I'll start with a recap of the report to highlight the four areas where we noted the Public Health Agency of Canada was not as prepared as it could have been. Then, I'll talk about measures the agency can take.
We noted that the agency should have been better prepared in four areas.
First, the emergency and health response plans were not updated. What is even more concerning is that the federal-provincial-territorial public health response plan for biological events had not been tested.
Second, we noted long-standing gaps in public health data sharing between the federal government and the provinces and territories.
Third, we noted that a risk assessment tool had not been designed to consider pandemic risk.
Fourth, the agency had neither contemplated nor planned for quarantine on a nationwide scale.
After the SARS and H1N1 influenza outbreaks, as well as Auditor General reports released in 1999, 2002 and 2008, the agency was aware of long-standing shortcomings that it needed to address. That shows the agency placed little value on, and did not pay enough attention to, preparing for emergencies, investing in appropriate systems and taking the time to adequately test plans for deficiencies. The importance of those efforts is underestimated until a new emergency arises.
Now is the time to focus on those areas on a nationwide scale. To ensure it is adequately prepared, the agency must take into account all aspects of the response to a national health crisis and not wait for another to arise before taking action.
It is worth noting that public servants worked very hard. They responded and did their best to fill the gaps. Nevertheless, the agency needs to be better prepared for the next crisis.