I think, as the honourable member pointed out, these are fundamental principles that are simply being reiterated and positioned for you, ideally, in the network world of modern intelligence sharing. I would think and hope that we could go forward with the necessary review and mechanism agency development without necessarily completely waiting for the results of another inquiry.
However, I would point out, because we appeared and made two submissions to the inquiry on Air India, that what it brings to this discussion is the fact that we have to look at the network world of security intelligence now, and we can't think it's just a matter of maybe the RCMP and the particular cases, and the two previous ones.
What we're also looking at in the Air India Inquiry, I believe, is how national intelligence infects--sorry, it should be “affects”, but perhaps “infects” in some way too—commercial domestic transport: the supervision of our airports, the supervision, for example, of airport personnel. So it brings into the picture the other agencies that are part of the national security world that I think we cannot ignore. And Transport Canada has a role to play. FINTRAC, which does money laundering review, is another part.
So I would say we have to be able to create a model that leaves a place for this kind of development. But I think my colleagues may have—