Thank you, Mr. Chair.
In 2006, Kandahar had been largely untouched in terms of a strong, robust NATO-ISAF presence. The Canadian battle group, which later grew into a brigade minus, then arrived, and of course wherever we went, we found nests of the foe. Intense combat was routine, with asymmetric threat response specifically through mines and IEDs deliberately targeting those who are charged to protect the weak and innocent. In this case, it was Canadian soldiers who, speaking frankly, fought the good fight and literally risked their lives, and in some cases lost them in large numbers, doing that which their country expected them to do. It was lonely in Kandahar, because that was Canada's remit. For a long time, we weren't assisted by large numbers of other troops from other nations.
The urgency with which the operational requirements were identified almost always starts with a tragedy. Immediately afterwards, a bunch of military experts at my level gathered and determined what lessons we could learn from this tragedy. Is there an equipment acquisition that could actually help mitigate against it? Are there tactics or procedures that we can modify, keeping mind, of course, that the enemy always has a certain degree of initiative in initiating these tragedies?
The response between 2006 and now, of course, in my opinion, as the user, if you would, has been brilliant. There are a lot of hardworking folk in this town and elsewhere giving the soldiers the kit they need.
I don't know if that's a concise enough summary, sir. Perhaps I'll just leave it at that and see if you have any subsequent questions.