If I could comment, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the issue of how one plans for the expected and also how one is prepared for the unexpected, I think it is important to point out, as others have mentioned, that Canada is part of a number of collaborations. One that has been referred to is NAPPO, the North American Plant Protection Organization, which brings together the science expertise and capacities that exist with Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. We also participate actively in what is called the IPPC, the International Plant Protection Convention under the United Nations.
Within those activities, what we are attempting to do collectively is modelling. In other words, we're looking at the impact of temperature changes and changes in wind and current patterns and how those would affect the distribution of pests through natural means of entry, or through inadvertent ones. At the same time, there is sharing of information collectively with other countries who have similar concerns as Canada. Again, we participate in what's called the quadrilateral plant health group, which includes Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. So we're looking at hemispheric realities and how they are having an impact and the types of issues these countries are managing. We're also investing significantly in new science, particularly what's called foresight science.
Foresight science has been promoted very actively in Canada by a number of entities, including the Privy Council Office. It's the ability to look at the weak signals that exist and that can be interpreted in ways that try to figure out how they might coalesce into a circumstance, and what the results and consequence of that circumstance might be—social, economic, or trade-related. If that circumstance were a convergence that could happen in five, fifteen, or twenty years out in the future, we would do what is called backcasting. That is to say, with these multiple scenarios that could occur, what would we have to be doing five or ten years out to lead us to desired outcome, as opposed to the negative consequence outcome?
It's a new application of scientific principles that also obliges us, as the CFIA, with our counterparts, to be actively involved in looking at the curriculum that's being taught in agricultural colleges and various teaching institutions around the question of what are the skill sets we need for people who can apply that type of technology to give us a better predictive value. And also, beyond the point of predicting what may show up and what might be the pathway, it also tells us what our best strategy is to deal with something, should it get in, despite everybody's best efforts.
Again, it's not a situation of trying to respond to something after it's here and then figuring out how to deal with it, but in fact of knowing what the best defence for Canada would be, collaborating with the sectors that would be involved, whether it's horticulture or the wine industry, and the impact on grape-growing in certain regions of the country that are very sensitive—or it could be the forestry sector.
Those are the types of investments we are making to get the best models available to us that will give us an early indication of the types of plant pests, in terms of weeds, or other types of issues in terms of viruses, that could come in, and what would be the most logical way they could find their way into Canada.
The second point you raised was the issue of working with provincial counterparts. Again, what is critical about that relationship is getting that knowledge...which, again, is a question of looking at specific ecosystems within provinces that may be unique and have to be protected. It looks at the level of surveillance and the surveys provinces are doing, or the information systems they are picking up through their work, whether it's the ministry of natural resources, or information they're getting from industry, in terms of die-offs in certain parts of the forest. It's a matter of trying to determine quickly if it's a pest issue, or if it is related to some other ecosystem change that needs to be taken onboard in those areas where pests do find their way in despite everybody's best efforts. You certainly want to ensure that it's detected as early as possible to mitigate the level of economic harm that can derive from that.
The third point you raised was whether some of our regulatory decisions serve to be rather unpopular with certain segments, simply because we are a regulatory agency. I would answer back, certainly that can occur. I would use the specific example of the issue of a North American perimeter, which Paul referred to. Because the issue is about trying to ensure integrity within the North American reality, we take decisions that address issues, for example, of pests that may not have an impact directly in Canada but may have a huge impact on the U.S. citrus industry. Because of the integrated trade between our countries, it could find its way into Canada and then be introduced into the U.S. While we don't necessarily have a strong citrus country, it could affect other species besides citrus. Therefore, we're obliged to take action as part of perimeter security. Some people would say that disenfranchises their interest in terms of a nursery, or something else, because of the cross-species availability of that pest to affect the nursery; but that action is taken in a broad series of commodities in the best interest of maintaining a very important trade relationship with the U.S.
That would be an area where perhaps a regulatory science-based risk decision could be seen as impeding trade, that people might not necessarily support the rationale.
