My name is Dominique Peschard, and I'm the President of the Ligue des droits et libertés, the Human Rights League. Before introducing you to the league, allow me to convey counsel Denis Barrette's regrets for being unable to appear with me today, as he had learned of this meeting's postponement too late and was unable to reschedule in court.
The League is a human rights advocacy and defence organization founded in 1963 and dedicated to defending all human rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The League spoke out publicly and quickly following the September 11 attacks to denounce anti-terrorist measures that failed to include the principles of fundamental justice, all in the name of fighting the war against terrorism, and that were based on the belief that freedom must be sacrificed in return for greater security. However, the O'Connor and Iacobucci reports show that on the contrary, the security of Canadians is threatened when these principles are set aside.
The case of Maher Arar is the story of an innocent man, beaten down by the respective security apparatus of Canada, the United States, and Syria. This story demonstrates what happens when a society abandons the safeguards of its justice system, built on compliance of fundamental rights, in the name of security.
In specific terms, the O'Connor report reveals the following: an RCMP inquiry that describes Mr. Arar with inaccurate, or blatantly erroneous facts, and on no sound basis, describes him as an Islamic extremist with ties to Al Qaeda; unrestricted intelligence exchange with American authorities who do not even comply with RCMP rules; voluntary ignorance of the torture suffered by Mr. Arar when he was detained in Syria; “accepting and exploiting information acquired through torture”; and lastly, obstructive behaviour on the part of police authorities to prevent Mr. Arar from returning to Canada and allowing leaks that served to discredit Mr. Arar in public opinion, and to justify police action in his regard.
Unfortunately, the case of Maher Arar is not an isolated one. The Iacobucci Internal Inquiry revealed that these same practices used by security services contributed to the detention and torture of Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abou-Elmaati and Mr. Nureddin.
Today, two years after the publication of the Arar report, a fifth Canadian has experienced the same fate. Abousfian Abdelrazik, is rotting away in Sudan, and the Government of Canada is putting up roadblocks to his repatriation despite the fact that he has been exonerated of suspicions by the RCMP and CSIS. Mr. Abousfian's situation proves that the remedial measures put forth by Justice O'Connor are still pending.
The inquiry into the facts surrounding Maher Arar's deportation revealed that 24 agencies or federal government departments were involved in matters of national security. Municipal, and provincial police services, as well as provincial intelligence services are also likely to have collaborated with other agencies or government police services, or even been involved in joint investigations. In fact, Project A-O Canada involved various Canadian and U.S. agencies, including the FBI, and probably the CIA. We have learned that 247 agreements on intelligence sharing were concluded between Canada and other countries.
Since September 11th, security measures throughout the world, coupled with technological developments, have triggered an accumulation and sharing of intelligence on citizens, at a dizzying rate. Ongoing sharing of intelligence between various domestic agencies and foreign agencies facilitates the integration of information in different databases located in different states. For example, intelligence provided by the RCMP can be found in one of the largest U.S. databases, the Treasury Enforcement Communication System. This database is a super database because it combines data contained in at least 19 other databases, which taken individually, hold an impressive amount of information. This complex process could have a direct result of generating erroneous information that could trigger a domino effect, multiply the amount of damage and number of victims, thereby leaving these victims bereft of any real recourse.
For people who are no more than victims of a mistake, the damage suffered can be clearly identified: the inclusion of innocent people on blacklists, loss of employment, denial of citizenship, immigrant or refugee status, restricted movement, indefinite detention, or deportation to a country where detention, mistreatment, or torture awaits.
What happens to the principles we deem essential in a democratic society: accountability, correction of erroneous personal information, the right to compensation in cases of damage to reputation, the right to privacy, individual physical and psychological integrity, protection against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, fundamental freedoms, the right to equality, and prohibition of illegal profiling?
To prevent future breaches of rights, and to protect Canadians, the O'Connor Commission proposed a series of measures concerning police training, police practices as well as a mechanism for complaints and surveillance of activities relating to national security.
In his first report, Justice O'Connor put forth 23 recommendations. Two of these recommendations are of particular significance. Firstly, the RCMP's practices and agreements on intelligence sharing must be subject to an independent review entity. Secondly, information should never be conveyed to a country where there stands a credible risk of the use of torture.
Justice O'Connor's second report highlighted glaring flaws in the surveillance mechanisms of many agencies involved in national security. Some agencies, such as the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP have limited powers and means—commissioners have already stated this publicly before this very committee—other agencies such as the Border Services Agency have no surveillance mechanism. In any case, a great number of surveillance agencies would not have a broad enough vision required to assess the practices of police services and agencies that work in an integrated fashion.
To address the situation, the League, following the example of other rights advocacy groups, recommended to the O'Connor Commission that one single surveillance agency be empowered to monitor all national security activities, and that it be given broad investigative powers. Justice O'Connor proposed a similar organization with a different structure, but with the same objectives.
In summary, the commissioner recommends replacing the current Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP with an independent review organization with strengthened powers, to be renamed the Independent Complaints and National Security Review Agency for the RCMP, which would also be responsible for looking into the national security activities of the Canada Border Services Agency.
The current mandate of the surveillance arm of CSIS should be widened so that more complaints can be received, and the review of the activities of various departments and agencies involved in intelligence activities and national security can be stepped up. These entities include the Communications Security Establishment Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
Lastly, the commissioner recommended to the government that a new mechanism, to be called the Integrated National Security Review Coordinating Committee, be established to provide a centralized intake mechanism for complaints regarding the national security activities of federal entities and to report on accountability issues relating to practices and trends in the area of national security in Canada, including the effects of those practices and trends on human rights and freedoms.
This new mechanism must not become an empty shell, and the appropriate financial resources must be allocated to it. Its annual budget would be subject to parliamentary review prior to approval. In the opinion of the League, it is unacceptable that government institutions dedicated to protecting human rights are barely able to fulfill their mandate because of a lack of funding. This type of situation undermines the public's confidence in people's ability to exercise these fundamental rights, and in the proper functioning of government institutions.
Of course, significant change in State surveillance and investigative methods must be coupled with changes in culture, customs, and with a genuine respect for fundamental rights, especially, but not exclusively, within the RCMP. Nonetheless, these changes in mentality must be part and parcel of long-term changes, and can only be effected when the State sends a clear and unequivocal message to its constituents.
In the face of an astounding increase in State control, surveillance and investigative powers, an appropriate and effective review mechanism must be developed . This is the indispensable condition, as well as the price to pay for keeping our society free and democratic. Following a thorough and rigorous review of the matter, at both the national and international levels, Justice O'Connor recommended the creation of a new review mechanism similar to existing models in other democratic countries such as Belgium, Norway and Sweden.
It is high time to implement all of these recommendations.
We hope this committee will make a number of recommendations to the government. Since the Iacobucci Commission does not have the mandate to do this, we would also like to see this committee put forward a recommendation to the government to extend a formal apology to Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abou-Elmaati Mr. Nureddin, as well as compensation. We also recommend that the government take all the necessary measures so that erroneous information on these people and their families, which is still on file within Canadian and foreign services, be corrected, and that a formal complaint be filed against the governments of Syria and Egypt for the mistreatment of these Canadian citizens.
Thank you.
