Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to deal with a specific matter relating to the O'Connor commission, Maher Arar, the RCMP, and CSIS.
Now, the O'Connor report concluded that the RCMP had conveyed false and misleading information, to the effect that Maher Arar was an Islamic extremist associated with al-Qaeda, which, as the commission concluded, likely contributed to the subsequent rendition of Mr. Arar to Syria. Commissioner Zaccardelli, in his appearance before this committee, said that the RCMP corrected this false and misleading information on or around October 2002, on the occasion of Mr. Arar's detention.
Now, the heads of CSIS who appeared before us, former head Ward Elcock and now James Judd, stated that they were not aware that this false and misleading information was initially conveyed to U.S. officials, and that they did not know that this false and misleading information had been corrected until Commissioner Zaccardelli came before this committee four years later.
So my questions, my series of questions, are these. Is it not surprising, I would say even disturbing, that an important, indeed crucial, intelligence-relating function right within CSIS's mandate: a) would not have been known to CSIS; b) that CSIS would not have had knowledge of it being conveyed to U.S. officials; c) that CSIS would not have had any inter-agency intelligence-relating discussions with U.S. officials about it; d) that CSIS would only learn about it four years later, not because of any discussion with the RCMP and not because the RCMP had even reported it to the government, but only because Commissioner Zaccardelli reported to this committee, and without the commission of inquiry he would never have come before this committee and none of this would have ever been known; and finally, that in the absence of this information, or in the absence of this information conveyed by the RCMP to the U.S. officials that was false and misleading, CSIS continued to be engaged in the Maher Arar case, including not joining in the one-voice letter, maintaining contact with Syrian intelligence agencies during Arar's imprisonment, and not correcting the public record when damaging and prejudicial leaks were made, both during and after Maher Arar's return from imprisonment?
Is this not a serious dereliction of the intelligence-gathering mandate of CSIS? Is there not a serious dereliction of its accountability with respect to its intelligence function? And is this not something that your intelligence review committee should in fact look into?