Well, again, that's a good question.
You know, I have 25,000 employees. I have literally tens and tens of thousands of investigations and files that are out there at any given time. We have a system that tries to funnel the most important files, the ones that I need to be briefed on, and at what time and so on. This was a file that, remember, targeted a number of suspected Islamic terrorists. Mr. Arar is a peripheral figure; he's a person of interest that comes into the file. This is not something that I would normally be briefed on. So when he did become of interest, after he was in prison in Syria, I did start to get briefed on the file.
Again, on the false information, as I've stated, and Justice O'Connor states, the members who actually produced the false information or the false labelling were not aware themselves that this was false information. It is only when Justice O'Connor brings it all together in an audited way.... This is normal in a large organization where you have disparate pieces of information all over the place. You don't know what they mean until somebody brings them together when an inquiry or an audit is done.
This is what happened in this case. That's why none of my senior officers was actually aware and that's why they couldn't have briefed me, because the people on the front end were not aware that these were errors or that this was a mislabelling. That's one of the big lessons from O'Connor. That's why we've put into place rigorous training. We've put in rigorous policy in terms of information sharing. That's what O'Connor has done for us, enabled us to really learn from this so that we don't repeat these mistakes again.