therefore not sharing information? How do we balance these things?

[Sheila Fraser]

Thank you, Chair.

I think there are two elements of response. The first is the whole question of the sharing of information. We note in the report that many of the departments and agencies raise concerns about sharing of information, citing either legal restraints—there might actually be in certain acts clauses that do not allow them to share information—or in other cases privacy concerns. The Department of Justice has been apprised of this for quite some time, has been working on it, has been categorizing the different concerns. It certainly indicates in its report that it will identify these obstacles and try to propose solutions. We believe it is really critical that this be done as quickly as possible, because the sharing of information is really critical to security intelligence.

I believe that for the privacy question, many of these issues can be resolved by working with the commissioner of privacy, but the departments need to work more closely with her to have clarity around it. I think it's sometimes too easy to invoke privacy without, perhaps, having done all the research and background work that is necessary.

The second issue I would bring up is the question of oversight of agencies and departments that have security operations. We have noted in the report, as we had noted in our first report, that there is a varying degree of oversight to these agencies, some of which in fact have no oversight. We have recommended in the past to the government that this be reviewed and that oversight be commensurate with the powers of intrusion of these organizations.

Government has done a fair bit of work on this, has certainly studied various options, and is, I believe, waiting for the results of certain inquiries to be made known before completing all that analysis and then perhaps bringing something forward. That is also a very important issue to give confidence to Canadians that the balance between security and privacy is being managed appropriately.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Now, you brought in a very interesting word, “oversight”, and I was looking at your paragraph 1.12. Some agencies involved in security intelligence, such as the Canadian Forces and Canada Border Services Agency, were not subject to independent review. Therefore, I ask this question. What is interesting is the judgments they make. For example, they made a judgment not to allow MP Galloway, but how did the Vice-President of Iran slip into the country? How did the minister of Gujarat, who is responsible for massacring 2,000 or more people, slip into the country? Where is this balancing act, and what lessons have they learned from the Maher Arar inquiry?

I'm asking you such a large question, but expecting your very short answer, I guess.

[Sheila Fraser]

Well, the answer will be fairly short because I'm really not able to answer that. That would have to be directed to government.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Ms. Ratansi.

Mr. Kramp, you have five minutes.

[Daryl Kramp, Conservative, Prince Edward—Hastings, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and welcome to all. It's sort of the good news, bad news.

I sat on this same committee after your 2004 report, and I'm going to refer in particular to the national security intelligence information sharing. It was just nothing short of an unmitigated disaster, almost a complete, total breakdown in communication. There was literally no information sharing for a wide variety of reasons, whether it was systems, institutional, just unwillingness, departmental priorities, or interdepartmental jealousies. Who knows? It was horrendous. This committee made very, very, very strong recommendations based on your findings. I'm very, very pleased to see there's progress.

Now, it's certainly not perfection yet, but there's significant progress. In your statement you mentioned that “Audits by nature focus on areas that need improvement”. It couldn't be better stated. You're pleased the government has made progress in most of the areas you visited. Well, this is classically one.

I see you've mentioned a number of problems that still exist where we need improvement, so I really think we should just start to buckle up and focus on some of these again. One in particular is that you mentioned the RCMP and Transport Canada have made unsatisfactory progress in sharing criminal intelligence information. Yet, of course, I've been informed that both Transport Canada and the RCMP are working on a memorandum of understanding to address this issue. Could you tell me if you have any information on that? Once it is signed, will it affect the security clearances that are involved in this?

[Sheila Fraser]

We do know they are working on this. I would like to say that I hope it will resolve the issue. But there was a memorandum that existed previously, and we can see that there are gaps in information sharing. Time will tell if the information is actually being shared to the degree that is required by, for example, the RCMP, so they are able to do the more extensive criminal checks.

[Daryl Kramp, Conservative, Prince Edward—Hastings, ON]

Right. Well, there are a number of spots. There's CSIS, DND, the RCMP, Transport Canada, and Canada Border Services Agency. They're all involved in this. Originally they didn't even speak the same language in communication. Now we're making some progress.

If we were to tackle this on a priority basis to try to solve this issue, give me your first, second, and third priorities in terms of how you think we should deal with this. Is it a system that doesn't speak the same language? Is it willingness? Is it a privacy concern, or is it a national security concern?

[Sheila Fraser]

I would say that there are probably two elements. Mr. McRoberts might want to elaborate as well.

One is the restraints and obstacles that have been reported to us, legal and otherwise, in privacy legislation, which people are claiming will preclude them from sharing information. The Department of Justice really needs to resolve those issues so as to be clear that there are legal obstacles. Then they have to be resolved, perhaps even through changes to certain legislation. Privacy concerns need to be addressed. Those obstacles to sharing information that people see need to be resolved.

The second one, I think, is the secure system they are working on so that they can exchange information. Systems don't solve all problems. We all know that. It's the people who put the information into the system. Hopefully, if the agencies and departments all agree to collaborate on this, that will send a signal, as well, that they should be sharing information.

[Daryl Kramp, Conservative, Prince Edward—Hastings, ON]

Do you sense a willingness to collaborate, and if not, where not?

[Sheila Fraser]

Time will tell. They still raise a number of obstacles. We haven't gone to assess how valid those obstacles are. That's the work of the Department of Justice. I think their review could be telling as to whether there really are a lot of legal obstacles, and I suspect there probably are. We know there are in certain legislation. However, I think, as well, that it's culture and attitudes too.

[Daryl Kramp, Conservative, Prince Edward—Hastings, ON]

Yes. There was some point when we started to work on this level of communication, in 2004-05, and we expected to see a deliberate response. Here we are now, almost five or six years later. Patience wears thin at some point.

[Sheila Fraser]

Things have got better. We note in the report that there have been a number of improvements. Members who were on the committee at the time will remember how inadequate the watch lists were, that stolen passports weren't on watch lists, and things like that. Those issues have been resolved. So there has been progress made over the last few years.

[Daryl Kramp, Conservative, Prince Edward—Hastings, ON]

I'm really pleased to see that, for a particular reason. Obviously we have a new Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Ms. Napolitano. With the passport situation dramatically improving, with new regulations as of June, they had to, quite frankly. Otherwise, we could have experienced some severe trade distortions. I'm really pleased that all the departments have recognized that and have moved forward.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Kramp.

Monsieur Desnoyers, you have five minutes, please.

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

I have one question, and then Ms. Faille will use the rest of my time.

Ms. Fraser, my question deals with national security as well. It seems worrisome that these entities do not speak to each other to resolve problems. I am thinking specifically of a situation at Dorval Airport dealing with a company that provided on-board meals. A number of criminals were arrested at the time. Everyone wondered how these individuals had been able to obtain authorized passes or important authorizations. I too wonder about the RCMP's response, in your report, indicating that it will continue to take steps. The RCMP has been taking steps for three, four, or five years. I wonder what we can do to settle this problem once and for all. They must stop invoking legal aspects and confidentiality. In the end, Canada is like a sieve the whole time.

[Sheila Fraser]

We note in the report that the RCMP occasionally receives incomplete information from Transport Canada, and this limits its ability to search various data bases. The RCMP can, of course, see if a person has a criminal record, but the RCMP is also trying to determine if the person is involved in organized crime. The difficulty stems from the fact that Transport Canada does not see its role as including the detection of criminal activity that may occur at airports or through airports, but rather as one to prevent illegal breaches of aircraft and threats to the well-being of passengers, in other words terrorism.

So this more limited definition of the role leaves holes. There may be people who have a criminal record but who do not represent a threat. The cases may go back a very long time and be related to something relatively minor or something that does not affect the reliability of the person who wants to work at an airport. Transport Canada has not defined that, but instead conducts case-by-case evaluations. So there need to be stricter criteria and the department needs to work more closely with the RCMP to try and prevent issuing passes to potentially dangerous people.

[Luc Desnoyers, Bloc, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you.