Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to discuss our fall 2018 report on physical security at Canada's missions abroad. This audit examined whether Global Affairs Canada had physical security measures in place at its missions for the effective protection of its staff and assets.
Physical security measures include safeguards such as fences, and vehicle barriers or alarm systems to prevent unauthorized access or attempts to cause harm. As an employer, the department is responsible for the safety and security of its staff. More than half the mission's staff members work in dangerous locations that require protective security measures.
Overall, we found that Global Affairs Canada had not kept pace with evolving security threats at its missions abroad. Over the past decade, the department received $650 million to upgrade the physical security of its higher-threat missions. We found insufficient documentation to demonstrate how its physical security projects were prioritized to ensure that the most critical needs would be met. The department had identified more than 200 security measures that were urgently needed across all its missions, but it did not yet have a plan in place for their implementation.
We found weaknesses in the security assessments conducted by Global Affairs Canada at its missions. For example, more than one-third of threat assessments were out of date and many of the vulnerability assessments were incomplete or failed to recommend safeguards to resolve identified weaknesses. In fact, baseline security standards that specified the safeguards needed to protect missions against direct physical attack were still under development at the time of our audit.
Without these standards, Global Affairs Canada cannot comprehensively assess the measures needed for the effective protection of staff and assets across its missions, yet the department is responsible for the safety of its staff working at missions abroad, and security upgrades to its many missions are urgently needed.
We examined the security measures in place at six high-risk missions and found significant security deficiencies at all six. The department had known about several of these deficiencies for years, yet it had not put in place all the recommended measures to resolve them, such as improved video surveillance, alarms or vehicle barriers.
Security officials at these missions didn't know the status of the approved physical security upgrades or what interim measures were needed to mitigate the identified security risks. Most of the department's capital projects to upgrade security were at least three years behind schedule and were taking almost twice as long to complete as originally planned. We found that these delays were caused by weaknesses in the department's project management and oversight. For example, construction project plans didn't sufficiently assess and build into the schedule the risks unique to the host country, such as the time needed to obtain permits.
Other federal entities, such as Defence Construction Canada, have specialized knowledge and experience in international construction projects that could help Global Affairs Canada ensure that important security upgrades are delivered on time and on budget.
Finally, we found that more than one third of the staff members working in some of the most dangerous locations hadn't taken mandatory security awareness training. As a result, Global Affairs Canada didn't have assurance that its staff members had the appropriate level of security awareness needed for their effective protection. We made five recommendations, and Global Affairs Canada agreed with all of them.
This concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.
Thank you.