Public Safety Committee on Dec. 1st, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Good afternoon. Welcome, everyone.

This is meeting 44 of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Wednesday, December 1, 2010. Today we are continuing our study on issues surrounding security at the G-8 and G-20 summits.

Towards the end of our meeting today, at approximately 5:15, our committee will go to committee business, if that's still the wish. It was at the end of last meeting, so our intentions are that we will go to committee business at 5:15 today.

Appearing as witnesses, we have with us, from the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs, Jenilee Guebert, director of research, G-8 and G-20 groups; from the Movement Defence Committee of the Law Union of Ontario, Mike Leitold, member; from the Department of National Defence, Brigadier General John Collin, chief of staff of Canada Command; and from the Peel Regional Police, Superintendent Brian Adams.

I understand that each one of you has an opening statement for our committee today. Hopefully we can hold those statements to approximately ten minutes each, and then we would proceed into the first and subsequently the second round of questioning. The first round of questioning will be a seven-minute round for each party.

We look forward to your statements, and looking across the panel, Ms. Guebert, if you would begin, we would appreciate it.

[Jenilee Guebert, Director of Research, G-8 and G-20 Groups, University of Toronto, Munk School of Global Affairs]

Thank you.

I will try to keep to ten minutes, because I know there are probably a lot of questions and comments perhaps that need to be made.

Before starting with my official presentation I want to give a brief context of what I am going to present. I am the director of research at the G-8 and G-20 research groups at the Munk School. Our group's mission is to serve as the world's leading independent source of information, analysis, and research of the institutions, issues, and members of the G-8 and the G-20 summits respectively within both groups.

In this capacity I research trends related to both groups, both in terms of policy and in terms of the physical summits themselves. I have been on site at several G-8 and G-20 summits as well as at other ministerial meetings. I generally attend these meetings as part of the accredited media, whereby our groups conduct on-site analysis and interviews.

Today I am here to discuss issues surrounding security of the G-8 and the G-20 summits that were hosted in June. I am simply going to try to provide you with facts and evidence that the G-8 and G-20 research groups have gathered on this topic from past summits, as well as provide you with any insight and thoughts that I have from my personal experiences at these past summits.

I have no expertise in regard to policing or proper security protocol. I can offer examples of problematic cases that have come up at other summits or give you an idea of some of the security measures that have been enforced at other summits. But I have little knowledge to offer in regard to what instruments should or should not be used, how many personnel should or should not be required at each summit, or what is unlawful or inappropriate.

It is extremely difficult to predict what sort of events will transpire at a G-8 or G-20 summit. Protesting can be expected now, but how violent, in what numbers, where the protesters will gather, and what instruments they will use is impossible to know. There is also now a common fear of potential terrorist attacks that might take place at these summits.

It is also difficult to come up with a single figure for how much a G-8 or a G-20 summit will cost, including for security, particularly on a country-comparative basis, since there are many variables to take into consideration. When assessing overall summit costs, one needs to assess factors including already-available facilities at the summit sites, regular and overtime salaries, accommodation, travel expenses, meals, security, technology, infrastructure, communications, and service staff. There are also differences in when and how hosts report these costs, what they include as a special summit expense rather than part of their regular operation or capital budget, how much of the pre-summit preparatory and post-summit implementation period they include in these reports, the timing of their fiscal years, and exchange rates at the time of financial reporting and subsequently, as most costs become known.

Some hosts benefit from the use of large military and security facilities that are already in place, as was the case at the recent summit that I attended in Seoul. Or they'll use the summit as a trigger for major capital investment in a particular region. This was the case, for example, at the 2000 Okinawa summit in Japan.

In the lead-up to the summits this summer, it was estimated that the Canadian government was going to spend $1.1 billion on the events, including $930 million for security. This number has come down a bit since then. The last report I saw was about $858 million, lower than the predicted cost but still one of the highest in summit history, at least from the available evidence that we have gathered.

The G-20 summit was actually the most expensive, in terms of the costs for Toronto; however, when we take out the costs for the Muskoka summit, it was actually fourth. The 2000 summit and the 2008 summits, which were both hosted by the Japanese, came in as first and second, and the Russian summit in 2006 was actually the third most expensive.

It is not uncommon that the majority of the money for G-8 and G-20 summits is spent on security. This is in line with the majority of past summits. What stood out for the Canadian summits was the overall dollar figure that was actually spent. For example, British estimates from the 2005 summit in Gleneagles suggest that it cost £90.9 million, approximately $157 million U.S., the majority of which went to policing and security. The London G-20 summit was reported to have cost approximately $30 million.

It is estimated that the 2002 Kananaskis summit cost around $200 million to $300 million. Again, most of the money went to security. This was the first summit that was to take place after September 11, as well as the G-8 summit in Genoa 2001, where there were massive protests and the first civilian actually died on the sidelines of a G-8 event.

I would like to point out that it is not uncommon for Canada to spend more on security than other countries at summits because we don't have massive infrastructures in place for security, such as large military contingents, as was the case at the Seoul summit in November.

The high costs for the G-8 and the G-20 summits this summer were not unprecedented. The 2000 Okinawa summit is reported to have been the most costly. Media reports claim that this summit cost between $750 million and $780 million. While this is less than the $858 million reported for the Canadian meetings, it was only for one G-8 meeting. The Japanese government intentionally selected Okinawa as the G-8 summit location to usher money into this area.

There has also been much discussion over damage, security protocol, and the degree of force used by officers on duty at the G-8 and the G-20 summits. These challenges do not always accompany summits. For instance, at the first G-20 summit in Washington in 2008, there was very little in terms of this to report. However, on the whole, this is not uncommon.

For example, at the 2001 Genoa summit, arguably the most violent of all the summits, an estimated 200,000 demonstrators showed up, hundreds of people were injured, and one man was shot dead by an Italian officer. The officer was acquitted of any charges, as the judge determined he was acting in self-defence.

After the G-20 finance ministers meeting in Australia in 2006, 26 people were charged and arrested for reasons including damaging property, arson, and disorderly conduct. At the G-20 summit in London in April 2009, 86 protesters were arrested, and just a few days ago it was reported that the U.K. police officer who attacked Ian Tomlinson at the London summit will in fact be charged for inadvertently causing or contributing to his death. At a gross misconduct hearing the officer is being charged for using force that is considered not necessary, proportionate, or reasonable in these circumstances.

I have a variety of other facts and information available from summits past, as well as the Canadian summits, which I'd be happy to share. I look forward to your questions or comments later.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Ms. Guebert--all in seven minutes and 30 seconds. We appreciate that.

I'll just warn our committee members, as well as our guests, there is a chance that the bells may start ringing fairly soon. If that happens, we will have to suspend and then go to the House for a vote. But our intentions are that we're going to come back here and continue with this. If that happens, if you see lights flashing and bells ringing, not to fear.

We'll now proceed to General Collin, please.

[BGen John Collin, Chief of Staff, Canada Command, Department of National Defence]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity to explain the role and actions of the Canadian Forces during the G-8 and G-20 summits and also to address any questions or concerns that committee members may have.

I'm here today in two capacities. First, I am currently the chief of staff of Canada Command, the organization that is responsible for all routine and contingency domestic operations, less air defence, which remains a NORAD responsibility. Second, and perhaps equally important, in my previous job I was the Canadian Forces joint task force commander for the G-8 and G-20 summits, and as such was responsible for all the tactical planning and execution of the military operations associated with the summits.

In these short opening remarks, I would simply like to offer a few main themes and also describe in broad terms the primary functions undertaken by the Canadian Forces during the summits.

First and foremost, it is important to remember that the Canadian Forces were in support of law enforcement agencies; we were not the lead. You are aware that the overall responsibility for summit security rested with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Working with them and other police forces of jurisdiction, the Canadian Forces developed plans and executed operations as part of the larger team, but always in support of requirements and requests from our law enforcement partners.

Specifically, the Canadian Forces provided, either directly or indirectly, support to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto Police Services, and Peel Regional Police. Throughout and consistent with normal practice and government policy, the Canadian Forces focused on providing capabilities that are unique to the military or capabilities that were clearly beyond the capacity of the first responders. Our main roles can be summarized in four broad areas.

First, the Canadian Forces, working within the bi-national command known as NORAD, were responsible for Air Defence. This is a standing task for Canada's military, which is executed 365 days a year. For the summits, there were increased demands in the form of "restricted flight zones" and increased forces required to satisfy the demands and potential threats, but, essentially, the task was one which our military executes on a regular and continuous basis.

Next, the Canadian Forces contributed significantly to surveillance and early warning. We did this with ground, air, and, to a limited degree, naval resources. Our main task was to ensure that all potential hazards and threats were identified and communicated quickly and accurately to the decision-makers for action.

The Canadian Forces also provided military air transport with both fixed-wing airplanes and rotary-wing helicopters in support of the summits. Tasks included the transportation of the heads of state and other VIPs to and from the G-8 summit location and administrative transport of some police forces to alternate locations. We were also prepared to execute other tasks, such as emergency air evacuation of the heads of state, rapid delivery of police emergency response teams, and emergency medical evacuation. In the end, none of these tasks were required.

Finally, the CF provided assistance in establishing and then operating the command and control architecture for the summits. To be clear, we did not lead this effort nor were we the only agency to contribute to it, but, our past experiences and our integral capabilities were used to enhance the capabilities at various command nodes; most notably at the RCMP led Integrated Security Unit and Unified Command Centre at Barrie, Ontario.

As a sidebar comment, it is important to also remember that the Canadian Forces were not asked, nor would we have entertained the request even if asked, to conduct crowd-control operations or what police forces call public order duties. Maintaining public order is clearly a police responsibility, and the Canadian Forces are neither trained nor equipped to fulfill that role. For that matter, we also did not undertake any of what might be termed traditional police functions such as arrests and evidence-gathering. These limitations on the use of Canadian Forces personnel were clearly understood by all of our security partners and led to no difficulties whatsoever in our ability to support the police in the four broad areas I have just outlined.

To accomplish this support, the Canadian Forces contributed approximately 3,000 personnel dispersed primarily in and around Huntsville, the Lester B. Pearson Airport in Toronto, the Toronto waterfront, at various command and control nodes, and in the skies overhead. The majority of the elements were deployed for no more than 25-30 days and this included all of their movement and training requirements.

The initial budget allocated to the Department of National Defence was approximately $77 million, of which, although the final figures have yet to be tallied, we expect to have expended only approximately $20 million, or 26%. The significant reduction can be attributed to several cost-saving measures that were implemented and the fact that since everything went according to plan, contingency funds, which were approximately $20 million, did not need to be used.

Overall, from a CF perspective, the planning and execution of the summits were resounding successes. I was quite pleased with the leadership and competencies demonstrated by our police partners, and together we formed an outstanding team. As the Canadian Forces joint task force commander, I must close by stating how impressed I was with the professionalism and accomplishments of all CF personnel associated with the summits. I know I also speak for the entire senior leadership of the Canadian Forces when I state that we would have it no other way, and that our men and women in uniform continue to do us proud.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, General Collin.

We'll go to Mr. Adams, please.

[Supt Brian Adams, Superintendent, Peel Regional Police]

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon. On behalf of the Peel Regional Police, my chief's management group, and me, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to address this committee with regard to the roles and responsibilities of Peel Regional Police during the G-8 and G-20 summits.

I was the designated command lead for Peel Regional Police, and I was responsible for the overall operation. During the summits themselves, I was the assigned incident commander for Peel police at the unified command centre in Barrie.

I'd like to begin by giving you an introduction to Peel Regional Police.

The Peel Regional Police, being the second-largest municipal police organization in the province of Ontario, provides policing services to the 1.2 million residents of the cities of Brampton and Mississauga. There are 1,891 uniformed personnel and 764 civilian staff within our organization.

Police services are made available through five divisional facilities, eleven community stations, the Emil V. Kolb facility, and police headquarters. The service delivery area is 538 square kilometres. The city of Toronto is on our eastern border and the regional municipality of Halton is located on our western boundary.

The Region of Peel borders Lake Ontario, and our marine unit patrols all accessible shoreline, including inland bodies of water and 272 square kilometres of water to the international border with the United States. Canada’s busiest airport, Lester B. Pearson International Airport, is situated in the city of Mississauga. It is policed by Peel Regional Police under a full-cost-recovery agreement with the Greater Toronto Airports Authority. An estimated 32 million passengers pass through the airport annually.

The mandate of the Peel Regional Police is to maintain peace and good order, protect lives and property, investigate and resolve criminal activity, prevent crime, and respond to our community’s needs. Balanced by sensitivity to the importance of successful major crime resolutions, the organization is committed to community-based policing, the development of effective and proactive initiatives, crime prevention programs, and victim services, as delineated by Ontario's Police Services Act.

With respect to Peel Regional Police's G-8 and G-20 summit involvement, in July of 2009 the Peel Regional Police were invited to partake in meetings with the integrated security unit in preparation for the G-8 summit. It was believed that Lester B. Pearson International Airport was being considered as a possible arrival point for dignitaries and their families. The degree of involvement for our organization in the summit was unknown at that time.

When the announcement was made in September of 2009 that Canada would also be hosting the G-20, it was anticipated that the Lester B. Pearson International Airport would play an integral role in the movement of those heads of state who were considered to be internationally protected persons. This would necessitate the involvement of the Peel Regional Police in the protection of these individuals.

It was at this stage of the process that the Peel Regional Police selected a lead planner and a small dedicated group to begin preparing preliminary operational plans for the summits. The responsibilities of the planning team included airport security, motorcade security, accreditation, and security checkpoints, as well as maintaining ongoing airport division operations.

As a member of the integrated security unit, Peel Regional Police ensured that in coordinating and developing their security plans they fully integrated with our policing partners.

In December of 2009 it was announced that Toronto was to host the G-20 and that Lester B. Pearson International Airport was to become the main port of entry for several heads of state and their delegations. As a result of this announcement, Peel Regional Police had to increase its initial G-8 planning team to support the additional functions and scope of the G-20 summit. This process involved the following list of activities or tasks: development of integrated operational security plans; implementation of a community relations group to engage with citizens, area businesses, and the community impacted by the summits; gather intelligence and conduct investigations; development of logistical plans; development of financial plans associated with the overall security of the operation; and procurement of supplies and equipment, as well as the identification and implementation of infrastructure upgrades.

All areas within our organization participated in the preparation of the operational plans for the G-8 and G-20. These areas included tactical and rescue, explosive disposal unit, canine, criminal investigations, forensic identification, traffic services, bicycle units, intelligence, fleet management, telecommunication systems and services, information technology services, uniform patrol—and I'll add to the list I originally provided communications, finance and administration, and public affairs.

It is important to identify that the Peel Regional Police formed strong partnerships with the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and the emergency management teams from the Region of Peel, Cities of Mississauga and Brampton, as well as our partners from fire and EMS. Their contributions were essential in the overall development of our plans.

The Peel Regional Police were fully committed to the RCMP-led integrated security team. We were involved in over 30 committees and working groups. We participated in all the mandated exercises, which were conducted in preparation for the summits. Training programs were provided for our officers at all levels in preparation for the summits, which included the incident management system, incident command system, incident command, and CBRNE training.

The mobilization process for Peel Regional Police effectively began on Monday, June 21, 2010, and concluded on Monday, June 28, 2010. All regular days off and vacation time were cancelled during this time period. Peel Regional Police personnel were phased in during the week of mobilization. During the peak times during the summits approximately 650 personnel were used each day.

Peel Regional Police had executive representation on the steering committee and assigned incident commanders to the unified command centre in Barrie and the Toronto area command centre at Lester B. Pearson International Airport. We did not have representation in the other command areas for the summits.

Peel Regional Police also provided assistance to our policing partners in Toronto. A memorandum of understanding was prepared for ten motorcycle officers, four marine unit officers, and two video producers to provide assistance during the week of the summits.

On Friday, June 25, 2010, the Toronto Police Service made a request to have the Peel Regional Police public safety unit attend the city of Toronto for support. This request was approved, and 81 Peel Regional Police officers were subsequently assigned to Toronto. The public safety unit has two commanders and supervisory staff within its structure. They worked in Toronto under the direction of the Toronto Police Service until released on Monday, June 28, 2010.

On Saturday, June 26, 2010, the Peel Regional Police received a request from our integrated security partners for additional uniform resources to be assigned to the city of Toronto. The Peel Regional Police provided an incident commander and supervisory staff, as well as 128 uniform officers to the Toronto Police Service for June 27, 2010. Again, these officers were subject to the command and direction of the Toronto Police Service.

We would like to recognize the commitment and professionalism of our partners within the integrated security unit. The combined efforts and extensive planning of our partners were exceptional.

In closing, the G-8 and G-20 summits were the largest security undertaking in the history of the Peel Regional Police. The safe and efficient policing operations at Lester B. Pearson International Airport were integral to the success of the G-8 and G-20 summits. We are extremely proud that we were able to ensure the safety and security of the general public and heads of state during the summits. This is a tribute to the men and women within our organization.

Once again, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Adams.

My understanding is that these bells are not going to be long bells. So we are going to suspend at this point and we'll come back and with great expectation wait to hear what Mr. Leitold has for us.

We'll suspend.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Order.

Mr. MacKenzie.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

I know that we had indicated that at 5:15 we would go to committee business, but because of the vote and the delay, I think it would only be fair to the witnesses that we go to 5:30 so that these people who have taken time out of their lives to be here get an opportunity to talk to the committee.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Is that all right? Do we have a consensus? I see everybody nodding their heads.

All right. It looks like we're going to be able to hear from you, Mr. Leitold.

Then we will proceed and we'll go until 5:30, at which time we will adjourn. There will be other bells.

Welcome back, committee. At the break, before we went to votes, we were just preparing to hear from Mr. Leitold.

Mr. Leitold, you have the floor.

[Mike Leitold, Member, Movement Defence Committee of the Law Union of Ontario]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm here speaking today as a member of the Law Union of Ontario's movement defence committee. I'm also a lawyer, but I'm today speaking as a member of that committee. Just by way of background, that's a working group of the Law Union of Ontario, and that working group focuses on providing legal support to progressive organizations and social justice activists in Toronto.

Our role before, during, and after the G-20 protest was threefold, in essence. We provided some background know-your-rights information and legal trainings to those who had expressed an intention of attending the demonstrations. Through our summit legal support project we did those workshops around southern Ontario. We also trained and fielded approximately 100 legal observers to monitor police action and misconduct, and those persons were easily identifiable wearing orange hats during the demonstrations. We also created a legal response office that would have been staffed for about a total of 12 days, from June 18 to 30, with a legal number that people could call if they were experiencing police harassment or in a circumstance of being detained or arrested, or simply to report searches or other excesses by the police. In some instances we did receive calls about police brutality.

We also--for people who had been arrested--created a list of lawyers who were prepared to offer their services pro bono to individuals who were arrested. We did end up requiring the services of all 25 of the lawyers who had offered those services for free.

We were in many cases the first non-police point of contact for the over 1,100 people arrested. We received hundreds of calls from the prisoner processing centre. We also supported those detainees and arrestees, connecting them with their parents, connecting them with possible sureties to bail them out, and also taking steps to ensure that dependants or pets or other things that needed to be dealt with while they were detained were dealt with, and also advocating on their behalf in order to obtain medication, assistive devices, or other supports.

Our direct experience in that regard I think gives us a unique perspective on the events of the policing of the G-20. I think what our experience has led us to conclude is that there are many unanswered questions that arise out of these demonstrations and the policing of them. We hope you will join us in our call for a public inquiry with subpoena powers in order to get to the bottom of those questions.

Some have characterized the policing of the G-20 summit as sort of a threefold process, characterized by police restraint initially, then negligence, and then a police overreaction later on in the weekend. Our experience diverges from that criticism. In fact we don't necessarily see the negligence for the overreaction part. We actually observed a systematic targeting of social justice movements in Canada over the period leading up to the G-20 demonstrations--and during them and after--and what amounts effectively to a systemic repression of critics and those who oppose the policies of this government.

We point out in our written submission the differences in the policing of two major demonstrations that took place in Ontario this summer: the anti-choice demonstrations on May 13, 2010, in Ottawa versus the G-20 protests, which of course took place in the last week of June 2010. One obviously didn't have a prison created for it or millions of dollars spent in preparation for the policing of it, and one did. Of course it's the second, the latter, the G-20 protests that we're here talking about today.

There are seven basic areas--and I'll go through them quickly--of police repression that we identified arising out of our committee's experience this summer, the first being searches, harassment, and detention of activists and protesters. Second was the militarization of police tactics in operational functions. Third was the use of preventative arrest and detention against protesters. Fourth was violations of a person's procedural rights when in detention or arrested. Fifth, we received considerable concern about the conditions in the prisoner processing centre, and I will spend a bit of time on that.

Also, we noted mass violations of the Human Rights Code and the Canadian Human Rights Act, which of course governs the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Finally, there were certain indicia of the criminalization of dissent that took place over the course of those demonstrations.

I will go through them briefly, if I might. With respect to police harassment, detention, and searches, we received reports, leading up to the demonstrations, of dozens of instances of police harassment of activists and organizers, leading to home visits, workplace visits or visits at schools, involving RCMP agents or operatives contacting people seen to be organizers of the demonstrations. We received reports of 29 incidents of that type of harassment.

Between Monday, June 21, and Saturday, June 26, we received reports of over 80 people being harassed, detained, and searched by the police. We believe that many others were similarly harassed, detained, and searched but may not have known that our services existed.

Notable indicia of these types of harassment and search almost always involved pedestrians walking in downtown Toronto, generally young people who were targeted because of their appearance. Harassment was conducted by police, in our view, without reasonable grounds. It often involved groups of armed police officers surrounding those pedestrians. It invariably included searches of people's bags and pockets without any caution that they were not required to participate in that search, and often involved the illegal seizure of personal belongings, including leftist political literature. I'll just note that this was prior to the afternoon of Saturday, June 26.

In many instances the police relied on fictitious powers under the Public Works Protection Act in order to justify the detention and search of those pedestrians. In many cases they also claimed expanded detention and search powers under the Trespass to Property Act.

For example, on Friday, June 25, persons entering Allan Gardens in Toronto were told they could not enter the park without having their bags searched pursuant to the Trespass to Property Act. Further, the police, near the subway system, often would assert that the Trespass to Property Act allowed them to search people's persons and belongings.

In our view, the above and what I have described show a blatant pattern of bad-faith searches on the part of the police, and a pattern of proactive targeting of activists that began well in advance of Saturday, June 26.

We've highlighted questions that need answers, such as what were front-line officers told, and by whom, of the legal limits of their powers to stop and search persons during that period of time? What orders or directions were given with regard to police searches and investigative detentions? Who gave those orders?

I now turn to the second area of concern, that being the police militarization of operational tactics. Many of our legal observers described how there was, at Queen's Park, on Saturday, June 26, 2010, a concerted effort by police to terrorize participants in a demonstration on the lawns of the legislature.

Numerous horse charges were used. Baton charges were used. Protestors were corralled into small groups. Snatch squads would then proceed and target individuals. Tear gas and rubber bullets were used. And as I believe the special investigations unit has at least concluded, there was excessive use of force by police with respect to physical assaults of individuals who were being arrested.

In these instances, I think what we're asking is why those militarized use-of-force tactics were used against demonstrators at Queen's Park and what orders police forces were given in relation to the gathering at Queen's Park, which of course is the grounds of the legislature, which has been subject to much debate in the media and in the public.

We would also note that the legal observers we had present did not hear any announcements by the police asking the crowd to disperse at that time.

Third, I'd point to the rampant and illegal use of what we'd describe as preventative arrest and detention. The Movement Defence Committee concluded that at least 740 people were held under breach of the peace provisions of the Criminal Code. For those who don't know, that is not actually a criminal charge. That section of the code requires that in fact people be released within 24 hours.

As a result of the large-scale detention of individuals and the fact that they were held beyond those 24-hour limits, we would argue that there were breaches of police powers. We're concerned about who ordered those breaches and whether they were done to prevent or undermine further demonstrations that weekend.

Turning to the fourth area, the violations of procedural rights that I mentioned, many of the people who were held at the prisoner processing centre were not told the reason for their arrest. Those who spoke French weren't told in French. People weren't able to access counsel in a timely way. They weren't able to use the phone in a timely way. Many were held for 24 hours without seeing a justice of the peace, which is not justified in the Toronto region. There is no shortage of resources to bring people before a justice of the peace. Many who were released were subject to what we would characterize as unreasonable terms of release.

I've cited some questions that need answers with respect to those violations, most notably, who gave those orders, and were there really resource issues with respect to the undermining of those procedural rights?

You've heard much about the conditions at the prisoner processing centre. We've cited many of the accounts that we heard in the over 200 calls we got from prisoners at that centre. Many people had their photographs taken in illegal circumstances that weren't justified under the Identification of Criminals Act--i.e., they weren't charged with any offence. Many people were held without regard to proper conditions: lights were left on all night, no food or water was provided for 12 or more hours, people--

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We're over 12 minutes now.

[Mike Leitold]

I'll be very quick. I only have two other areas of concern that I'd like to highlight.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I'll give you about 25 seconds. We want to get to questions.

[Mike Leitold]

Absolutely.

There were mass violations of the Human Rights Code and the Canada Human Rights Act. People can go to our submissions in order to talk about the targeting, notably of many visibly queer persons. Also, those who were disabled were not accommodated when they were detained.

With respect to the criminalization of dissent, many people were targeted. For example, community organizers were targeted and intimidated by police visits, and isolated and silenced by restrictive bail conditions. Those who actually had our leaflets giving them background on their rights were singled out for arrest.

Our conclusion is that we need answers to these unanswered questions. A public inquiry with subpoena power is the best way to go forward with that. It's the citizens of Canada, the people who live in Canada, who are seeing our hard-won rights and freedoms undermined by the conduct of the police that week, who really suffer when those answers aren't addressed in a public forum.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Leitold.

We'll go to the first round with Mr. Kania.

[Andrew Kania, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Can you please let me know when I have one minute left?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Well, yes...or buy a clock.

[Andrew Kania, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

Madam Guebert, I have your paper here on the G-8 and G-20 summit costs, July 5, 2010. I'm looking on page 3, at the breakdown of the various countries and expenses.

First, can you explain what the major differences were in the expenses in Canada in relation to other countries--why they were so much different, what the main differences were within the context, as you already indicated today, of this being one of the most expensive summits in history?

[Jenilee Guebert]

Yes, thank you.

There's a variety of different factors that come into play as to why some summits are more expensive than others. For example, if a host country picks a facility where they already have a structure in place to host the meeting, they won't have to spend money on erecting a certain facility. Broadband communications have to be taken into account. Also, there is the transportation of the leaders. For example, if you had a summit in Toronto versus having it in Muskoka, you'd be able to avoid the additional costs to get the leaders from Toronto to Muskoka. Most would fly directly into Toronto.

There are other factors in assessing a location--for example, security. Since 9/11, in particular, there have been efforts to have G-8 summits at more remote locations, because they're seen as more securable and harder to get to in terms of demonstrators. Again, these are the sorts of costs that come into consideration.

One of the major reasons Canada tends to have to spend so much more money on security is because we don't have major structures or major annual portions of our budget that are awarded to military structures. For example, when the Washington summit was held in 2008, they already had so much security infrastructure in place because of the everyday goings-on of Washington that they didn't need to usher in special summit dollars for such security measures.

These are all the types of things that come into play. I'm happy to answer more specific questions, but I hope that gives you a bit of an idea about it.

[Andrew Kania, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

My understanding is that the government spent more than $200 million extra because they split the summit between Huntsville and Toronto. Is that an accurate figure? Do you have an exact figure of how much extra they spent?

[Jenilee Guebert]

I can't give you a specific dollar figure, but certainly it would have been less if they had had both of the summits in Toronto because you would have been able to combine all of the facilities. You would have been able to not have the extra security measures that were needed in the second location.

[Andrew Kania, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

Based on your analysis, historically, of all these other summits, was there any reason why they could not have combined the G-8 and the G-20 summits only in Toronto?

[Jenilee Guebert]

In technical terms, no, there is no reason why they couldn't have done it. There are a variety of other reasons why they may have stuck to the way it was.

[Andrew Kania, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

Political decisions.