Good morning, my name is Pierre Poupart. I am a lawyer and member of the Quebec Bar. With me today are Mr. Langlais, an immigration lawyer, and Ms. Nicole Dufour, who is in charge of the Research and Legislation Service for the Barreau du Québec.
To begin with, I want to point out that the Barreau du Québec is a professional body whose primary mission is the protection of the public. It is an essential institution within a society such as ours, which is based on the rule of law. As such, it carries out its social responsibilities by standing up for fundamental values that are inherent in a free and democratic society, including equality under the law and respect for human rights.
The working group's report which, I hope, has been provided to Committee members, is the result of a lengthy period of reflection during which members of the Human Rights Committee of the Barreau du Québec, the Immigration and Citizenship Advisory Committee, and the Criminal Law Committee gave a great deal of thought, I have to say, to this issue for many months.
On February 23, 2007, in the Charkaoui ruling, the Supreme Court recognized the utility of the security objectives pursued through the security certificate process, specifying, however, that the latter should not be carried out at the expense of procedural fairness and principles of fundamental justice. On October 22, the Government of Canada tabled Bill C-3, which maintains the use of secret information while introducing a system of special advocates. The Barreau du Québec has concerns about the merits of such a solution, which does not seem to meet the requirements underlying the principles of procedural fairness and fundamental justice.
First of all, as regards continued use of secret information, a person subject to a security certificate will still be deprived of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including disclosure of the evidence and the right to a fair hearing. Parliament seems to have decided to create the special advocate position to address the fundamental justice problem raised above.
Our first comment has to do with the fact that the special advocate will not necessarily be a member of a professional body that regulates the conduct of members of the legal profession. As regards the special advocate's role, the Bill talks about protecting the interests of the named person in specific circumstances. However, this central function, which is generally carried out by counsel, must be questioned. The special advocate, in particular, is retained and may be dismissed by the judge. Furthermore, as we pointed out, after seeing the secret information, the special advocate may no longer communicate with the person directly affected by it, except with the authorization of the judge. In our opinion, that process undermines the very essence of the duty of representation.
Finally, as laid out in subclause 85.1(3), the relationship between the special advocate and the named person is not that of a solicitor and client which we, as legal counsel, find extremely surprising. As a result, the special advocate does not seem to be bound by the same ethical obligations as a lawyer and there would be no mechanism for the Barreau du Québec to review anything that had been done by a special advocate. As a professional body whose primary responsibility is to protect the public, the Barreau du Québec is concerned about the protection given to a person subject to a security certificate under the current wording of this bill.
The solution we propose reconciles the demands of national security and the procedural rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In that context, it is necessary to ensure that the evidence that is required is of adequate quality before an order is made regarding indefinite detention or deportation of the named person.
Many questions the current system as regards the content of the “evidence”. We are essentially talking about allegations or information provided by intelligence services in a number of other countries. That intelligence or information may not conform to the standards of reliability that our own legal system considers appropriate, in both civil and criminal matters.
In these cases, the evidence involves information whose probative value is determined on the basis of “reasonable grounds to believe”; you may wish to refer to section 33 of the Act. Introducing information into evidence based on that evidentiary standard has serious consequences if the information cannot be verified, because some of it may have been obtained from a variety of sources, some of which are reliable and others not, not to mention the fact, as others pointed out earlier, that some of the information may have been obtained under torture or through other forms of coercion, perhaps less spectacular but no less efficient.
The consequences for individuals directly against whom this evidence is used may include removal to torture or, worse, be fatal. Under the circumstances, it is important that there be a reliable mechanism for assessing information, in order to offset the weaknesses of the evidentiary regime. In order to meet procedural standards, the level of rights protection must be equivalent to that applied in the criminal law—in other words, the right to retain counsel, which is recognized in the Canadian Constitution.
However, this right becomes meaningless if counsel is not able to adequately represent his or her client, which would most certainly be the case if the current structure were to be retained. Accordingly, the use of secret information or intelligence in the security certificate process is inconsistent with such values as justice and fairness.
The solution adopted must provide for a procedure that guarantees appropriate respect for rights in a manner that is equivalent to the process laid out for criminal matters. Furthermore, the process must allow a court of law to terminate proceedings where the evidence is insufficient or unreliable, and where continuing an unfair process would cause further injury and prejudicially affect the integrity of the legal system.
The court must have access to all the evidence to be used and have the power, after hearing the arguments, to determine which evidence will be disclosed, as well as the validity of that evidence, based on the evidentiary principles underlying the criminal law.
As Lord Hoffman said:
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.
He was referring to similar legislation on another continent.
Having said that, we see this as an excellent opportunity not to allow ourselves to be motivated solely by fear which, although it may be the beginning of wisdom, must not drive the drafting of legislation in a free and democratic society. Section 7 of the Charter, if it means anything, is a clause that guarantees everyone the right to life, liberty and security of the person. If I am not mistaken, people who are not yet Canadian citizens certainly fall within the category of “everyone” and therefore have the right mutatis mutandis to protections which are just as rigourous as those guaranteed Canadian citizens.