An example, Mr. Chair and Mr. Garrison, is that if an individual who is incarcerated had—unrelated to the reasons why he was incarcerated—been in a motor vehicle accident and injured me or my client, and has insurance, and I successfully sue that individual, I have a judgment against that individual pursuant to my damages for the motor vehicle accident. Let's say this individual suddenly comes into a settlement pursuant to—I don't know—maybe his suit against the director of CSC for mistreatment while he's inside prison.
So if paragraph (d) is in place, I, on behalf of the motor vehicle injury victim, can attach the proceeds he gets from his successful lawsuit against the director of CSC. If Mr. Garrison deletes paragraph (d), the only things that are covered are child support, spousal support, restitution, and victim surcharges.
So you're quite right. Ms. Hoeppner's quite right: it narrows it significantly for other classes of legitimate victims that the sponsor of this bill clearly intended.