Public Safety Committee on Nov. 1st, 2006

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

I understand that you can't give us any figures, for security reasons, but do you believe that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has enough staff speaking the languages of the people who would be most prone to plan terrorist acts, for example in order to wiretap conversations and to look at documents?

[Gary Filmon]

I think the short answer is that we'd like to see them do more--more resources, more people who are qualified in various different languages.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

In the fight against crime -- and I suppose it's the same thing in the fight against terrorism -- I have seen that when a small organization cooperates with a larger one, it always feels that the larger one thinks that it are better than them and also that this large organization always wants to receive more information than it is ready to give. I believe this is a natural tendency and that it might exist between the American and Canadian organizations.

Can you confirm from your examinations that there is indeed some exchange of information between Canada and the US, both ways, but that there may be, let's say, three roads leading to the US for each road leading to Canada?

[Gary Filmon]

I don't think we have any way of knowing that. However, our impression is that Canada pulls its weight and that our security and intelligence service is regarded as being very professional and contributing at least its share, if not more, to the international fight against terrorism. This impression is based on our review of CSIS and our discussions with counterparts in other countries of the world.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Mr. Hawn.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I'd like to explore the general oversight of defence and security in Canada. We've talked about various committees and parliamentary oversight committees. From my point of view, there wouldn't be much sense in making another committee of parliamentarians to give oversight if security clearance limitations don't give them any more access to information than this committee has.

I'd like to get your thoughts on creating an agency dedicated to public safety, like the U.S. National Security Agency. It would have representatives and intelligence from federal policing bodies such as the RCMP, DND, DFAIT, Public Security, and so on. Do you see a place for a body like that manned by people with the appropriate security clearance, whether they're members of Parliament or whatever? I'm not familiar with the level of security clearance of privy councillors. I don't know whether it's at the same level, higher, lower, or whatever. It seems to me there is a place for a coordinated agency like this. It could be chaired by the Prime Minister, who would oversee and help to coordinate and de-conflict activities of the various agencies responsible for keeping us all safe here and abroad.

[Gary Filmon]

It's a little difficult for me to get into that. It is a matter of public policy that the government, with the advice of this committee and concerned members of Parliament, would have to look at. They would have to decide whether there is sufficient oversight and review of these security and intelligence functions. I don't know if there is any place in which people are satisfied that they have everything they want, that they have sufficient tools, or that they can feel secure about how their agencies function in this field. It's a very difficult situation.

Combining all of these under some sort of vehicle, provided that it has the proper security clearance and access, makes a lot of sense. On the other hand, there may be reasons why it could be problematic. There is the question of whether you could give them all of the access they need.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

As you said, no system is perfect, but it seems to me that what we've been talking about here is a perceived or real disconnect and a lack of coordination between CSIS, RCMP, Foreign Affairs, and other agencies with an interest in security. There ought to be one body that oversees all these activities and coordinates them. In the U.S., it's the National Security Agency. In other places, it's called something else. Is it fair to say that you see a potential benefit in something like this?

[Roy Romanow]

Mr. Hawn, there was a submission by the Security Intelligence Review Committee to the O'Connor commission on the issue of an independent, arm's-length review mechanism that would try to coordinate all of this. I don't mean to be dismissive at all in saying that this document describes in very pithy terms the position of SIRC on this issue. The chair has approved it; we've all approved it. It's not an easy situation, but it's available. In the interests of time, if you haven't seen it, we can make it available, as an answer to your question.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

I'm not attacking SIRC or how you do business with CSIS.

[Roy Romanow]

No, I understand. I'm not being defensive.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

It just seems to me that as a country and as a Parliament we are bogged down. Maher Arar is an example. The case has highlighted some of the deficiencies in how agencies coordinate with one another. At some level, it might help alleviate some of those things.

[Roy Romanow]

If I may just speak very briefly and finally on this—I can't speak for the chair, but I know him well, and his comments indicate this—all the members of the committee, I'm sure, share this concern of trying to put some form and order into the various agencies that are charged with this responsibility.

It's complex. When one looks at Parliament, you're looking at the conduct of public business, basically, openly. In other jurisdictions, in matters of this nature, there will inevitably be issues of national security that will be in conflict with doing business openly. Therefore, you have an immediate problem, and perhaps criticisms, as to whether or not this can be carried out.

I think the ideal situation is to try to have, I would say, this submission prepared for Mr. Justice O'Connor. Perhaps I'm biased. Ms. Landry and I are very recent arrivals here, compared to people like Mr. Filmon, our chair. But I think this is probably a meritorious suggestion for an imperfect solution that would compromise these areas and come closer to your view that we have some coordination.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Sure, yes, there's never a perfect.... And I must say, you're a healthy addition, if I can use a pun.

[Roy Romanow]

Thank you very much. I'm not sure my doctor agrees, but....

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you. We'll have to come back after the next round.

We'll now move to the third round of questioning and the Liberal Party.

We'll go to Mr. Cotler for five minutes.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to deal with a specific matter relating to the O'Connor commission, Maher Arar, the RCMP, and CSIS.

Now, the O'Connor report concluded that the RCMP had conveyed false and misleading information, to the effect that Maher Arar was an Islamic extremist associated with al-Qaeda, which, as the commission concluded, likely contributed to the subsequent rendition of Mr. Arar to Syria. Commissioner Zaccardelli, in his appearance before this committee, said that the RCMP corrected this false and misleading information on or around October 2002, on the occasion of Mr. Arar's detention.

Now, the heads of CSIS who appeared before us, former head Ward Elcock and now James Judd, stated that they were not aware that this false and misleading information was initially conveyed to U.S. officials, and that they did not know that this false and misleading information had been corrected until Commissioner Zaccardelli came before this committee four years later.

So my questions, my series of questions, are these. Is it not surprising, I would say even disturbing, that an important, indeed crucial, intelligence-relating function right within CSIS's mandate: a) would not have been known to CSIS; b) that CSIS would not have had knowledge of it being conveyed to U.S. officials; c) that CSIS would not have had any inter-agency intelligence-relating discussions with U.S. officials about it; d) that CSIS would only learn about it four years later, not because of any discussion with the RCMP and not because the RCMP had even reported it to the government, but only because Commissioner Zaccardelli reported to this committee, and without the commission of inquiry he would never have come before this committee and none of this would have ever been known; and finally, that in the absence of this information, or in the absence of this information conveyed by the RCMP to the U.S. officials that was false and misleading, CSIS continued to be engaged in the Maher Arar case, including not joining in the one-voice letter, maintaining contact with Syrian intelligence agencies during Arar's imprisonment, and not correcting the public record when damaging and prejudicial leaks were made, both during and after Maher Arar's return from imprisonment?

Is this not a serious dereliction of the intelligence-gathering mandate of CSIS? Is there not a serious dereliction of its accountability with respect to its intelligence function? And is this not something that your intelligence review committee should in fact look into?

[Gary Filmon]

Mr. Cotler, I don't want to say that I'm overwhelmed, but I am. You have put quite a lot of information and many, many questions on the table, and I'm not sure where to begin.

But with respect to a number of the issues, I think the one-voice letter was responded to yesterday by Mr. Judd for the committee with respect to their policy of not confirming or denying whether an individual is a target or a person of interest. I believe that Justice O'Connor concluded that it was appropriate for them to meet with and keep in touch with Syrian security and intelligence officials. I'm sure that would have been encouraged by DFAIT and others who were attempting to work for his release and that they would have wanted to keep the lines of communication open.

With respect to a number of different matters.... Did you raise the issue of their suspicions or that they should have had suspicions of human rights abuses? Was that one of the issues you raised?

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

I'm just saying that it's astonishing that a body charged with an intelligence mandate should not have known of a crucial intelligence bit of information, which turned out to be false and misleading, and only learned about it four years later because of the commissioner's and the inquiry's report and because Commissioner Zaccardelli came before this committee.

I find that astonishing. How could they possibly have had any relevant, authentic relations with the Syrian intelligence agencies if they didn't know about this fact that the information about Maher Arar, which was false and misleading, had been conveyed to the U.S. officials who brought about his rendition to Syria?

To me, it is astonishing that a committee involved with intelligence would not have known of this. It says something very disturbing about their relationship with the RCMP during that period. It says something very disturbing in terms of the accountability of CSIS and the RCMP, two civilian authorities, including the government. And in my view, this is something that the CSIS review committee should look into, because this, to me, is a very disturbing experience that has been revealed here.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Mr. Filmon, do you have a brief comment?

[Gary Filmon]

If I may, I can assure you that virtually every time we get together with CSIS officials, we ask about relationships with the RCMP, the exchange of information, and all the various integrated security programs that they have under way, and there are many these days. We're doing constant reviews of the various different programs--INSETs and all these programs. Having said that, it's obvious that something fell between the cracks.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

For four years.

[Gary Filmon]

If I recall, though, it was indicated in testimony here that that information was in the hands of the Solicitor General, then eventually the Minister of Public Safety. So if that wasn't being coordinated, somehow, through the government's security establishment, if they were aware of it and it wasn't being discussed with CSIS, that begs the question as well.

[Irwin Cotler, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

[Inaudible--Editor]...not aware of it. So that's yet another problem. That's what I meant about the lack of accountability.

[The Chair, Conservative, Garry Breitkreuz]

Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Norlock, please.