In a context where anti-terrorism provisions are being used, I doubt that counsel for such a person would be capable of showing that the information suggesting the supposedly imminent nature of a terrorist attack was secured through torture. A lawyer would not be able to produce that evidence. The Arar inquiry lasted months and made that demonstration to the public at large. We have fought hard and many lawyers have fought against the national security argument.
In the case of these two provisions, there will also be the cover of national security. That should not be forgotten. Mr. Forcese talks about public investigations. It is true that part of the investigation for recognizance with conditions will be public, but one part may remain secret. Because as soon as we're dealing with investigations or information from an outside source—as you pointed out, as occurred in the case of the Arar inquiry or information about Omar Khadr—we will come up against the national security argument.
I would challenge any lawyer, and I say good luck to anybody who tries to show that the information was obtained through torture. There is a high probability that such information was in fact obtained through torture. In my opinion, the problem is not so much the imminence factor as it is the probability or reasonability of the imminence factor. It is the lowering of the burden of proof which is important.