Public Accounts Committee on May 6th, 2021

[The Chair, Conservative, Kelly Block]

Thank you very much, Mr. Blois.

We will now go to Mr. Blanchette-Joncas for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to begin by acknowledging all of the witnesses here today.

My first question is for Ms. Hogan.

Ms. Hogan, it is a pleasure to see you again today.

There are precisely 75 railway companies in Canada. Their role under the Railway Safety Act is to ensure the safety of their own operations. Yet, as we read your report, we find that the railroads are not able to fulfill their responsibilities and ensure that the railroads are safer. While Transport Canada has stated that there is more monitoring activity, it cannot demonstrate whether there is an improvement in rail safety.

You are certainly getting to know me, Ms. Hogan. I made it a point to review the history of the Railway Safety Act. I found that the Railway Safety Management System Regulations were not created several years ago, but in 2001. So since 2001, railroads have been responsible for implementing their own systems of field audits by federal inspectors.

During the preparation of your report, did you obtain any data that might have shown a correlation between the changes made by the various governments, this deregulation, frankly, and the disastrous rail safety situation that we currently have?

[Karen Hogan]

You are correct that railroads are responsible for their own safety. However, I would like to mention that safety is really a partnership issue. The railroads are partly responsible, but Transport Canada also plays a very important oversight role. It sets the regulations and does more monitoring of the railroads. Their combined roles work well to improve safety.

As part of our audit, we did not examine whether there was a correlation between the regulatory changes and the current situation. Instead, we looked at Transport Canada's operations. When time, effort and energy are invested, it is very reasonable to expect that the investment will pay off. This final step is extremely important in determining whether the efforts are in the right place, adequately targeted at risk, and effective.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thanks for the clarifications, Ms. Hogan.

I tried to review the history, to understand when the situation had changed. From my observations, it is really since the change in 2001, in terms of regulation, that there has been a decrease in audits. That change in policy has created some consequences that we can see today.

In reading your report, I note that Transport Canada does not provide enough detailed guidance to the railroads at this time. In addition, Transport Canada's senior management has been provided with incomplete information regarding the results of monitoring activities, when they would normally make informed decisions.

I would like your opinion on the following reasoning. The railroads, although it is their responsibility, are unable to maintain the entire infrastructure. Transport Canada, on the other hand, only manages to make minimal improvements, as you have pointed out. Faced with this state of affairs, even if we draw up a new action plan and you produce a new report in a few years, it will not be enough. What would it take to really change the situation, in your opinion?

[Karen Hogan]

You raised a few points.

I'll start with your question about the data that Transport Canada receives from the rail companies. We found that the department took the appropriate steps to gather more information. The next step is to provide more guidance to rail companies so that Transport Canada can collect the data in a timely and consistent manner and obtain all the information needed to make the right decisions about locations that require inspection and about safety management systems that require verification. I often raise the issue of data quality. We need to make sure that the department is receiving good data and then using the data appropriately. This would improve Transport Canada's approach to inspections and audits, since it could better target the risks.

The department should also properly use the results of audits on safety management systems in order to make more informed decisions regarding inspections. Transport Canada has the necessary tools, but must learn to use them more appropriately to improve the effectiveness of its oversight.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

I completely agree with you, Ms. Hogan. The department has the necessary tools. In addition, your office prepared an audit report in 2013 and submitted recommendations to the department, which the department accepted. Unfortunately, the recommendations haven't been implemented.

Even though reports are prepared every five years, it seems that nothing happens in the meantime. Unfortunately, human tragedies occur. There were 47 deaths in Lac-Mégantic. I'm thinking in particular about my colleague, Mr. Berthold, who must live with the consequences on a daily basis alongside the people in his constituency.

There's a game plan, but it isn't adhered to. We keep coming back to it every year. What more can we do right now?

[Karen Hogan]

Rail safety is important to our office and to the office of the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development. As you know, in October, the interim commissioner also tabled a report on the transportation of dangerous goods. Our office will continue to follow up.

That said, I encourage the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts to follow up on the reports and recommendations that fall within their purview. In June 2014, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts submitted a recommendation to Transport Canada. Increased monitoring by everyone would improve safety.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kelly Block]

Thank you very much.

We will move on to Mr. Bachrach for six minutes.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I had a chance to ask some questions of Ms. Hogan at a previous meeting of the transport committee, so I'll be directing my questions today to Mr. Keenan.

My first question is around the pattern we are seeing. At a recent committee meeting, we were looking at an audit of pandemic preparedness, and what we saw was that an audit that was done several years ago pointed out a bunch of shortcomings and made a bunch of recommendations. The agency, PHAC, agreed with all the recommendations and committed to implementing them. Years went by. There was a follow-up audit. The recommendations weren't implemented.

Here we see a major disaster affecting a community in a profound way, because 47 people died. We see an audit that made a number of recommendations. I think the whole country was looking to the federal government to do everything in its power to correct the deficiencies that allowed that disaster to occur. Years go by, eight years. We have a follow-up audit, and the recommendations weren't implemented.

Mr. Keenan, I'm wondering if the Canadian public should be satisfied with that response and in general with this pattern of not implementing the recommendations that are made by the Office of the Auditor General.

[Michael Keenan]

Thank you for the question.

I think that in this case there is a very clear pattern of significant and major improvements in the rail safety system and the oversight. Those significant improvements have actually been noted by the Auditor General in the follow-up audit.

The Auditor General also pointed out where there is more work to do, and we agree with that.

As a world-class regulator, we're always committed to keep driving towards zero on this, so in terms of the improvements and the actions taken in response to the 2013 audit, I would point out that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of inspections.

In terms of the recommendation to better focus oversight on high risk, we actually went from a random inspection system to a risk-based one, based on data and analysis of risks.

In terms of strengthening the safety management system, we completely overhauled the regulations for safety management systems, and we went from doing four audits of SMS programs per year to 25.

In a systemic way, from the oversight to the safety standards, there has been a significant improvement in the rail safety system. Outside observers have noted this significant improvement. For example, as the independent Railway Safety Act Review Panel reported in 2018, “The safety of the rail system has improved in the last 5 to 10 years.... Due to a sustained focus on inspections, compliance and enforcement, as well as technological improvements and investments in rail infrastructure”—

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Keenan, just on account of time, I'm going to have to move on to my next question.

I acknowledge that progress has been made, and the Auditor General pointed that out in her audit. The question was about the fact that there were things the Auditor General pointed out that weren't done. I think the Canadian public would expect that all recommendations would be implemented, especially over an eight-year period.

I'd like to move on to the safety management systems themselves. This was a large part of the audit. I've been speaking with the rail companies. This is an issue that is of serious concern, not only for the community I live in but for communities up and down the railroad in northwestern British Columbia.

Maybe I'll start with a question around response plans, because I think that when we think of safety management systems, we mostly think about preventive measures—behaviours and actions that prevent bad things from happening. My understanding—and you can correct me if I'm wrong—is that safety management systems also include response plans in the case that things do go wrong.

Of particular interest, given the increase in dangerous goods being transported through our region, is the risk of something similar to Lac-Mégantic happening in one of our rail yards, where we have multiple cars of extremely volatile products like liquid propane parked on the tracks.

When I was speaking with the rail companies, they told me that first of all they rely on first responders, mostly volunteer fire fighters in small communities, to respond to these events. They provide training, but they only work on scenarios involving single-car events.

In your view, given Lac-Mégantic, given these multi-car events that have tragic consequences, should the safety management systems have response plans for events involving multiple cars? In your experience and based on your knowledge, is that a risk that communities should be concerned about when it comes to products like liquid propane, and is the current approach that the rail companies are taking adequate?

[Michael Keenan]

Thank you for the question. There are a lot of questions there.

I'll do two really quickly, and then I'll turn the third one over to my colleague Mr. DeJong.

On the first one, Transport Canada took significant action on all of the recommendations in the 2013 report, and I am happy to elaborate later.

On the second one, the rail safety system is vastly improved today relative to what we had before the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, so the risk profile is completely different and much lower today.

On your third question, with respect to scenarios and response plans as they fit into SMS, I'm going to turn it over to Michael.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kelly Block]

That will have to be a very short answer.

[Michael DeJong, Director General, Rail Safety, Department of Transport]

Thank you for the question.

I would simply point out that with respect to our oversight regime in that northern B.C. corridor, we're taking a number of active measures to address the risks that have been identified, including front-ending a number of our inspections in that area, as well as noting to the company that their corridor falls under the definition of “key trains and key routes”, which involves reduced speed limits as well as requirements for increased track inspections.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kelly Block]

Thank you very much.

We will now go to our next round of questioning. It's a five-minute round. We will be starting with Mr. Berthold for five minutes.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Hogan and Mr. Keenan, I'm pleased that you and your colleagues are here today.

I think that it's important to set the record straight.

Recently, I heard the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport speak about the 2013 audit. You also referred to this audit in your opening remarks, Mr. Keenan. You said that the Auditor General's initial audit in 2013 was carried out in the context of a terrible tragedy. Unfortunately, you and the parliamentary secretary are totally wrong.

The 2013 audit states as follows: “Our report is not an inquiry into this tragic event or an investigation of how it happened or of other subsequent rail accidents.” The audit work was completed on June 28, 2013, prior to the tragedy on July 6, 2013. I find it inconceivable that the 2013 tragedy would be used in a presentation such as yours. All the recommendations made by the Auditor General at that time concerned events that occurred before the 2013 tragedy.

I want you to explain why you referred to the 2013 tragedy in order to talk about the audit in your opening remarks, when that audit specifically states that the report doesn't address the tragedy at all.

[Michael Keenan]

Thank you for the question.

I apologize if I actually created a false impression on the relationship between the Auditor General's report and the terrible tragedy of Lac-Mégantic. The fundamental reality is that it was a terrible tragedy, and it showed, dramatically, weaknesses in the rail safety system. There has been a tremendous amount of work over the years to strengthen the rail safety system in an effort to ensure that such a terrible tragedy doesn't happen again. There is a causal relationship. I may not have described the timing exactly right in my opening remarks, and for that I apologize.

It is our assessment that there were serious problems in the rail safety system that we've been working years to improve upon. Searching for risk factors and using a data-driven system to find risk factors to preclude the possibility of such a tragedy happening again is a top priority for Transport Canada.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Keenan.

It would be important for the briefing notes that Transport Canada provides to the Parliamentary Secretary to set the record straight, so that people stop linking the 2013 study to the tragedy. The study was done before the tragedy occurred. It doesn't make sense to link the two and pretend that the 2013 recommendations were in response to the tragedy, because they were not, and the study explicitly states that. It's important to get the facts straight. There is the pre-tragedy and the post-tragedy. We would have expected that after the tragedy, the recommendations of the 2013 audit would have been followed and the process would have been accelerated.

I would like to come back to the following response by Transport Canada to one of the recommendations of the 2013 audit: “By spring 2014, Transport Canada will develop a follow-up procedure and provide all inspectors with training on the procedure to enhance the consistency of follow-up activity.”

“Consistency” means that the same follow-up and the same category of information applies to all regions. One of the findings of your last report, Ms. Hogan, is that there is still no consistency between the various follow-ups.

[Karen Hogan]

Is the question for me?

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Yes.

[Karen Hogan]

In terms of consistency, you've articulated well the finding we made in the audit. Consistency is great. We always have to adjust based on risk, but we need to make sure that monitoring and inspection are done consistently so that nothing is missed.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Keenan, as I mentioned, there is the pre-tragedy and the post-tragedy. We would have expected Transport Canada to give priority to that kind of recommendation. Why is the Auditor General still making the same recommendation in 2021?

[Michael Keenan]

I think we're—

[The Chair, Conservative, Kelly Block]

Give a very short answer, Mr. Keenan.

[Michael Keenan]

I think you're seeing that the follow-up audit recognized the progress that Transport Canada had made and asked us to take further steps in building a risk-based oversight program. We're doing a better job of aligning our resources and our actions to safety outcomes, and we are executing those follow-up recommendations as we speak.