Public Accounts Committee on March 30th, 2010

[Sheila Fraser]

Mr. Chair, I will ask Mr. Berthelette to answer.

[Jerome Berthelette]

Mr. Chair, I will answer the member's question by putting forward the facts as I understand them and as I understand the way we tried to place them here in this audit.

The army had the Leopard 1 in theatre. It made a determination that because of the deficiencies--particularly with respect to mine resistance--it needed to replace the Leopard 1; that, plus the fact that it couldn't operate as effectively in the heat as they had hoped.

They made the decision to acquire a Leopard 2. When they started this process, in terms of the acquisition of the Leopard 2--the borrowing of the 20 tanks from Germany--they started out on the assumption that the Leopard 1 and the Leopard 2 were similar vehicles. Because they are called Leopards doesn't, as the department found out, make them the same vehicle. There has been an evolution in terms of the construction of the vehicle, and the old Leopard and the new Leopard are fundamentally different vehicles.

The new Leopard was brought into theatre, and as we point out, it had some initial problems that have been resolved. It is actually being used by the army for operations in theatre and is providing the direct fire support that the army requires.

I think I've answered the member's question, but I'd just ask if there was something else I may have forgotten in terms of a response.

Oh yes. The Leopard 1s are being maintained in theatre because of the dozer plows and blades that are required. When we were in theatre we saw the Leopard 2. It had the mine plow and the mine rollers--it's equipped now with the mine rollers--but the department, the forces, still need the mine plows and blades, as I understand it. So the Leopard 1s are being kept in order to provide that support to the troops in theatre. As I understand it--I stand to be corrected, of course--the two are working together in Afghanistan to provide the full range of protection that is required.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Berthelette.

Because we are running out of time, I have to move on to Mr. Dreeshen for five minutes.

[Earl Dreeshen, Conservative, Red Deer, AB]

Thank you very much. I really look forward to this opportunity to meet with all of you here today. This is my first time on the public accounts committee, and I'm certainly looking forward to learning about the whole process. Certainly to have the opportunity to be able to discuss some of the issues with the Department of National Defence is truly an honour for me.

This last summer I was in Wainwright. I had an opportunity to be with our troops and to meet General Leslie.

I know one of the things that seemed significant to me is the type of training we actually have. I would like to ask him if perhaps he could explain some of the differences between the training that is in theatre and what we would have here at home. What kinds of costs are associated with trying to make sure those training programs are effective?

[LGen A. Leslie]

Sir, great soldiers, great training, and great equipment give the Government of Canada great choices with which to employ its army, be it at home or abroad.

We've been talking about equipment. Of course, that equipment is just so much metal until such time as you get the proper instructional techniques, the tactics, the lessons learned from theatre, and the young soldiers themselves using that equipment so they can get out and do that which they have to do.

I'm responsible for the training of the Canadian army. There are hundreds, indeed thousands, of people who are part of this cycle. They get all of the credit--and indeed the acclaim--that is being directed towards the standard of training on which our allies have commented. So I would argue--I think relatively logically and not just because of an emotional link to the Canadian army--that we are the best trained army in the world.

Having said that, this training is expensive, but our training is not the most expensive in the world. To prepare a force of roughly 3,000 soldiers to do what we're now doing in Afghanistan is somewhere in the order of $100 million. That is an all-up; it's not a precise number, and it sounds like and is a great deal of money. It covers a six or twelve-month period, depending on the skill sets. But think of the instructional requirements, the transportation of the soldiers and equipment to wherever they're going to conduct the training, the ammunition that has to be fired to prevent the tragedy of fratricide. Take the fuel consumed, the spare bits for the vehicles, the depreciation of the same equipment fleets, and then you subdivide it by the number of soldiers in a year--6,000 of whom we send into harm's way--and it's actually not a lot of money.

Does that answer your question?

[Earl Dreeshen, Conservative, Red Deer, AB]

Absolutely. Another thing we can all be heartened by--from speaking to some of those in Wainwright--is our engineering crews. When they look at a problem they can look at all aspects of it, whereas some of the Americans are specialized in only certain areas. This is really a credit to the overall training and types of individuals we have.

I have just one other question. I understand that defence procurement involves this interaction and collaboration of multiple government departments. Can you explain to the committee how DND is working to improve communication and coordination with these other government departments?

[Robert Fonberg]

I will give a very quick opening statement on that, and then Treasury Board may want to speak to this, because a project was running under Treasury Board--and now with Public Works--on streamlining military procurement.

You have heard a number of comments about the integrated nature of the teams, efforts to streamline processes around urgent operational requirements, the dialogue that takes place around major capital projects on a monthly basis, and the embedding of Public Works officials in the DND process much earlier in the process than in the past. So we are always looking at ways to streamline the process and take inefficiencies and time out of it wherever possible, while making sure that we deliver on our accountabilities.

I don't know if my colleagues would like to make any other comments on that.

[John Ossowski]

Sure, I can add to that particular question.

One of the things that is happening in parallel with the discussion we're having this morning is that the department is developing its investment plan. It's a new policy that Treasury Board approved in June 2007. It's basically a high-level strategic document essentially replacing the long-term capital plan as a document that links with the department's strategic planning--in this case the Canada First defence strategy. It's aligned with the high-level outcomes the department is trying to achieve. And the documents in particular, the Auditor General noticed, were absent. In this instance the project profile risk assessments are built in up front.

In the case of National Defence, their investment plan was approved by Treasury Board ministers last year with around eight projects in it. Each project was evaluated on its inherent risk. We also evaluated the department's ability to manage risk--to emphasize the point I made earlier around risk. So we're moving away from the sort of time-consuming preliminary project approval and effective project approval stages. We're doing a lot of up-front work now to ensure that we have a good handle on how the risk is being managed, that the costs are going to be contained appropriately, and that the appropriate mitigation strategies are in place for scope, budget, and whatever else may actually happen.

That's our contribution to streamlining the approval process. That means as long as they're managing a project that's within their risk management capability, they don't have to come back to Treasury Board for approval. There are still some that do because ministers have expressed an interest in them, but by far the large part now will no longer come back. They will still have to go through the contracting approval process, and we'll continue to work in that vein. But the project planning part is being managed in a completely different fashion now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Dreeshen.

Mr. Paillé, you have a point to make. I'm going to allow you one minute, because I have to shut this meeting down. There's another committee coming at 11 o'clock.

Mr. Paillé.

[Pascal-Pierre Paillé, Bloc, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I too am going to a committee meeting in another building. I will therefore dive right in.

Thank you for coming and I apologize in advance for ending on a less positive note. In light of what I have observed, I am quite concerned. I see that we are still—and I am saying “we” because it is the responsibility of all of government—behind and always reacting to problems that occur.

With regard to various comments made by Lieutenant-General Leslie, starting in 2006, when Canada assumed command in southern Afghanistan and replaced the United States, we perhaps changed the mission. I want to state that, initially, the Bloc Québécois supported the mission in Afghanistan when it was a humanitarian and reconstruction mission.

It was when the mission changed and instead became an armed and military mission, that there were problems. I would like to ask you the following question.

Do you agree with me that, starting mainly in 2006, without saying that the Canadian armed forces were poorly equipped, they were not adequately equipped to undertake the Afghan mission that the government deliberately changed?

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

The question, I find, is outside of the scope of the Auditor General. If the deputy minister wants to give a very brief, 10-second comment....

[Robert Fonberg]

No, thank you, Mr. Chair. I have no comment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Christopherson, you have 30 seconds.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair. I appreciate that.

The Auditor General mentioned that there was a discrepancy between the reason that was submitted to Treasury Board for the purchase and the analysis that was done by the army. They were different. No one has yet explained why that was. Would someone quickly do so, please?

Why did you say that the reason was one thing to Treasury Board, I think, and when the Auditor General checked the analysis of the army itself in terms of what was used to form that recommendation, it was different. Help me understand the two.

[Dan Ross]

All I can say is that there was a large number of views and analysis done, much of it by fairly junior ranking officers. There were thousands of briefing notes and e-mails, and so on. The committee that I chair weekly did not bring diverging views of analysis to me and to General Tremblay from the army staff and the senior officer of CEFCOM to say there should be some other solution halfway through or a different way to go on the LAV RWS. It was a volatile period. People had their views and sometimes expressed them strongly. Obviously that's all on the record. We had to look at all of those, and fairly, I think, the Office of the Auditor General did look at all of those views.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Christopherson.

That concludes the first and second round.

I'm going to ask now whether any of the witnesses have any closing comments before we adjourn.

Madam Fraser, do you have anything to say?

[Sheila Fraser]

Chair, I would just like to thank the committee for its interest in this report. We are pleased that the departments have accepted the recommendations and that they have prepared action plans that we believe will address the issues we've raised.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Fonberg, do you have any final comments?

[Robert Fonberg]

I'd actually like to take about 30 seconds, Mr. Chair, if I could.

I'd like to come back to comments articulated by a number of members, but probably most clearly by Mr. Christopherson in what were, in some ways, charitable comments about the process and the commitment of public servants. His comments actually speak to the integrity of the process, the integrity of the public servants. His comments about Hugh McRoberts, who has always been very open to our dialogue, works within a tone that clearly is established by the Auditor General herself, but I will interpret the member's comments as applying to those public servants who have given their family time and given up their weekends and nights to make sure that the Canadian Forces have been able to get the equipment they needed.

So I thank you very much for those comments, sir.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Fonberg.

Mr. Guimont, do you have any final comments?

[François Guimont]

No comment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Ossowski?

Just before I adjourn, I want to echo a lot of the comments that were made here today, and perhaps directly to you, Lieutenant-General Leslie. I want you to take the thanks and the gratitude of all members of this committee and please convey them to all the Canadian Forces members under you.

Thank you very much.

[LGen A. Leslie]

I'd be honoured, sir.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Also I'd be remiss if I didn't take a moment to thank Mr. McRoberts for his dedication. Just for clarification, he is going to another assignment within the Auditor General's office, but he will be retiring within a year and this is his last of many appearances before this committee. Certainly his work has always been professional and he has been of tremendous assistance to this committee.

So, Mr. McRoberts, on behalf of everyone on the committee and everyone in Parliament, I want to thank you very much for all your assistance.

[Applause]

[Hugh McRoberts, Assistant Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General of Canada]

Thank you very much.