Basically, Parliament gets to oversee and set a limit for each of these votes. So if you set a limit on the capital vote, then presumably that is a budget you want to oversee to make sure it isn't exceeded. If the practice is such that some expenditures can go either way, then it makes it difficult for you to oversee whether that particular limit is being observed.
The framework was set in place back in about 1992. It is about time to take a look at it.
In the first instance, this $5 million mark was set some time ago. Some departments we notice actually have major expenditures that are over $5 million, but because they don't have a capital vote they can't charge to a separate vote. That oversight mechanism isn't there when in fact they would have a lot of expenditures that might be over the $5 million mark.
The other thing is that this concept of minor capital, which allows departments to charge capital-type expenditures to an operating vote, is basically allowing each department to set their own limit. What we saw was that in one case, for example, the limit was pretty high, so expenditure of over $1 million is when it needs to be charged to the capital vote. But some expenditures under $1 million are still capital in nature, arguably, but they would not necessarily go in the direction of the capital vote.
In another department we noticed that there is no limit set whatsoever, so it's almost like a case-by-case basis. That means there is inconsistent application between departments and agencies. It was something we discussed last year with the Office of the Comptroller General, and the Comptroller General's office is in agreement with us that that inconsistency needs to be looked at as well.
Those are the kinds of issues we're trying to underscore to make the vote structure and Parliament's vote authority oversight work better.