Public Safety Committee on Oct. 15th, 2012

[Ryan Leef, Conservative, Yukon, YT]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all our witnesses today.

On the modernization aspect of the bill, I was going to ask a question about one of the recommendations that came from the RCMP's Reform Implementation Council's fourth report. That report highlighted a program, the RCMP reserve program, which uses retired officers to provide backfill capacity and mentor younger members. From my experience in the RCMP, the mentorship program was invaluable. I certainly see that representing the Yukon, where they use a reserve program a fair bit for longer stretches of time to provide necessary relief to a lot of our remote communities.

My understanding right now is that reservists who are hired on short-term contracts have frequent downtime mixed up in that to conform with pension rules. It prohibits the longer-term or progressive use of that reservist program. It seems to me that might be a little cumbersome, having a member on for six months, then giving them some time off, and then getting them back on for another six months. It creates some challenges, particularly in rural and remote Canada, where we are using them for relief, or where you want to continue or extend a mentorship program, and you want to maintain that continuity without a break. Am I reading this right? Is that how that works? Is how that system works a cumbersome obligation for the RCMP right now?

[C/Supt Craig MacMillan]

That is. I will let Superintendent O'Rielly address that. He has a little more detail on it.

[Superintendent Michael O'Rielly, Director, Legislative Reform Initiative, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The RCMP reserve program itself has been in operation since approximately 2004, and it's been run on a pilot basis for the last few years. It is an incredibly useful tool in terms of backfilling vacancies and being able to provide the seniority that sometimes can be lacking, especially in some of our smaller or more remote areas.

The challenge you speak of, the way the program is administered, has to do with a lack of clarity, if you will, between the way the reservists are appointed and a particular statement under the RCMP Superannuation Act. Reservists are right now hired for a period of three years. However, that three years is broken up into periods of six months less a day, and at the end of six months less a day, a reservist is required to take a two-week cessation period.

The idea of that is to ensure there is no mix-up between being appointed under the RCMP Act and then the RCMP Superannuation Act. The RCMP Superannuation Act says that if a person is appointed under the RCMP Act but is not appointed as a member—and this is an incredibly important point, because reservists aren't appointed as members, they're appointed as reservists—they are appointed as an employee in the public service. It becomes confusing in terms of trying to administer the program. If we have someone who has worked for six months plus one day, does that mean they're no longer a reservist but instead they are now a public service employee?

This lack of clarity has caused issues in terms of the administration of the program. It does impact our ability to deploy for greater than six months. There is also the question, if someone were to work for six months plus a day, of whether that would have an impact on their benefits, for example, pension allotments or entitlements.

There is some clarity required around that particular question.

[Ryan Leef, Conservative, Yukon, YT]

Okay.

Everybody here at the table has worked heavily with this piece of legislation. Obviously, from your indication, you'd probably be amiable to us considering some form of amendment to clear that up.

Has anybody on your side worked on any sort of amendment, or do you have any ideas on how we can sharpen that up a little for your benefit?

[Supt Michael O'Rielly]

The opportunity would be to ensure that notwithstanding that particular subsection of the RCMP Superannuation Act, which is subsection 3(3), a person who is appointed as a reservist is not to be considered a public service employee.

[Ryan Leef, Conservative, Yukon, YT]

Okay. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Two minutes.

[Ryan Leef, Conservative, Yukon, YT]

There's a bit of discussion around the impartiality and lack of bias that's important with the changes in the act. We're talking, generally speaking, about community and the public's perception of the investigations. It would be just as important that members of the RCMP feel there's impartiality and lack of bias in the process if they're subject to an investigation.

I'm speaking from a rural region of Canada, where sometimes rumours can turn into fact really quickly and they supercede any kind of investigative work that is going on. It doesn't matter what the outcome of the RCMP's investigation is; the public don't necessarily believe that. I think some front-line members might be concerned that because of that public input and pressure they may not be subject to an impartial investigation.

What kinds of things are in the act to ensure—I guess with the independent body, this might answer the question itself—that an independent review might allow for both public confidence and front-line member confidence in the investigative process, which sometimes can have its own wings in the small regions of our country?

Any comments on that?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Leef.

[Mark Potter]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think the member's question gets at some of the fundamental principles that underlie this legislation. Arguably, one of the most important and fundamental roles of government is to provide public safety, and in that context having a policing service that enjoys the confidence of the people is absolutely essential. Measures such as this get at an issue where....

Particularly in some other countries, police investigating police has been considered to be done inappropriately and has led to loss of confidence in the police service. That can have a very negative effect on the officers themselves, which is exactly what you're saying. The members themselves are often the strongest advocates for wanting to ensure there is a completely unbiased process. Even though they feel in many respects that they do these investigations in an impartial way, they know that public perception is very important, so addressing that perception is important for them to be able to retain the confidence of the people they serve.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Potter.

We'll welcome Madame St-Denis here today. Welcome to the committee. She's a new member, filling in for Mr. Scarpaleggia.

You have seven minutes.

[Lise St-Denis, Liberal, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

Thank you.

I will ask a couple of questions that may already have been answered, since I am only here temporarily. I have three brief questions.

On page 8, it says that the new commission will have strengthened investigative powers similar to that of a superior court of record. Who will sit on this commission?

We have seen this in the employment insurance bill. Judicial power was simply transferred to a committee or a commission. So who will sit on this commission? Is it a matter of transferring judicial power?

[Mark Potter]

Thank you very much.

In terms of the composition of the commission itself, Bill C-42 allows for the appointment of a chairperson, as well as up to four additional members of the commission. These are Governor in Council appointments by the government, and these are the individuals who will lead that organization and have certain powers within the context of the act.

To support these individuals there is a public agency that is made up of some 40 to 50 individuals. I believe you'll be hearing this week from Mr. McPhail, who's the current interim chair of the commission, and he can give you more details. It's a fairly robust body that exists to provide the support to conduct the investigations and to compile the information on complaints. That's the office in Ottawa.

In Surrey, B.C., they have an intake office that works with complainants to process the complaints and ensures that particularly those individuals who may not understand the process very well or need support can be assisted in preparing their written complaints so they can be submitted and reviewed by this agency.

These public servants form the bulk of the agency, conduct the investigations, and develop the reports, but ultimately, it is the chair, appointed by the government and acting independently within its legal mandate, that approves those reports and submits them.

[Lise St-Denis, Liberal, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

When I read what is on page 4, I was very surprised to learn that during the first stage of the public complaints process, as few as 15% of complaints were resolved.

The new bill—

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Madame St-Denis, we're having a problem with our translation. Nothing's coming through here.

[Lise St-Denis, Liberal, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

I apologize.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

That sounds better. All right, please continue. Sorry for the interruption.

[Lise St-Denis, Liberal, Saint-Maurice—Champlain, QC]

I was surprised to learn that only 15% of complaints were resolved. Do you think that the new bill or the new structure will improve the situation? Fifteen per cent is not very high, given that this is a basic process.

[Mark Potter]

Thank you very much.

You will have a great opportunity when you hear from the commission itself, the current CPC, I believe later this week or soon, about some of their statistics on complaints.

This regime builds on the existing regime, and under both regimes, in the first instance, when an incident happens and a member of the public wishes to make a complaint, they can go through three doors: they can complain directly to the RCMP; they can complain to the Commission for Public Complaints; or they can complain to the provincial complaint body. In doing that, although there are three means by which the complaint is submitted, normally in the first instance the RCMP itself would investigate that complaint. There may be exceptions to that depending on the nature of the incident, but in the vast majority of cases the RCMP would conduct the investigation.

The rationale behind that is that many of these complaints are fairly minor. I guess that would be one way to describe them. There might be concerns about the attitude of the officer involved, or there might have been a misunderstanding regarding the number of investigative resources that would be applied to the case. Often through a discussion directly with the RCMP and the RCMP member involved, the matter can be resolved informally and both parties can walk away quite satisfied that they understand what happened and they're comfortable with the outcome.

The first instance is to have the RCMP investigate the matter. What happens in that figure you were referring to is that in 85% of all those instances where the RCMP reviews the matter, the individuals involved are satisfied with the outcome and there is no role for a further review by the independent complaints investigation body.

In the 15% left over, the complainant is told that if he's not happy with how this matter was handled, he has the option of having this matter investigated by the independent complaints review body, and they will conduct that investigation. They can do the investigation directly. They can ask the RCMP to do further investigation around it, or they could do both. The goal is to get all the information relative to the matter, and if they, in conducting their own independent investigation, reach a different conclusion from the one the RCMP reached, they will convey that to the RCMP and say here's the interim report on this matter—here's what they found; here's what they recommend. The Commissioner of the RCMP will have an opportunity to consider that interim report.

In the vast majority of cases, the commissioner will accept the independent findings and recommendations of the independent body and will proceed on that basis, which often involves some kind of corrective action, for example, training of an RCMP member, reminding him or her of certain policies and procedures to follow in certain instances. The RCMP will typically be in concurrence with the findings and recommendations.

If, in those rare instances, the commissioner feels on some basis that he does not agree with those independent findings and recommendations, he has the opportunity to provide his views in writing back to the independent review body prior to its finalizing the report. The independent review body will take those comments and input from the commissioner into account and may find that adds some useful information for the investigation, or it may find that it doesn't add useful information and it may continue to believe that the matter needs to be handled in a certain way; it will convey that through its findings and recommendations, and that final report will go to the commissioner, to the minister, to the RCMP member directly involved, and to the complainant directly involved.

By going to the minister there is the opportunity to make the minister aware, given that he is accountable for the force and can direct the force on any issues that in the minister's view are cause for concern. It is a check and a balance on the powers and authorities of the commissioner, aided by independent findings and recommendations from the review body.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We'll move back to the opposition, and we'll go to Madame Doré Lefebvre.

You have five minutes.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank you for being here to answer our questions. We have several of them, because this is a large bill. I am very pleased to see you here, and to hear your answers to our questions.

I tried to go through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act over the last few days. There is a lot in there.

Bill C-42 contains many amendments to the act. If you could shed some light on a few issues for me, that would be greatly appreciated.

Under the current legislation, the commissioner has the power to hire and fire members. Under Bill C-42, the commissioner would have more power to fire or to sanction a member of the RCMP. I would like to know why this is necessary, since the commissioner already has this kind of power.

[C/Supt Craig MacMillan]

In terms of a dismissal as a result of discipline, the commissioner doesn't do that directly, in the first instance. The adjudication board would have to make a determination that there had to be a dismissal. If the member appealed that decision, it would only be at that point that it would go to the external review committee. They would then make findings and recommendations, and it would come to the commissioner.

In those instances when the adjudication board didn't dismiss the member, there is no right of appeal for the manager. That's where the case stops. In that instance, the commissioner would not have the authority to effectively make the final determination on whether that employee should be dismissed, because there is no appeal authority there.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Therefore, without a recommendation to the commissioner, the commissioner will not have the power to dismiss that person. A recommendation must absolutely be made. Is that correct?

[C/Supt Craig MacMillan]

No.

I'll keep my answer in the discipline realm.

If you have an allegation of misconduct against a member presently, and the appropriate officer, which is the commanding officer of the division, is seeking dismissal—they think that's the correct sanction that ought to be imposed—it's a requirement, under the current act, that there be an adjudication board held. There are three officers. They will hear the evidence. If they find that the misconduct is established, they will then turn to what sanction they would impose.

In the instance where the board says they are not going to fire the member, the manager doesn't have an ability to appeal, and it is effectively terminated there.

If the board does dismiss, and the member appeals, it goes to the ERC. Then it would go to the commissioner, who would have the opportunity to make a decision on whether he or she agreed with the board. Or maybe if the ERC said they thought termination was too harsh, the commissioner ultimately would then have the ability to make the decision.

That's in the area of dismissal.

If you're talking about performance-related matters, there is a legislative process under the RCMP Act. Again, there is a board involved and a decision is made.

The commissioner is not directly making these decisions. These decisions are coming to him, through the final instance, to make a decision, but it really depends on which process you're in.

I wouldn't view it as a situation where the commissioner is actively going out and saying that he or she is hiring someone and then has the ability to necessarily, in all instances, terminate somebody's employment.

[Rosane Doré Lefebvre, NDP, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

I have read the provisions contained in Bill C-42 which would add new ones to the act. I was struck by proposed subsection 4(1), which is on page 16. I will read it out loud, since some of you might not have it on hand:

(4.1) A member is not entitled to have access to a standardized test used by the force, or to information concerning such a test, if in the opinion of the commissioner, its disclosure would affect its validity or continued used or would affect the results of such a test by giving an unfair advantage to any person.

I don't quite understand this subclause as worded in the bill. What is its purpose? What is it going to change or bring about within the RCMP?