Public Safety Committee on Oct. 26th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I call this meeting to order.

This is the sixteenth meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and today we are having a meeting in regard to Bill C-12, An Act to provide for emergency management and to amend and repeal certain Acts.

We would like to welcome our witnesses from the Canadian Electricity Association. I believe the leader of the delegation is Mr. Francis Bradley, and he is the vice-president of corporate resources.

We welcome you and the people who are with you, sir. I will allow you to make an opening statement. You can introduce your colleagues, and if any of them have any comments or statements, they can make them as well.

Normally we allow ten minutes, sir, but if you need more time, you may take more, as you are the only witnesses today. After you are done, our procedure is usually to go to the government side first, then the official opposition Liberals, and then we'll go back over to the government side to conclude the first round of questioning, which consists of seven-minute turns.

Again, welcome. We look forward to the testimony that you have for us. You may begin.

[Francis Bradley, Vice-President, Corporate Resources, Canadian Electricity Association]

Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.

Thank you for this opportunity to meet with you to discuss Bill C-12 and to inform you about the viewpoint of the members of the Canadian electricity sector.

My name is Francis Bradley. I am Vice-President of the Canadian Electricity Association, which represents all electricity-related areas of activity in Canada, including production, transportation, distribution, customer service and electric energy marketing.

I'm responsible for the association's critical infrastructure protection activities, or CIP program, which was launched in January 2000.

The chairman of our CIP working group, Dave Baumken, from Hydro One, was unable to join us today. He's actually in Germany representing Canada at a NATO event, but he asked that I convey his greetings to the committee and offer, on behalf of CEA, to provide a subsequent briefing to the committee on the security of the electricity sector, at the committee's convenience.

With me today are the persons responsible for the security activities of three of the largest electricity businesses in the country.

Chris Price is with Hydro One, the Ontario transmission and distribution company. Jim Davis is with Ontario Power Generation, the largest power generation company in this province, with hydro, thermal, and nuclear generating facilities.

Jean-Guy Ouimet represents Hydro-Quebec, the main producer, transporter and distributor of electricity in Quebec. Mr. Ouimet is also the chair of our task force.

Following my introduction, we'll be pleased to discuss our views on Bill C-12 and on the challenge of protecting the electricity industry in Canada.

Our critical infrastructure protection initiative looks at both physical and cyber threats and events. It takes an all-hazards approach, and it includes work on such diverse issues as pandemic planning and marijuana grow ops.

Given the interconnected nature or electricity in North America, we work closely with the North American Electric Reliability Council, the NERC. In fact, a Canadian, Stuart Brindley, of Ontario's Independent Electricity System Operator, is the chair of the NERC CIP committee, and he's a former chair of our group.

The regulatory framework of Canada's electricity industry is different from that in the United States.

In the U.S., the federal administration holds essential authority for regulating this industry. In Canada, it's the provinces that have most of the powers in this area. It goes without saying that this aspect has at times made our security activities more complex, requiring coordination between federal and provincial authorities and between federal departments.

In addition to our North American activities through the North American Electric Reliability Council, we also collaborate with other sectors in Canada and with a wide range of government officials at Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Natural Resources Canada, the RCMP, and CSIS, to name a few.

The association launched its CIP initiative following the Y2K transition. While Y2K was seen by many to be a non-event, we learned a great deal during the transition, most particularly about infrastructure interdependencies and the importance of information sharing.

During the Y2K transition, the federal government's activities were coordinated through the National Contingency Planning Group. The NCPG played a critical role in engaging all infrastructure sectors and providing analysis of the interdependencies between the various sectors. Their analytical work was subsequently captured in a March 2000 report entitled “Canadian Infrastructure Interdependencies”. I highly recommend it to the committee, as it left no doubt as to the importance of electricity.

Electricity is the original and ultimate example of just-in-time manufacturing. It cannot be stockpiled in large quantities like other commodities.

From the moment someone switches on a light or boots up his computer, the additional electricity that action requires must immediately be available at a power station that may be located hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away.

The importance of electricity to the economy was detailed in a discussion paper published by PSEPC that reviewed the 2003 blackout. Permit me a moment to quote from that NCIAP discussion paper, which came out in November of 2004: The August 2003 blackout provided an object lesson in infrastructure interdependencies by demonstrating how a disruption in one infrastructure can cascade across others. This was the largest blackout ever in North America, leaving 50 million people from New York to Toronto without power for up to two days. Ontario's public health infrastructure was stressed due to hospitals operating on emergency generators. Food and water supplies were put at risk. Grocery stores were forced to discard thousands of dollars worth of food and water treatment plants operated on emergency power. Thousands of Ontarians felt a cash crunch due to closed banks and disabled bank and debit machines. Transportation and commuting were disrupted when gas stations were unable to pump gasoline (pumps require electricity to be able to operate). Flights were cancelled at both international airports in Ontario (Toronto and Ottawa). An extraordinary volume of calls created tremendous backlogs on 911 systems, and cellular transmitter stations failed when their battery back-up power was exhausted.

Given the importance that electricity plays in our economy, CEA began engaging the federal government on CIP early in 2000, initially through the federal government's CIP task force; subsequently with the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, OCIPEP; and then with Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, PSEPC. We've worked cooperatively with governments and government officials on a wide range of initiatives over the past six years, from providing input on policy matters to developing scenarios for and participating in tabletop exercises.

However, from the start of this relationship, our most urgent concern has been the issue of an effective information sharing framework.

According to the assessments that the government itself has conducted, the private sector owns and operates 85 percent of the essential infrastructure. It is mainly responsible for protecting its own property.

An effective two-way movement of information between the private sector and government is essential to our success.

The importance of protecting industry-provided information has been acknowledged by the Department of Homeland Security in the United States. Through their protected critical infrastructure information program, they have recognized that they need to work with the private sector and provide protection for information.

Even if an information sharing framework requires much more than mere protection of the information that the industry provides to government, we consider protection the basis of a relationship of trust between these two partners.

The protection accorded to information provided by industry to government in Bill C-12 will allow for a far greater depth of collaboration. We believe that it will greatly enhance the partnership that already exists between industry and the Government of Canada, and that it is the backbone of a much bigger relationship.

It's been said that there's a wealth of information available in the public domain about the vulnerabilities of our sector. This may have been true once, but no longer is that the case. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the industry moved rapidly to remove information from the public domain that could compromise the safety and security of systems, and in 2002 we began adhering to a North America-wide standard for protecting potentially sensitive information.

Industry has information that cannot be shared without the protection provided for in Bill C-12, and we believe that it would benefit PSEPC as well as federal security, intelligence, and law enforcement to be able to access this information in the planning and execution of infrastructure protection activities or law enforcement activities, which, if not implemented appropriately, could lead to unnecessary threats against the electricity sector.

For things to be this way, a complete information sharing framework is still necessary. Protecting information is the first important step.

To sum up, we feel that the bill strikes a fair and prudent balance between the public's right to information and the imperative of ensuring the protection of the electricity industry, this central infrastructure essential to everyone.

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. My colleagues and I would be happy to discuss Bill C-12 or other CIP matters with you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much. We appreciate that.

I will begin with the Liberal Party. Mr. Holland, please, for seven minutes.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

First of all, thank you to the witnesses for coming today and taking the time to speak to our committee with respect to Bill C-12.

I am going to start with some issues on which I have concern and on which I would be interested in your perspective, and then move to some things you might be suggesting.

Obviously you're quite right, after 2003 and the blackout people understand just how critical a resource electricity is and how essential it is and the devastating impact it can have when there are disruptions.

I am going to draw from my experience, and certainly both Hydro One and Ontario Power Generation, and perhaps all of you, can relate to the important role that municipalities play when these problems occur. For example, if there's a situation in Pickering with the plant, some of the first communications are between the municipality and the station as well as with the local Veridian Corporation, which I was on the board of directors of, and with local utility operators, distributors.

My concern is that this bill doesn't really address municipalities or bring them to the table at all. I am wondering what your thoughts are on that and how you think that might be addressed. Do you think they should be at the table as part of this process? There's barely a reference to them in the bill. Do you think they should be partners at the table and taking part in the broader discussions around emergency planning, when they are, in many cases, the first responders and the people who you would be dealing with right away as well?

[Francis Bradley]

I would imagine my colleagues from Ontario would want to reflect on that in their particular circumstances. Certainly in any situation in which our members have been involved, you're quite right, the critical delivery mechanism is often at the municipal level.

Perhaps either Mr. Davis or Mr. Price can talk about the specific circumstances in Ontario and working with EMO.

[Jim Davis, Director, Corporate Security, Ontario Power Generation, Canadian Electricity Association]

I would like to respond to that.

In fact, we do work very closely with municipalities. This bill will go a long way in allowing us to work even closer with everybody across the country. We have an excellent working relationship currently with intelligence and policing agencies right across the province of Ontario, and as I said, we have an excellent working relationship with municipalities.

I don't foresee there being a major problem in continuing that working relationship.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I guess the question I'm driving at is, when emergency management is being planned and there's talk about whether or not there are adequate resources and adequate ability to respond to emergencies as they develop, would it make sense in your minds to include municipalities at the table in the discussions, more than just in a cursory hope that the provinces get in touch with them and let them know what's going on, but actually including them formally in this process and allowing them representation at the table?

[Jim Davis]

I think cooperation with all players is important. Unfortunately, I would have to leave the answer to that question to people senior to me. My position is specifically around the security area, and I really don't want to comment in areas outside of my expertise.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

That's fair.

On the consultation leading up to the development of this bill, Bill C-12, can you just describe to me how the government engaged you on the bill and what consultation you participated in?

[Francis Bradley]

Certainly. We have actually been consulted fairly extensively in the development of this. As I mentioned, it's an issue generally that we raised, likely first in the first meeting we had with the CIP task force all the way back in March 2000. It's an issue we raised subsequently in 2001 and 2002, both in face-to-face meetings and in correspondence we had with the head of the CIP task force and then subsequently the deputy minister.

We have participated, as I've said, in a number of meetings, and prior to this current incarnation of the bill—I believe it was first introduced as Bill C-78, if my memory serves me correctly—we were consulted in the months leading up to the introduction of Bill C-78. In fact, we were also briefed on the afternoon Bill C-78 was tabled in the House.

So we had pretty solid engagement for a number of years on the issue, and specifically on the legislation, we had been engaged in the months leading up to, first, the introduction of Bill C-78 and then of Bill C-12. So we were happy with the level of engagement we had.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

It sounds as though you're very supportive of this bill and have been working on its previous incarnations in the previous government as well. But is there anything specifically here—we didn't get a package, or at least I didn't receive a package of information from you, as we have from some, with some changes or modifications or concerns you had—on which you could outline any concerns you may have, or areas where you feel this bill needs to be improved?

[Francis Bradley]

We didn't provide a brief because in fact our message is, I think, fairly concise and very specific.

We don't have any comment on the first seven clauses of the bill because it talks about how the government is going to organize itself and how it's going to deliver its services, the responsibilities of the minister, responsibilities of the ministries, and so on. That is the government's business, to manage the government's business. The term they've used previously is “looking after our own house first”.

Our only specific area of interest in the legislation, and the only one that will likely impact us, is in clauses 8 to 10, which deal with the protection of information. That is an issue that we, as I say, have been engaging the government on for quite some time.

Of course, as I said, this is a piece of what is a much larger relationship. A great deal more has to be done to improve the flow of information, cooperation, and coordination, but I wouldn't expect this legislation to address any of those other issues. It's really quite specific and quite pointed, and on the issue we're particularly interested in, it goes where we want it to go.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

I'm sorry, Mr. Holland. Time is up.

Mr. Ménard.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

First, I'm very pleased to have the head of security in Ontario among our witnesses. There's one aspect that concerns me more particularly, and that is that Ontario operates a number of nuclear power stations. Personally, unlike many ecologically minded people, I still think that the Canadian nuclear power station system has the immense advantage of using natural uranium rather than enriched uranium, which would be less dangerous.

It's often said that emergency preparedness means preparing for the unforseeable. Can you add some details on security measures that are provided for in the event of an incident, if, for example, there is a loss of control at a nuclear power station. I imagine we can't send in any old police officer or the first person to arrive at the site. Could you explain to us briefly how your action plan is designed?

If an incident of the kind that occurred at Chernobyl happened, who would be responsible for a response?

[Francis Bradley]

I am sure Mr. Davis would be delighted to discuss this, but first I'll just point out that although you are quite correct that this is certainly an issue for Ontario because of the number of nuclear stations in that province, it is not unique to Ontario. There are, of course, nuclear generating stations in two other provinces, in New Brunswick and Quebec, although the preponderance of nuclear energy in this country is found in Ontario.

Mr. Davis, do you want to talk specifically about OPG's plans?

[Jim Davis]

This is a regulatory area. It is regulated by the CNSC. It is not an area that I could discuss from my perspective, so I would have to defer that question, unfortunately.

I am prepared to speak on the access to information piece of this bill, which our company wholeheartedly endorses. We believe that more cooperation, particularly with the government and intelligence agencies, will help protect all of our facilities, including our nuclear plants.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

However, I'm sure we can know whether the municipalities that have a nuclear power station in their area have an emergency plan in the event of a nuclear incident. That's not a secret.

Who would intervene on the outside?

[Jim Davis]

The emergency plan for our company is an integrated plan. It's integrated in the locations where those plans are rolled out, so it is the local policing agencies, the emergency preparedness people in our company, and the province. There is a network involved--but again, emergency preparedness specifically is not my area of expertise, and unfortunately that person is not here today.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Okay.

However, it seems to me that, if I were a police officer and I learned that a nuclear incident had occurred at a nuclear power station, I'd have to do something to prevent people from approaching it. It would be necessary to organize assistance, go in and pick up the wounded, etc., but I wouldn't dare approach the power station.

In municipalities that have nuclear power stations, do police officers know whether or not they should go on site?

[Jim Davis]

We in fact do have security measures in place at our nuclear facilities, as I am sure the committee is aware. It is public knowledge that we do actually have a policing agency on site.

Certainly from an emergency preparedness standpoint we are well prepared for emergencies, and I can say that the CNSC has very stringent requirements of us to have plans in place and to be paying attention to the safety of the communities where we are located.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Mr. Ouimet, could you perhaps tell me whether you have a plan at Gentilly that includes intervention by the Sûreté du Québec or any other police department? If an atomic incident occurred at Gentilly, are partners included in your emergency plan?

[Jean-Guy Ouimet, Senior Analyst, Threat and Risk Assessment, Industrial Security, Hydro-Québec, Canadian Electricity Association]

Of course.

Emergency measures are prepared in part by the emergency preparedness and fire security branch of Quebec's Ministry of Public Security. Sûreté du Québec is the police department identified as the responder in the event of a nuclear incident.

We've conducted simulations with the officers of the tactical response group who are asked to work in cooperation with the municipal police department that serves the Bécancour region and Sûreté du Québec. Bécancour City Hall and the current mayor, Mr. Richard, have been involved in the deployment of emergency measures that would be necessary in the event of a nuclear incident.

Simulations are regularly conducted to ensure that all participants — the people who must intervene — are entirely familiar with their roles. They are informed of the risks and put in place security measures that are necessary to ensure population control, among other things, to prevent people from getting too close to the areas. I won't go into the details of the plan, but there are areas that people may not enter; that can be up to 16 kilometers around the power station, and the roads around those areas are closed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you very much.

We'll go over to Mr. Comartin now for seven minutes, please. Mr. Comartin.

[Joe Comartin, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Mr. Bradley, I want to deal specifically with the major point of your being here. In your presentation on security of information and the sharing of that under certain circumstances, given the structure of the bill and the ability of the government in clause 5 to make special arrangements with the United States, and then under consequential amendments to other bills under the Access to Information Act of the requirement of the industry to share information when it's in the public interest....

Given the nature of the Patriot Act in the United States, is there any risk whereby either personal information, that of an individual, that we've paid our bills to Ontario Hydro, how much we consume--and the same, perhaps more importantly, for commercial activities? Is there any risk of that information being required to be given by you to the Canadian government and then being passed on to the American government? Are consumers at some risk there?

[Francis Bradley]

We have looked at that. We have some concerns not about the legislation, but generally about the Patriot Act and its impact on a variety of initiatives, including the Homeland Security Information Network, HSIN, and frankly we were a little concerned. We would like to see some kind of Canadian system we would be able to report to. The reason I mention that is, for example, our members participating in the North American marketplace for electricity currently report on a North American-wide basis to our North American Electric Liability Council, which is made up of the utility companies themselves.

We're likely moving into a world where there will be a requirement to report into the Homeland Security Information Network, and that causes problems for us because of the Patriot Act. In terms of how the legislation is written, I don't see anything specific in there, nor in the discussions have we come across anything specific in the legislation that would give us pause in the same way. Sharing information about vulnerabilities and threats and so on with the government likely wouldn't include anything that would have personal information or billing information or those sorts of things.

Given the interconnected nature of our network, at least at this stage, some of our neighbours north to south know more about our systems than people here in Ottawa do, because they need to know about our systems. We're interconnected and synchronized with them, but some of the people here in Ottawa don't know about them. We can't share some of that information because currently there isn't protection.