If I understand the comments of counsel and the assistant deputy minister at the same time, it appears to be that how the Department of Justice gives advice determines the rights of this committee, that the parliamentary rights of this committee, as a matter of constitutional law, are governed by how the Department of Justice sees its role as a legal adviser.
Mr. Chairman, I just find that the two don't connect. Clearly, this committee has constitutional status. The law of parliamentary privilege is clearly part of the constitutional law of the country. These committees are entitled to receive the information they ask for. If the practice of a given department, whether a legal practice or administrative, can trump this committee in its access to information, then Parliament becomes a joke. It's that simple.
There is some misconception here on the part of our witnesses to think that the role of Justice, as adviser to the government, somehow takes priority over the rights of a parliamentary committee, which ostensibly and legally is serving the public interest in its pursuit of information. I simply have to speak, and I don't mean to be disrespectful to our witness, Mr. Chairman, but it really is that simple. This committee is a constitutional body.
The proposition was stated in the presentation that no provision of subsection 8(2) of the act applies. Now, even if we for a moment academically suppose the act applies here, which it doesn't, subsection 8(2) has a provision that allows for disclosure pursuant to an “order made by a court, person, or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information”. This body, on a report to the House, can compel production of information. This body, in my view, fits within paragraph 8(2)(c). We're not a court of law, and maybe the government officials are accustomed to thinking in terms of courts of law and their subpoenas and court orders. But this body, when it sends its report to the House with a report that its requirement for documents has been refused, can get an order of the House compelling production.
There cannot be any question about that, in my view, as a matter of law. I have to speak in these terms, not with any disrespect to my colleagues from the Department of Justice, but only because this is a point that comes up from time to time. There is unnecessary confusion about it. For example, this committee, not for the first time, is taking up time dealing with an issue in respect of which, in my view, there shouldn't be any confusion. The committee asks for information. It gets it.
The committee might think twice about some of the information it's asking for, but that is the committee's call. The committee might decide not to pursue certain information out of the interest of privacy. That is the committee's call. That is not the call of any official to tell the committee it can't have information because they think better of giving it to the committee. That is fundamental as a legal matter. I'm not speaking politically or entering a debate. I'm speaking legally. That is fundamental to the constitutional status of committees of the House, and of the House itself, of course.